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1 Introduction
The conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round and the contemporary proliferation of 
regional trade agreements' will probably be remembered among the major economic- 
related events of the 90’s. The concerns that regionalism may undermine the spirit of 
global free trade, and hence be a stumbling block for a more integrated and successful 
international economy, really signal how trade is still considered a crucial factor for 
economic development. Trade policies have been economists’ object of study since the 
beginning of their science and these new events have stimulated further analyses. The 
view we have of economic development has also been influenced by a third prominent 
event: the 1992 Global Warming Rio meeting. This international conference registered, 
for the first time, the formulation of global policies for sustainable growth and 
environment preservation. It is interesting to note that most of these policies consisted of 
mutual promises and concessions among developed and developing countries, in a very 
similar way to that witnessed at the Uruguay Round.
These main events, their interrelation, the original ideas and policies they produced, 
the new questions they raised, have all motivated this thesis. Its broad objective is to 
contribute to the formulation of new hypotheses on and analyses of North-South 
relations, particularly in respect of trade policy, regional trade agreements and their 
effects, trade and environment linkages, and sustainable growth.
Is the formation of a Free Trade Area between developed and developing countries 
advantageous to all or does it have some conflicting consequences? What is at stake in 
such an agreement in terms of trade creation, trade diversion, consumers’ welfare, 
structural adjustment, growth effects? Are trade liberalisation and growth objectives 
conflicting with environment protection? Or, is an environmental policy too costly in 
terms of growth potential, and does its implementation influence developing countries’
' The most prominent have been NAFTA and Mercosur in the Americas, the EU enlargement to include 
former EFTA countries in Europe, and the expansion and consolidation of the ASEAN group in the Pacific 
region. See, for overviews, Landeck M. (1994), Sapir A. (1992), Yamazawa I. (1992), Brown D„ A.V. 
Deardorflf, and R. Stem (1992).
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comparative advantage in international trade? What are the economists' main analytical 
instruments used in the analysis of the mentioned issues? What data are available for 
empirical analyses? These are among the main questions addressed in this thesis.
Clearly, given the breath of these issues, the analysis presented here had to be 
circumscribed and focused in a number of ways. One restriction has been in terms of the 
geographic area considered. The thesis does not address global issues: the specific 
Mediterranean area has been chosen as the object of study. This area has the main 
advantage of being the point of contact between developed and developing countries, 
moreover it has not been subject of extensive analyses as. for instance, has North 
America.
A second restriction has been on the specific economic policies investigated. The 
thesis thoroughly examines two broad policies: commercial and environmental policies. 
In particular, it analyses the first in the form of the creation of a regional block including, 
on one side, the industrialised European Community, and, on the other, the developing 
countries of North Africa. Additionally, the focus is on the interrelations between trade 
liberalisation and environment protection.
A third restriction on the thesis has been on its analytical approach. The types of 
issues of interest as well as the focus on distributional effects of the policies here 
examined require a system-wide, general equilibrium perspective. Therefore general 
equilibrium analyses are the main analytical tool used throughout the thesis. By providing 
benchmarks and counterfactuals, they allow simulating policies not yet implemented, as 
it is the case in a regional Mediterranean agreement or in a green tax policy. Besides, the 
complex interrelations among the environment, the production structure and trade, where 
direct as well as indirect effects are very important, can be fully captured and explained 
only with a general equilibrium study.
As an introduction to the following chapters and a useful way to outline my analysis 
and my contributions to the economic literature on the mentioned issues, three main 
themes developed throughout this thesis are identified and described below. Their
7
coherence results from the desire to tackle the issues of interest using a common database 
and multi-sectoral, general equilibrium modelling approach. The logical, and practical, 
link among these three themes is given by the strict connection between data and models 
(theme 1), as well as by the crucial relationships among trade, growth, environment, and 
policy sequencing (themes 2 and 3).
1. Data Compilation. Accounting and Multiplier Analysis
The first theme is concerned with data compilation, accounting, and multiplier 
analysis. Given the geographic and analytical focus of my thesis and the lack of good 
basic data, the construction of an updated and extensive new Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) for two representative countries of the Mediterranean area, was the necessary first 
step in my work. This is of fundamental importance: a SAM is the essential database for 
all my subsequent quantitative analyses and the quality and consistency of the SAM data 
affect the intrinsic value of all the results presented here. This new Mediterranean SAM 
is valuable in its own right for providing a "snapshot” of the structure of the subject 
economies and as such represents a part of my original contribution in this thesis.
A full description of the Mediterranean SAM and its preliminary analytical uses are 
therefore provided in the first part of the thesis. Initially, the SAM is used to highlight the 
main characteristics of the relevant economies, and to build a fixed-price model. Then, 
the lengthy and detailed process of the SAM construction is outlined.
The originality of this first part, beyond the provision of a new, informative database, 
is mainly ascribable to the use I make of the fixed-price model. The initial simple 
analytical results granted by this model represent a novel way of describing the basic 
economic structure of the particular region under study and its structural adjustment 
process following an exogenous shock. This preliminary examination reveals several 
important features of the Mediterranean area, for instance its similarities with the 
NAFTA region. It is also considered a very useful precursor to the more complex 
Computable General Equilibrium models. In fact, the demand-driven, fixed-price, fixed
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coefficient (SAM-based2) models may exaggerate quantity adjustments to policy 
changes. However, the market clearing assumptions of CGE models may sometimes 
result in excessive price responsiveness and dampen quantity responses3. It may be that 
the results of SAM-based and CGE models reflect upper and lower bounds on quantity 
and price adjustments in the context of the policy experiments here considered. Although 
the following chapters are not dedicated to a systematic comparison of SAM-based and 
CGE results, by offering both of them, this thesis fills a sort of gap in the economic 
literature that does not usually consider the strict links between these two models 
families.4
Once the SAM has been identified as a key input in the analysis and its basic structure 
as a crucial factor influencing the subsequent results, a natural question arises. How 
might a change in the accounting structure -  for instance in the treatment of imports -  
affect the size of the (fix-price) model multipliers? ThL special case of multiplier 
sensitivity analysis is another contribution of this first part of my thesis. The input-output 
literature considers three main ways of treating imports: (1) classified by purchasers. (2) 
classified by goods (competitive or complementary imports). (3) a separate input-output 
table for imported goods. Clearly, the last, by combining the first two methods, delivers 
more information but it also has demanding statistical requirements. In this thesis, by 
experimenting with a regional fixed price model. I offer a practical way to evaluate the 
information loss of going from the comprehensive accounting structure of (3) to that of
2 In the text I use the expression 'SAM-based model' when I refer to multipliers model, which are an 
evolution of earlier input-output models.
’ This may occur when countries undertake major economic changes and prices, especially those of 
factors of production, are not fully flexible.
4 Usually CGE models are preferred to SAM-based models for the simple reason that the latter do not 
include important supply constraints. In fact by fixing its prices, it would be perfectly possible to force a 
CGE model to emulate a SAM-based one. However, this latter kind of model enjoys some practical 
advantages: they are much simpler to construct and calibrate. Besides, their straightforward structure, by 
highlighting how the simulations results are affected by sectoral production and demand shares, factors' 
intensities, trade dependency ratios, income distribution and other ratios, clearly unveils the key role played 
by these important characteristics of the basic SAM data. In the relevant economic literature, very few 
studies attempt any careful comparison between SAM and CGE models. For an example refer to McGregor 
P.G. and J.K. Swales (1993). In another paper. I. Adelman and J.E. Taylor (1991) argue that "optimally, it 
may be worthwhile to estimate both types of models and test for the robustness of their results." (Page 
167).
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(2). One important conclusion is that this loss is minor, especially in the case where it is 
possible to distinguish between intermediate and final imported goods.
The relevance of this conclusion is not limited to fixed price models and can be easily 
extended to CGE models. In fact, a standard assumption in these models is to have a 
hypothetical "Armington” agent who minimises the cost of demanding a composite good 
subject to some aggregation function of imported and domestic goods. The shares of the 
imported and domestic component of the composite good are calibrated from the base 
year SAM. The ideal situation would be to have a separate input-output table for the 
national and foreign goods (as in (3) above). This in turn would entail having multiple 
"Armington” agents for intermediate and final demands with potentially different 
elasticities of substitutions. Clearly this complicates the analysis in two ways. Firstly, it is 
much more data intensive in terms of the accounting structure of the initial SAM, but also 
in terms of non-SAM parameters, namely the substitution elasticities. Secondly, by 
considerably increasing the number of equations and variables, it may create computation 
problems. A straightforward method to obtain structure (3) from (2), with no additional 
data required, is proposed and tested with the multiplier sensitivity analysis. This method 
has the advantage of providing the necessary data to calibrate the relevant Armington 
equations of a CGE model. Furthermore, the minor loss detected in the size of the 
multipliers -  in the specific regional case examined here -  may justify its application in a 
CGE context and the concomitant single “Armington” agent assumption.
The first part of the thesis is concluded with a detailed description of the 
Mediterranean SAM construction. The general approach to assembling data for the SAM 
is hierarchical. When direct estimates are available from official sources, these are 
incorporated first. The second category of estimates are updates of data from previous 
years. Finally, when data are missing or considered extremely unreliable, indirect 
estimation methods, such as share imputation and matrix balancing, are used. The use of 
these conventions is made explicit at each stage below. By making this construction 
process as transparent as possible, the primary objective of this chapter is to allow an 
assessment of the strengths (and weaknesses) of the empirical models based on the 
Mediterranean SAM. A second objective consists in providing some basic criteria for
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SAM assembling. Although this process can not yet be entirely standardised, the methods 
described there are fairly general and can be considered as guidelines in overcoming the 
most common obstacles.5
2. Trade and the Environment: Are There Policy Trade-offs or Is Co-ordination 
Possible?
The second theme of this thesis is the study, in the specific Mediterranean context, of 
the interdependencies of environmental and commercial policies. Apart from the obvious 
central interest in trade policy, various reasons motivate this theme. Firstly, the possible 
environmental consequences of more liberal trade arrangements have received the 
growing attention of policy-makers. Two recent prominent trade negotiations, the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT and the NAFTA agreement, contain various norms and 
restrictions on the use of environmental policy instruments that may conceal protectionist 
objectives. Secondly, a concomitant interest in this issue in the academic literature has 
been reflected in the large number of papers emerged on the subject. Two basic questions 
on the connections between trade and environmental policy are more often addressed in 
the literature: (1) for developing countries signing trade agreements with more developed 
economies, is specialisation in dirty activities the direct result of the realisation of 
comparative advantage? (2) How do environmental policies, such as abatement taxes, 
influence international competitiveness? Given the lack of robustness of qualitative 
results shown in theoretical work concerning these issues, most recent studies have been 
focused on measuring quantitatively the interconnections between trade and the 
environment. My contribution is in this line of investigation. By using a CGE model of 
Morocco I am able to carry out a detailed quantitative analysis of the linkages between 
economic activity and the environment in this Mediterranean country and to evaluate the 
joint impact of environmental and commercial policies.
Three main aspects of the CGE model presented in this thesis account for its 
originality with respect to previous environment and trade analyses. First, it embodies a
5 This also fills a gap in the literature on applied economics. Basically the only published work I could 
find on SAM building is that of S. Keuning and W. de Ruijter (1988).
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high level of disaggregation for pollutants, products, sectors and types of households. 
This model can be used to simulate abatement policies targeted to specific air emissions, 
measuring, at the same time, the effect on related water and soil pollutants. Trade policy 
reforms, and the related resource reallocation, do not have uniform outcomes across 
sectors. The expansions or contractions of specific activities have differentiated 
environmental consequences. The product disaggregation of the model allows 
highlighting specific environmental outcomes of trade policy. Moreover, income 
distribution issues arising from environmental and commercial policies, and the question 
of the redistribution of environmental taxes receipts, are briefly discussed and can be 
further investigated due to the detailed classification scheme of households. Second, this 
model explicitly includes dynamic features. Its simulations run to year 2004, allowing the 
introduction of exogenous factors such as productivity shifts and demographic changes 
that affect capital accumulation and growth trajectory. Comparing the trends of outputs 
and emissions derived from different scenarios reveals the dynamic interdependencies of 
environmental and commercial policies. Third, most economy-wide studies on growth 
and environment linkages rely on effluent intensities associated with output, and do not 
allow for substitution between non-polluting and polluting factors. Abating pollution is 
then achieved principally by reducing output in pollution intensive sectors, with a 
significant cost in terms of growth. By contrast, in the current model pollution emissions 
are linked to polluting input use, rather than output. Technical adjustment by substituting 
non-polluting factors to polluting factors may therefore be assessed.
3. Mediterranean Economic Integration
The third and last main theme developed in this research completes the empirical 
analysis of the Mediterranean economic integration by offering an assessment of the 
effects of the trade policy reforms currently discussed for this geographic area. The theme 
is developed in two parts. In the first, the economic benefits of further integration in 
terms of increased welfare, trade and growth rates are assessed using a multi-country 
CGE model. In the second, the recursive dynamic version of the same model is used to 
extend the discussion of the sequencing issue o f trade reforms.
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The novelty of this work is not limited to its geographic focus but rests on the model 
structure, principally its trade equations and its labour market alternative closures, and on 
the distinct use I made of the model for the sequencing issue. The present model differs 
from conventional CGE specifications in important ways. First, it is a detailed and 
complete two-countrv model, so domestic supply, demand, and bilateral trade for the two 
Mediterranean countries are fully endogenous at a 24-sector level of aggregation. 
Moreover, each country's import and export flows with the rest of the world are further 
spatially disaggregated into flows with the European Union and the other countries. The 
extent of price adjustments, as well as the volume and pattern of trade creation and trade 
diversion, are important factors in determining the ultimate welfare and resource 
allocation effects of multilateral trade policy, and are fully assessed by the present model 
in the case of a FTA trade liberalisation.
The main results confirm the findings of previous studies concerned with similar set­
up of trade integration among partners at different levels of development. The 
comparative static simulations of the removal of trade barriers show considerable gains 
whose magnitude is directly linked to the initial level of protection, trade dependency and 
relative size of the economies participating in the regional agreement. Extended 
discussions of the implications of different closures for the labour markets and of the 
possible limitations of the Armington and Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) 
assumptions for the trade equations complete the analysis.
An additional objective of this last part consists of extending the literature on the 
sequencing issue of trade reforms. The economic literature on this topic is mainly 
devoted to establishing the correct order of liberalisation between the current and capital 
account and, surprisingly, it neglects the problem of sequencing among the sectors of the 
current account. In fact, adjustment costs generated by the non-instantaneous realignment 
of goods and factor prices represent a major concern of policy makers when 
implementing more liberal commercial policies. By using a recursive dynamic version of 
the multi-country CGE model, a comparison of trade reforms, which differ in their 
liberalisation sequence, is presented with an estimation of their effects in terms of 
adjustment costs and growth rates.
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The thesis is structured into eight additional chapters as follows.
The next chapter presents a brief introduction to the Euro-Mediterranean economic 
relationship and to some background studies of this geographic area.
Chapter 3. by using a fixed price multiplier model, analyses the original two-country 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) constructed for this research thesis. The multiplier 
decomposition method is also originally employed to assess the validity of more data 
intensive formats of the reference SAM.
Chapter 4 should be considered as an extended technical appendix. It describes in 
detail the methodology and data sources for the construction of the SAM. Although no 
crucial research results are presented, this chapter has been included to allow an appraisal 
of the strengths (and weaknesses) of the empirical models built on these data.
Chapter 5 investigates the linkages between trade and environment with a single­
country CGE model. A detailed examination of the possible specialisation in dirty 
industries induced by trade liberalisation, or the loss o f competitiveness following the 
implementation of domestic environmental taxes is carried out, and encouraging 
conclusions on the co-ordination of trade and environmental policies are reached. Chapter 
6 is effectively the technical appendix of the previous chapter. It presents the complete 
algebraic structure and main assumptions on the exogenous variables of the model used.
Chapter 7 is the concluding research chapter. Here a two-country CGE model is 
applied to study the economic benefits (or costs) of trade policy reforms currently 
discussed for the Mediterranean area. An extension to the sequencing issue of trade 
reforms is also presented. Chapter 8 describes the differences of this model's equations 
from those of the previous model.
Chapter 9 contains the main research findings and conclusions reached in the 
previous chapters, and indicates future developments of the present research.
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2 Setting the Stage: the Mediterranean Economic Area
From earliest antiquity to the 15th century, the Mediterranean was the centre o f that 
part o f the ancient world situated to the west o f India and China. It was here, around 
the eastern basin o f the Sea (Egypt, Babylonia. Persia, Phoenicia and Greece) that 
the earliest civilisations appeared. From the time o f Alexander the Great's 
conquests, Hellenism gave the region a common imprint. Then within the 
framework o f  unification under Rome, this civilisation was gradually transferred to 
the people o f  North Africa and northwest Europe. Thus the foundations were laid 
upon which the medieval worlds o f  Christendom and Islam were later built. For 
1,000 years there was a constellation o f  societies bound to one another by organic 
ties o f  culture and ideology and technological and commercial exchanges to such an 
extent that it became possible to speak o f a system. Some o f the key features of 
capitalism (commodity exchange and merchant capital, free wage labour, private 
ownership o f the land and enterprise) appeared in the region at an early date and. at 
some periods - notably during the early centuries o f Islam and at the time of 
expansion o f  the Italian cities (between the 12th and 14th centuries) - became 
distinguishing features o f segments o f this system, so much so that the 
"Mediterranean system” can be seen as prehistoric ancestor o f the world system of 
modem capitalism.[...]
The Mediterranean region was [later] transformed into a periphery as the capitalist 
system developed. Later, the southern Arab shore was even colonized, while the 
formation o f the bourgeois national state in Italy and the Balkans meant that obvious 
traces o f underdevelopment persisted. The Mediterranean ceased to belong to the 
people living along its shores and became a geostrategic region for others, 
dominated by the egemonic power, first Great Britain, then the United States and 
later the USSR.
From: The Mediterranean. Between Autonomy and Dependency. Faysal Yachir
This chapter presents a brief survey of earlier analyses of the Mediterranean 
economic area, and a compact statistical overview of the main economic relationships 
between its northern and southern shores. This should provide the necessary introduction 
to my study by pointing out strengths and weaknesses of previous approaches, 
summarising the main results achieved so far, and identifying research potential. This, in 
turn, should help to put my own work and contribution in perspective.
According to their main subject of analysis, it is possible to divide the literature 
concerning the economic relationship between Mediterranean countries (the South) and 
the European Community (the North) into three main categories. The first category 
focuses on the economic effect of preferential trade agreements, the second on the
15
economic effect of the Single European Market (1992 effect), and the third on the 
possible economic consequences of further integration.
This categorisation follows a logical as well as a chronological order. In fact the EC 
international policy has evolved from its initial stages of trade preference agreements, 
through three enlargements and the 1992 process, to its future possible extensions. 
Economic analysis of these issues has evolved too. Earlier studies focused on simple 
measurements of trade flows indices, some considered merely commodities flows while 
others added factors flows. More recent studies used econometric models, mainly of the 
partial equilibrium variety. Another branch of applied research has employed computable 
general equilibrium models. An important advantage of this approach derives from the 
possibility of simulating the effects of policies not yet implemented: it does not rely on an 
ex-post approach and on the availability of time series data. In fact a formal analysis of 
regional integration, one of the major themes of this thesis, can only be carried out with 
analytical tools capable of considering counter-factuals.
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first .three deal with the three 
categories defined above. The last, divided into two parts, describes the evolution of trade 
and labour flows in the Mediterranean region in the last two decades, and, by presenting 
comparable statistics, contrasts the Mediterranean situation with that of NAFTA.
2.1 The Economic Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements
Despite the multilateral approach to tariff reductions fostered by GATT talks, the 
preferential tariff treatment of exports of developing countries has become a common 
feature of the international trading system. This regional approach to trade policy has 
been extensively used by the European Union.
The economic literature that addresses the question of whether regional arrangements 
are stumbling blocks or building blocks for a more integrated and successful international 
economy offers mixed evidence.6 In a recent paper, P. Krishna7 incorporates political 
economy factors in a model of trade with imperfect competition in segmented markets.
6 See J. Bhagwati ( 1993. and 1992), J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya ( 1996), A. Winters (1996), and R.Z. 
Lawrence ( 1996).
7P. Krishna (1996).
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and reaches two conclusions. First, preferential arrangements, which divert trade away 
from the rest of the world, are more likely to be supported politically, and second, such 
preferential arrangements will reduce member country incentives for multilateral 
liberalisation. In a survey of studies on trade preferences for developing countries, D. 
Brown presents another point of view8. She lists four justifications for this special 
treatment: the first is that "equal treatment of unequals is inherently unequal", in other 
words developing countries should be exempt from requirements of reciprocity and 
multilateralism. The second argument is that trade preferences are expected to stimulate 
local processing and help diversify the economies of developing countries. Third, 
stimulated exports should provide needed foreign exchange for exchange constrained 
economies. Finally, preferences are often offered to obtain political influence or to 
increase economic stability in a volatile region of the world.
It seems that extra-economic reasons (mainly political) are needed to justify the 
regional approach. And this is especially true for Europe whose main political instrument 
available to influence international affairs has always been its trade policy.9 Since its 
creation, the Community has built a very complex and extended system of preferential 
trade agreements.
To illustrate this system it is useful to depict the hierarchy of trade preferences as 
follows:
1. The Lome' Convention (which substituted the Younde' Convention after the UK 
accession) ACP GROUP 69 Countries:
46 African 
IS Caribbean 
8 Pacific
2. Association Agreement - providing eventual full EC membership:
Cyprus, Turkey, Malta
* D. Brown (1988), but see also D. Brown (1989).
’ In Yannopoulos' words: “Not wishing to emulate the patterns of influence exercised by the traditional 
superpowers and not possessing the diplomatic and military means with which this influence is 
underpinned, the Community has preferred to rely on trade links as a key factor in enabling it to play a 
balancing role and promoting conditions of lasting social and economic and hence political stability in 
those regions". See G.N. Yannopoulos (1977).
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3. Preferential trade and Co-operation Agreement:
Maghreb (Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia)
Mashraq (Egypt. Jordan. Lebanon. Syria)
Israel
Yugoslavia
4. Generalised System o f Preferences:
42 Developing countries (not covered by above)
9 Least Developed countries (not covered by above)
Hong Kong, Macao
Bulgaria. Hungary. Mongolia, Poland.
Clearly, historical ties, such as the colonial heritage of France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom, and the desire to obtain international influence have 
been the main factors that shaped the development of this system of hierarchical 
preferences.
This is of special significance for the Mediterranean countries towards which the 
European Community has demonstrated special interest and special responsibility. In 
fact, the place of the Mediterranean countries in the European Community's network of 
preferential trading arrangements10 *is not only privileged, in the sense of being near the 
top of the hierarchy, but is also qualitatively different from that of the Community's other 
special arrangements because of the blatancy with which the Community's Mediterranean 
policy contravenes the letter and practice of the GATT.
One important conclusion of a series of early studies" is that the European 
Community offered preferences to the Mediterranean countries according to a political 
strategy while the Mediterranean countries accepted the terms for economic reasons.12
Various methods have been employed to analyse the consequences of trade 
preferences, the most important of which are: (1) examination of the evolution of market
10 The Mediterranean policy can be broadly identified with levels (2) and (3) in the above scheme.
" R. Pomffet(l981, 1982. I986a,b).
13 A more detailed history of the Mediterranean agreements is found in A. Roe (1992a), A. Roe and M.A. 
Ayub (1992b), G.N. Yannopoulos (1989), R. Pomffet ( 1981. 1982. 1986a,b) and various documents of the 
Commission of the European Communities.
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shares for preferred and non-preferred suppliers; (2) statistical regression analysis; (3) 
partial equilibrium analysis in which imports from beneficiaries and non beneficiaries are 
usually treated as imperfect substitutes; (4) general equilibrium models, which try to 
avoid some of the shortcomings of the partial equilibrium analysis by considering indirect 
effects and interactions between different markets.
No general consensus about the effects of preferential treatment of developing 
countries’ exports emerges. Authors present different findings according to which 
aggregation of countries or products, or which time period is considered, or which 
method is used.13
As far as the specific Mediterranean area is concerned the picture is not much clearer. 
In this case, even the mere distinction between a developed and developing region seems 
complicated by the entry in the Community of three Mediterranean countries: Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. This deeply changed the Community making it much more 
Mediterranean, and transforming it into an agricultural superpower. Moreover, the 
inclusion of two additional ex-colonial powers broadened the Community economic 
interests in different areas of the world.14 These new features had a strong influence on 
the Mediterranean policy; thus studies concerned with it in the period before the 
Enlargement are not strictly comparable with those dealing with the situation post- 
Enlargement.
A number of studies on preferences and trade for the Mediterranean countries are 
briefly reviewed below.
One of the earliest attempts to quantify the impact of Common Market preference for 
the Mediterranean countries was by McQueen (1976). The purpose of his research was 
to estimate the commodity trade effects of agreements concluded with Greece, Turkey, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Spain and Israel. It considered the effects only on these countries and 
ignored those on the Community or third countries. It analysed the possible effects of the 
agreements on the commodity concentration/diversification of exports and on the
13 For instance D. Brown (1988) concludes that on balance the Lomé Convention appears to have done 
little to stimulate industrialisation of the beneficiaries through export incentives, whereas M. McQueen 
(1992) argues that there is some evidence that the Lomé preferences have been helpful - and that - there is 
also evidence that imperfections in the convention have been a constraint on more rapid diversification.
14 A. Tovias (1977. 1990a).
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structure of production, employment and incomes of the Mediterranean countries. Very 
simple measures were considered of the effects of the Agreements on total commodity 
exports and imports, such as the rate of growth of exports and imports with the EEC 
before and after the negotiation of the agreement.15 To identify the extent to which the 
growth of exports to the EEC was due to the growth of demand for imports by the EEC. 
he then deflates the rate of growth of exports to the EEC by the rate of growth of imports 
by the EEC from other LDCs (excluding oil-exporters). The extent to which this ratio 
[ratio 1] exceeds unity indicates that the countries receiving preference increased their 
share of EEC imports from developing countries. Additionally, to test whether 
preference-receiving countries recorded an acceleration in export growth rates due to a 
possible increased ability to supply goods on a competitive basis (independent from the 
agreement), the rate of growth of exports from the preference area to the rest of the world 
is deflated by the rate of growth exports by other LDCs to the rest of the world (Row) 
[ratio 2], The extent to which [ratio 1] exceeds [ratio 2] is an indication of the beneficial 
effects of the agreement on the exports of the preference receiving countries. From 
McQueen’s findings it appears that all six countries have recorded growth rates of 
exports to the EEC substantially higher than could be expected either from the growth of 
imports from developing countries as a whole or from any improvement in their 
competitive position in world markets. The substantial residual element in the growth of 
exports to the Community is therefore attributed to the third potentially important 
determinant, namely the beneficial effects of the agreements.16
The main result of the second part of his study, the analysis of commodity 
concentration, is that the agreements appear not to have had any marked effect in
15 M. McQueen actually warns that these measures are subject to problems of interpretation and in 
general are of limited use. The tendency to an acceleration in these rates of growth after the signatures is 
not simply attributable to the agreement but may have been the result of an increase in the rate o f growth of 
demand for imports by the Community that would have taken place irrespective of trade preferences, or of 
improved ability of the Mediterranean countries to compete both in world markets and in the EEC. To 
overcome these limitations, he proposes other measures such as: the change in the proportion of exports to 
the EEC with respect to total exports, or the variations in the balance of trade.
16 M. McQueen recognises that there are several possible criticisms of this method: firstly, it operates at 
an overly high level of aggregation (total imports, exports, "EEC”, "other LCD's", "Row"); secondly, it 
assumes that the whole of the residual element in the growth of Mediterranean countries trade with the EEC 
can be attributed to the agreement: thirdly, the results obtained are sensitive to the time period: and finally 
there is no proper countcrfactual scenario addressing the issue of would have been the most likely level of 
exports to and from the EEC by the Mediterranean countries in the absence of an agreement.
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lowering the commodity concentration of Mediterranean exports to the EC. This leaves 
the less developed Mediterranean countries still dependent on a few primary products, the 
only significant exception being Spain.17 In his final part he briefly offers some evidence 
of the possible effect of an increase in the capacity to import on the level of investment, 
and thus on the growth rate, of the Mediterranean economies.
In a series of econometric studies, R. Pomfret18 analyses similar questions 
considering smaller aggregates (a smaller group of countries and different types of 
goods). He investigates the consequences of preferences not only for trade but also for 
factor flows. As far as trade is concerned, Pomfret's main conclusion is that preferential 
access to the community markets did stimulate exports from the Mediterranean 
countries.19 By showing that the European effective rate of protection (i.e. the protection 
granted to value added) is on average around 20 per cent,20 he denies the general view 
according to which previous multilateral tariff negotiations had reduced the developed 
countries' MFN tariffs to such low levels that the effect of any preference would be 
trivial. He also suggests that the existence of a preferential trade agreement has at times 
inhibited the community's use o f non-tariff barriers. He bases his analyses on both 
national case studies21 *and on specific commodities (textiles and clothing) cross-section 
regressions. Despite the more detailed picture offered, especially for the products 
analysis, Pomfret's study still suffers from not specifying the counter-factual situation 
precisely. As far as factor flows are concerned, Pomfret predicts that increased trade 
flows due to preferential agreements should reduce flows of factors of production but, in
17 McQueen's analysis is based on a Gini-Hirschman coefficient, defined as
value of country j's exports.
"  See footnote 11 and R. Pomffet (1986c).
19 This conclusion is actually qualified by the author in the sense that, it is difficult to isolate the impact of 
preference from that of other simultaneous changes; and there's also the difficulty that preferences will only 
stimulate exports under favourable domestic conditions.
30 This calculation is made for the year 1984 when the Community's average nominal tariff was below
10% .
31 For two single countries - Greece and Turkey; for an homogeneous group - the Maghreb; and for a 
residual group of other Mediterranean countries.
where: X,j = value of country j's exports of commodity i, and X, = total
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one important respect, capital movements may be stimulated, and reflected in European 
investment in export-oriented industries in low-wage countries.22
The last interesting issue raised by Pomfret is that of the effect of the second 
Enlargement"3 and the consequent erosion of preferences. His findings confirm that the 
second Enlargement should not have great effects on manufactured goods but much 
greater erosion of the value of preference is possible for agricultural products. Using a 
similarity-index to compare exports of the other Mediterranean countries to the exports of 
primary products from Greece, Portugal and Spain, the author finds that the outsiders 
whose exports are most similar to those of these three new members, and that will be 
most susceptible to erosion of preferences, are Cyprus and Turkey, the Maghreb countries 
(especially Morocco) and Israel.
To conclude, the Global Mediterranean Policy achievements for non-member 
Mediterranean countries have been scant. This is argued to be the consequence of three 
problems. First, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has become increasingly 
protectionist. Second, despite the general principle of free access - that is, no custom 
duties or quantitative restrictions on industrial products - the EC has in reality adopted a 
protectionist attitude especially for textiles. Finally, the extension of initial concessions to 
other countries and the Enlargement of the EC have eroded the magnitude of the 
preferences.
2.2 The Economic Effect of the Single European Market (1992 effect)
The second important issue, which is analysed by the literature on the economic 
relationships between the EC and the Mediterranean countries, is that of the external 
consequences of the formation of a Single Market in Europe. Any discussion of future 
trade relations between developing countries and the EC should start by considering the 
potential benefit and harm caused by European integration. Increased access to the 
European markets is one of the main interests pursued by North African countries in their 
foreign economic policy. In fact, the proposed trade agreements between Europe and 23
23 The experience of Spain, Portugal and Greece is a clear example of capital inflows preceding or 
accompanying measures of trade liberalization, that in these cases are connected with the entry in the BC.
22 Second Enlargement: Greece; third Enlargement: Spain and Portugal.
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North Africa, discussed at length in this thesis, can be seen as an attempt of the 
Mediterranean developing countries of strengthening their preferential treatment vis a vis 
an increasingly integrated Europe.
This section presents a very brief survey of theoretical, as well as empirical issues, 
related to the "1992 effect". It starts by identifying what constitutes a 1992 policy 
measure, it then looks at what effect these reforms have in the EC (internal effect). and 
considers what are the possible spill-overs for non member countries (external effect). 
Finally some empirical estimates of the external effect are presented.
The Completion o f the European Internal Market
Despite the fact that the European Community (at least its greater part) has 
constituted a Customs Union for 30 years its internal market remains fragmented rather 
than integrated. For this reason nearly 300 separate directives have been produced to 
facilitate the free movement of goods, services and factors of production, and eventually 
to create a Single Market. Specifically, 1992 entails two broad kinds o f policy 
measures:24 (1) the removal of barriers to trade between member states of the EC; and (2) 
the implementation of legislation designed to improve the competitiveness of EC firms.25 
For our purposes, this discrimination can be enough to identify the main internal and 
external consequences.26
Internal Impact
The first objective of the '92 program was to achieve for Europe (of the Twelve) 
increased incomes and further economic growth.
There is broad agreement among analysts on the positive effects that can be expected 
from 92: comparative advantage and economies of scale can be better exploited, and 
competition between firms of different member states will increase. This qualitative
24 See A. Winters (1991, 1992a, and 1992b).
25 For instance labour and capital mobility, stimulation of EC R & D. competition policy, etc.
2<< A more detailed description of individual policies can be found in Page (1991a and 1991b) and 
Greenaway (1991), where the authors describe EC-92 and legal barriers to movement of goods, controls on 
intra-EC transport, border controls, market access in services (financial services, transport, public 
procurement), agreement on, or mutual recognition of, standards, fiscal harmonisation, regulation of 
business practices, factor mobility, development assistance, commercial policy, monetary union.
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assessment stems from traditional Customs Union theory27, its extensions28, and also 
from more recent developments o f international trade theory.
In Viner' s traditional analysis of trade creation and diversion it is assumed that 
markets are perfectly competitive and internationally segmented. Thus prices are equal 
to marginal costs and competitiveness is increased by the same proportion as the 
reduction of internal barriers: comparative advantage is the only mechanism at work. 
Looking, however, at the already quite low intra-EC trade barriers (between 1% and 2% 
of the gross value of trade), and considering the intra-industry nature of most of the 
commercial relations among Member States, traditional analysis would suggest only 
minor trade reorientation.
Integration in the presence o f  economies of scale has been analysed by Corden 
(1972), who introduced the concepts of cost reduction and trade suppression. In his 
model, firms from different member States compete for the whole market of the Union; 
eventually, the most efficient increase their scale, thus decreasing their costs, and forcing 
the least efficient to exit the market. Despite such cost reduction, these newly established 
Union firms are unable to match world prices and still require external protection, for. if 
this was not the case, they could have expanded before establishing the Union by 
exporting what it was not possible to sell domestically. This implies that import- 
competing firms can not become exporting ones after completing the internal market yet 
they are now able to completely dominate the internal market: the Union's existing 
imports are therefore eliminated (trade suppression). This model applies to homogenous 
goods and does not consider problems of market structure; its main results are. once 
again, specialisation and increased intra-community trade.
Patterns of trade may change more dramatically once imperfectly competitive 
markets enter the picture. In this framework, even with homogenous goods, it is possible 
for firms in different member states to price discriminate between markets.29 When 
barriers are reduced, competition increases, price-cost margins will diminish, and the 
enhanced openness of markets may reduce costs if scale increases. With differentiated
27 J. Viner (1950).
21 See W.M.Corden (1972).
29 See Brander and Krugman (1983) model on reciprocal dumping.
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products, these effects can be even larger; in this case import competing firms may 
become exporters (trade reversal). The first application of these ideas to a model aimed 
at measuring the internal effect of 1992 is by Smith and Venables (1988). Winters, in his 
overview (1991), identifies two possible extensions to this simple model of reciprocal 
dumping in which the number of varieties of each good can be variable and the 
possibility of integrated markets can be included. These have controversial effects on 
competition and therefore on trade patterns; few empirical studies have been made.
To summarise, more specialisation and increasing competition are expected to lead to 
lower costs and prices, higher productivity, and expanded incomes.
A detailed analysis of the different quantitative estimates of how much prices will fall 
and incomes rise is beyond this section' objectives, however, it is worth mentioning that 
the EC's preferred estimate for the increase in income is about 5% over five years.30
External Effect
Two distinct questions deserve attention in the study of the external effect of EC-92.31 
The first concerns the direct and indirect effects observable in non-member countries due 
to changes within Europe. The second deals with the international system of economic 
relations that may originate after the completion of the Single European Market, in 
particular the new European external trade policy and the potential response of non-EC 
countries.
Since there is no firm consensus on the magnitude of variations in European prices 
and incomes due to the 92 program, no well established results are reached as regards the 
first question.
Trade creation, diversion, suppression, reversal as well as variation in factor flows 
depend -  as described in the previous section -  on historical commercial links, past 
preferential treatment and on assumptions about returns to scale, market structure and the 
new European common external policy.
Aggregate trade effects are fairly easy to predict. If outside economies are small and 
dependent on EC trade, external spill-overs can be quite large even for fairly small gains
10 Baldwin (1989) argues that this measure is too small by a factor of 2, whereas Peck (1989) and 
Backhouse (1991) think it is too large by a factor of 2
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in EC variables; in practice these depend on the proportion of EC trade with third 
countries and the share of exports in the third countries' GDP. The relevant parameters 
are. therefore, the price elasticity of third countries' exports, which measures the 
sensitivity of trade diversion due to a fall in EC prices, and the income elasticity of EC 
demand for third countries' exports, which determines how much trade creation may 
follow an increase in EC incomes. It is also possible to have terms of trade 
improvements, depending on the composition of imports and exports of specific 
countries.
As far as factors of production are concerned, the '92 internal effects are rather 
unclear, which causes uncertainty about the external impact. Growth of intra-EC 
investment is expected, because of both the income growth effect and the competition 
effect (restructuring). This can be financed by EC savings and will probably be orientated 
towards Mediterranean member countries: Spain. Greece and Portugal recorded an 
increase in investment even before their entry.
It should be noted that political economy factors, such- as fears of the so-called 
"Fortress Europe", may induce other developed countries to invest in Europe, thus 
diverting important foreign investment flows from going to developing countries. Some 
authors31 2 consider this investment diversion the most damaging external effect of 1992 
because of its large consequences in the long run. Regional inequalities in employment 
opportunities in the EC combined with the removal of internal barriers concerning labour 
mobility may result in growing pressure for internal migration. At that stage, EC citizens 
would probably receive a better treatment than non-EC migrants. Concerns about a huge 
excess supply of low wage labour from East Europe, combined with enhanced 
competition among European firms that will reduce employment, may be used as 
justifications to implement a tighter migration policy even if internal movements of 
people are negligible.
Specific 92 measures such as fiscal harmonisation, standards, public procurement etc. 
may have effects on trade and on factor markets that differ among countries. A table from 
Page's study, reproduced here, neatly summarises their likely qualitative impact.
31 See Page (1991).
32 See for instance Hughes Hallen (1994).
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Table 2-1: Changes in relative pavilion
N o n -E C Developing M a n u fa c tu re rs
re la tiv e  to  E C re la tiv e  to non exp o rte rs  re la tive
_______ E C  developed_________________ to p r im a ry
In d iv id u a l " 1 9 9 2 "  Changes__________________________
Removing internal legal barriers - 0 -
Removing country preferences 0 0 0
Transport restrictions - - -
Ending border controls - - -
Private services 9 9 o
Public procurement 9 + -
Standards - . 0
Fiscal harmonization + + -
Business regulation 0  or + - +
Monetary Union 9 + +
T o ta l Effects O n  G oods
Increased trade from higher income - - +
Trade diversion - + -
Net effects - 7 9
Effects O n  Inves tm ent
From structural change 9 + +
From increased income - - -
E ffects O n  L a b o u r  _ _______ . _  - -
7
Source: Page ( 199 i f
One single aspect is not included in this otherwise comprehensive table: 
environmental regulation. Explicit emissions targets do not appear in any 92 directive, yet 
environmental standards, such as limitations of the use of certain toxic inputs in food 
products, are taken into account. These regulations may be misused and hence create 
trade discrimination against developing countries. In fact, special rules on these issues 
have been introduced in the NAFTA treaty and in the Uruguay Round agreements. A 
complete analysis of the linkages between trade and environmental policy is a central 
theme of this thesis and is developed below.
A very important factor which strongly influences the 1992's external impact is the 
Community's external trade policy. With the completion of the single market and the 
removal of borders any national restraints, quotas, VERs or other trade regimes have to 
be abolished, or substituted for, by a similar Europe-wide measure. It is also important to 
consider how the creation of the Single European Market may influence the whole 
system of international trade relations. Many authors judge past Community trade policy
”  See also Hughes Hallett (1992) who reproduces this same table but extends it by discriminating 
between perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive markets.
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as an almost constant departure from the multilateral principle implicit in the GATT, and 
EC-92 is seen as a move towards more régionalisation, rather than globalisation. The 
process of deepening the Union involves adjustment costs that may require temporary 
defensive trade measures. The last enlargement towards the Mediterranean basin may 
also result in restrictive policies in sectors relevant to developing countries. Finally, an 
economically stronger EC with increased bargaining power may end up with industrial 
and trade policies that favour its members only. In this respect two interesting issues 
deserve further analysis. The first concerns the potential response of non-EC countries 
and the formation of other regional blocs; the second deals with the interactions among 
those blocs. These themes and in particular the recently negotiated Mediterranean trade 
agreement are developed in this thesis.
Empirical estimates o f  the external effect
Most of the studies aiming at measuring the effects of '92 on outsiders are concerned 
with specific country groups, or with certain sectors.
Winters (1991) identifies two streams of research: one which makes use of 
econometric models and another which employs calibrated models of the general or 
partial equilibrium type. Examples of the first are: Jacquemin and Sapir (1988) and 
Neven and Roller (1991); both of these studies estimate trade effects, using as dependent 
variables in their equations factor endowments, R&D, product differentiation, and 
various policy variables. Examples of the second type are: the EC's own Cecchini Report, 
Norman (1989), Smith (1989) which are of partial equilibrium nature; Haaland (1990), 
Haaland. Norman (1992) which are CGE models; some of these incorporate scale 
economies and imperfect competition.
Winters concluded that general equilibrium analysis of "1992" is just getting under 
way and, for models with imperfect competition, it is just too early to draw any 
conclusions. Among the issues specifically related to EC trade with third countries in his 
agenda fo r  future research he points out the need for the estimation of general 
equilibrium models to identify the differing effects on the various partner countries, 
according to their comparative advantage and degrees of performance (e.g. EFTA vs. 
USA and Japan, or Mediterranean countries, or other developing countries).
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The same sort of conclusion is drawn by Hughes Hallett (1992) in a recent survey of 
the impact of EC-92 on Developing Countries. He argues that there are very few 
empirical estimates of the trade effects of EC-92, despite the fact that the central points of 
trade creation vs. trade diversion, the terms of trade effects, or the impact o f imperfect 
competition and investment diversion, are essentially empirical questions. No analytically 
rigorous general equilibrium studies of these empirical questions have been published.
Empirical Estimates for the Maehreb Countries
Some estimates of trade effects of EC-92 on the Maghreb countries are contained in 
Page (1991), Page and Davenport (1991) and Stevens (1990).
Stevens’ study aims at a qualitative assessment of the most likely effects. He 
distinguishes between 1992 direct effects -  increased EC incomes and increased EC 
competitiveness, which result in trade creation and diversion -  and indirect effects 
arguing that for the Maghreb countries the latter may be more important, in particular the 
outcome of the renegotiating of their bilateral association agreements. He argues that the 
distribution of benefits and costs between outside states depends on the change in their 
relative position in the hierarchical system of preferences of the Community, and on the 
possibility of them obtaining compensation, i.e. enhanced preferences. For instance, the 
Maghreb may face stiffer competition from other countries (NIC's) as a result of the 
potential reduction in preference following from the abolition of national quotas. To 
assess how vulnerable the Maghreb countries will be to changes that involve the loss of 
preferential treatment, Stevens suggests measuring the relative importance of the most 
sensitive products in their exports to the EC, and the concentration of these exports on the 
more protected EC national market, and concludes that a liberalisation o f the current 
MFA may cause special damage to Moroccan and Tunisian exports of clothing and 
textiles.
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Table 2-2: Estimates o f  "1992" effects on Developing Country Exports of Gtxxls11 <million EC ' i  s)
A d d it io n a l e x p o rts  to E C  
___P r im a ry ______ m an u fac t
D iv e rs io n  E ffec t  
m a n u f  on ly
N e t %  o f E x p o rt  
to E C
%  o f  tot 
E x d
All developing countries 2804 4434 -5655 *1582 + 1.5 +0.3
ACP 543 315 -477 +361 +2.3 + 1.0
Maghreb Countries 244 370 -534 +80 +0.9 +0.5
Morocco 24 99 -106 + 17 +0.8 na
Tunisia 26 % -108 + 15 +0.9 na
South Asia and China 86 920 -1125 •119 -1 .0 -0.1
Four Asian NICs 12 2574 -4077 -1491 -6.1 -0.9
ASEAN countries 102 344 -464 -18 -0.3 -0.0
Western Hemisphere 502 495 -751 +246 +1.3 +0.3
QEE£__________________ _____ _____ 1L5_____ -847 + 1224 __________ ±13 _____ ±L i
' The elasticities and calculations are based on those reported in Davenport and Page (1990). For primary goods, the elasticities 
are between 0.5 and 0 7, except for fuels, at 1.2; for manufactures they are about 2 except for machinery and transport, at 2.4. 
Diversion effects are expected only for manufactures, and are highest for chemicals and for machinery and transport.
The method used by Davenport and Page to calculate trade creation and diversion and 
terms of trade effects employs estimates available in the literature for all the relevant 
variables and parameters, namely: variations in the EC's income and prices, and income 
and price elasticities of EC imports from developing countries (and the Maghreb in 
particular). This allows them to present quantitative results, reproduced here in Table 2-2. 
It is worth noting that trade creation and diversion almost offset each other; since 
diversion derives from manufacturing trade only. EC 92 has the effect of hindering export 
diversification of the Mediterranean developing countries. Excepting Algeria, whose 
main export item is oil, the 1987 data used by Davenport and Page show that Morocco 
and Tunisia exported merchandise worth 1.9 bn ECU and 1.5 bn ECU respectively to the 
EC; of this, 46% and 35% respectively was in agricultural and other primary goods; 
clothing accounted for more than half of manufacturing exports with chemicals 14-15%; 
textile yam exports made up 11% of exports for Morocco, and 6% for Tunisia; machinery 
and transport equipment 7% and 9% respectively (page 85). The authors warn that 
uncertainties about data, parameters and the method of implementing certain 1992 
measures, give these estimations a merely "illustrative" character. Furthermore, General 
equilibrium effects are not taken into account.
As stated earlier, what is important for the Mediterranean countries and Maghreb in 
particular is their position relative to other potential competitors in future EC trade 
arrangements.
It is interesting, in this respect, to look at A. Halis Akder's (1992) paper, in which he 
considers possible competition between member and non-member Mediterranean
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countries and East European countries. To do this he calculates various indices of export 
similarity for total trade, and for agricultural products and manufactures. His main 
findings are that the Northern Mediterranean countries will compete with the East for 
German and Italian markets, whereas the southern Mediterranean countries will compete 
between themselves for the Italian and French markets; in agriculture the potential 
competition between East and Mediterranean is likely to be greatest for animal products, 
whereas for other agricultural goods Eastern and Mediterranean countries will primarily 
be competing with each other. In manufactures the SEM 's outcome will depend heavily 
on the adjustment process adopted by Mediterranean member countries.
Similar conclusions are reached by J. de Pinies Bianchi.34. He suggests that the 
reallocation of resources implied by the completion of the Single Market imposes high 
adjustment costs, particularly for the least developed EC members, thus creating pressure 
for more protectionism, especially in sensitive, labour-intensive products. This is further 
reinforced by D.J. Neven's 1990 analysis of labour costs across the EC, in which he 
concludes that the differences do not allow the exploitation .of comparative advantage 
between Northern and Southern countries, but that the latter could increase their labour- 
intensive exports. EC-92 will not, therefore, damage greatly outsider producers of hi- 
tech capital-intensive goods (Japan. USA), but it will affect developing countries as 
exporters of labour-intensive goods (Mediterranean and Maghreb among these).
2.3 The Economic Consequences of Further Integration
The term "further integration" is used to identify the process of outsider countries 
joining or becoming more closely associated to a group of countries that have already 
constituted some form of integrated area (Free trade area. Customs Union, etc.). Various 
approaches are encountered in the analysis of this issue. They range from theoretical 
studies of the economics of integration and enlargement, to empirical estimates of the 
economic consequences of joining a regional group for the new member and the former 
ones. Several surveys on theoretical and empirical issues are available and hence it is not 
necessary to reproduce them here. In fact the issue of "further integration” is one of the
54 J. de Pinies Bianchi (1992).
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main themes developed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In particular two aspects 
of this process will be analysed in detail. Firstly, a thorough investigation on the 
important links between trade liberalisation and the environment will be presented using 
a single-country CGE model in chapter 5. Secondly, within a multi-county modelling 
framework, an examination of the static and dynamic effects of the formation of a FTA 
will be offered in chapter 7.
This introduction is concluded with an overview of trade relationships and labour 
flows in the Mediterranean area. These flows represent the main linkages between the 
European Community and the Mediterranean developing countries. The descriptive 
analysis presented here identifies some important consequences that new trade 
agreements may have for this area, and hence emphasises the relevance of my CGE 
analysis. Moreover, the Mediterranean economic relationships are here compared with 
those of another regional group, the NAFTA. This comparison is relevant for two 
reasons. Firstly although numerous studies have covered the recent NAFTA agreement, 
very few have dealt with the Mediterranean one. and even fewer have compared the two. 
Therefore the following comparison conveys new information and fills a gap. Secondly, 
the similarity found among these two regions and their trade policy reforms may be used 
to justify the application of analytical tools used in the NAFTA case to the Mediterranean 
one.
2.4 The Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relationship
2.4.1 Trade
During the past twenty years the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean trade followed 
a broadly similar pattern to that of global North-South commercial relations: the oil 
shocks and counter shocks; the emergence of the South as an exporter of manufactured 
products, and import contractions as a consequence of the debt crisis for those countries 
faced by adjustment processes.
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Figure 2-1: Percentage Share o f  selected areas in EL' total Trade
The areas are defined by these countries:
-Med: Morocco. Algeria. Tunisia. Egypt. Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, Israel, Cyprus. Andorra. Gibraltar. Malta: 
-ExCom: Ex-Ussr. Albania. Bulgaria. Ex-Tcheckoslovack. East Germany. Hungary . Polland. Romania; 
-OthEurope: Austria, Finland. Norway. Sweden. Iceland;
-Gulf: Iran. Irak. Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia. Lybia,Oman. etc;
-OthMEast: Jordan. Lebanon, Syria, Yemen.
By the early 1970s the Mediterranean percentage share of the EU's trade (excluding 
intra-Community trade) was about 6.9, and by 1985 reached its maximum of 8.7. In 1991 
it was 7.4 %. The second half of the 80s reduction contrasts with the increase in the Asian 
share but it is less sharp than that of Latin America or of South-Saharan Africa. In 1991 
total trade between Mediterranean countries and the EU was 79.2 billions current USD. 
whereas that of North America (Canada and US) and Mexico was 66.7 billions USD. It is 
also worth noticing that the relative weight of Mexico and Mediterranean countries' trade 
with their developed counterparts has been fairly similar (in 1991 around 20%; see Figure 
2-1 and Figure 2-2).35
”  See Bensidoun I., and Chevallier A (1994). pag 114. Their measures take into account the changing
composition of the EU.
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Figure 2-2: % Share o f  Med (\texi in EL' (Xorth Am) Imports from Developing Countries
Despite the above similarities, there are important differences. First of all it should be 
noted that when talking about Mediterranean countries we are considering a very 
differentiated group of countries, even when the analysis is limited to the Mediterranean 
African ones. Besides, and most importantly, this group is not yet very integrated as 
shown in the table below.36 From Table 2-3, it appears that even the newly signed treaties 
such as the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union)37 have not been very effective in fostering trade 
within their member countries.38
Table 2-3: Percentage Share o f Intra-Group Trade
Imra-EU Intra-Med Intra-Maehreb
1970 52.88 4.74 1.89
1980 53.75 3.50 0.41
1985 55.22 4.40 1.37
1291____________ __________ tläM._____ 4.40 ___________LZ8
Other important differences between the European and the American side are 
summarised in the table below:
36 The shares are calculated as follows:
[ 2 x imports (or exports) within a group ] / [ tot trade (exports + imports) ].
11 The AMU was signed in 1988.
'* This should be taken into account when discussing different economic policies: a positive shock to one 
Mediterranean country should barely affect its neighbors through trade multiplier effects
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Table 2-4: Xorth American and Mediterranean main economic indicators (1991)
ratios of:_______________ CiDP Population Der capita GDP
NorthAm/Mex 23 3.2 7.1
FX'/Med 15 1.4 10.4
France/Maghreb____________________ Li____________________0.9 ________________ Lfi
From the above table it is possible to see that the North American GDP and 
population are respectively 23 and 3.2 times those of Mexico. These ratios far exceed 
those recorded for the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Yet. when taking into account 
the disparity in the level of economic development, measured by the per capita GDP. one 
may conclude that differences are lower for Mexico with respect to North America than 
for Mediterranean countries with respect to the EU. It is worth noticing that the France - 
Maghreb countries gap seems to be narrower.
The sectoral composition of trade flows within these two regions is also quite 
different as shown in the following Figures.
Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 show the evolution of the sectoral composition of trade 
flows for the two groups of countries in question. It is possible to observe that both 
Mexico and the Mediterranean group remain highly dependent for their imports on 
manufactured products coming from their developed partners, more than two thirds of 
their imports is composed of manufactured products. On the contrary, the composition of 
exports changes quite differently: for Mexico the manufactures share goes from 34 % to 
73 % with a sharp reduction in agriculture, and the energy macro sector goes up too; for 
the Mediterranean group the lower starting point for manufactures did not help (in a 
catching-up fashion) and by 1991 the manufactures share is still below 50%. agriculture 
reduces its importance (but less than for Mexico) and the energy macro sector (especially 
Oil for Algeria) remains very important.
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Figure 2-3: Sectoral composition of Mexico 
S’orth America and Mediterranean - EL' 
trade flows 1970
Figure 2-4: Sectoral composition o f Mexico 
-  North America and .Uediterranean - EU 
trade flows 1991
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Looking only at the 1991 picture the main conclusion is that trade between Mexico 
and North America is going towards a North-North intra industry pattern of international 
trade, whereas the Mediterranean-EU commercial relationship still shows evidence of 
complementarity (e.g. Algerian Oil against European manufactures. Mediterranean agro­
food or labour intensive products against European capital intensive ones).
1970 - Mexican and Mediterranean trade % shares with their Developed partners
Mex X Mex M Med X Med M
Agriculture 54 II 40 10
Manufact 34 81 22 87
Energy 5 4 30 2
Mining 1 4 8 __________ L
1991 - Mexican and Mediterranean trade % shares with their Developed partners
Mex X__________ Mt x M ___________MfllX __________ MssLM
Agriculture 10 II 14 II
Manufact 73 86 49 87
Energy 15 3 34 1
Minins ______________1_____ __________ 1_____ __________2_____ __________ L
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This situation is also clearly reflected in the trade balance between these two groups 
(see figures below). The European surplus (mainly driven by the manufactures surplus) 
was very strong in the 70s when the Mediterranean developing countries, due to the 
excessive liquidity in the international financial markets, were increasing their foreign 
debt and were able to increase their imports (more than their oil exports). The surplus has 
since been eroded due first to the protectionist policies adopted to face the debt crisis, and 
secondly to the export expansion. For the American side the situation was almost 
completely driven by the Mexican debt crisis which constrained the country to almost 
halt its imports. The situation is balancing again in the 90s. The Brady plan and the 
NAFTA agreement can be partly seen as economic policies towards increasing Mexican 
export possibilities.
Note that the Figure 2-5 shows only Mexico and Mediterranean group against their 
partners, whereas Figure 2-6 shows also the Maghreb situation. The latter shows a path 
closer to the Mexican one.
Fieure 2-5: Tracie balance as % o f Total Fieure 2-6: Trade balance as % of Total 
Frode Trade (includine Maehreb Group)
Md
* Urti 
Am- 
fctoc
Another important difference between the American and the European situation is 
noticeable in the relevance of the northern partner for the south trade flows. Consider the 
following three figures.
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Figure 2-7: EU % share in Total 
Mediterranean countries Exports
Figure 2-9: North % share in South total trade
Figure 2-8: EU % share in Total 
Mediterranean countries Imports
90
80
m i
M aghreb  Mad M exico
The first two figures show for different country groupings the evolution of the 
European % share in the Mediterranean trade flows. It can be noted that these do not 
excessively change in the last 20 years and that the Maghreb countries are on average 
more dependent on the European market than the other countries (the main countries in 
this latter group are Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Ex-Yugoslavia that, because of their 
geographic and strategic position, show a weaker European influence). This is clearly 
summarised by the third figure where Mexico is shown with the whole Mediterranean
38
and the Maghreb regions. (Note that the South shares in the North total trade shown 
above were more similar for Europe and NorthAm).
The last difference emphasised here concerns the relative intensity in the trade flows 
between North and South.
Intensities are defined as follows:
For export flows: [ Xy / X, ] / [ Mj / W ]
And for import flows: [ My / Mj] / [ Xj / W ]
For the export flow the bilateral trade intensity is the quotient of two ratios: in the 
numerator there is the share of the exports of country i towards country j and in the 
denominator there is the weight of the imports of country j in the world total imports. 
Therefore a value equal to 1 means that the influence of country j (the destination 
country) on country i is equal to the influence of j over the total world trade. In other 
words the relative bilateral trade intensity is in line with the average. Similar comments 
apply to the import flow indicator.
The main conclusion is that the average intensities for the Mediterranean-EU trade 
are quite weak, being equal to 1.31 for the EU to Mediterranean flows and 1.34 for the 
Mediterranean to EU. Moreover, they result from a mix of some very strong localised 
bilateral relations (France. Spain. Italy <--> Maghreb) and some very weak ones (North 
Europe <--> Med). It should be noted that the average intensity for Mexico -  North 
America is more than 6.
The graph depicted in Figure 2-10 should be read as follows: the co-ordinates of each 
point represent the export intensity (X axis) and the import intensity (Y axis) for a 
particular country. The further from the origin the higher the intensity, the closer to the 
45 degree line the more similar the export and the import intensities.
It clearly appears that three European countries, France Italy and Spain, and the 
Maghreb countries register some significant trade intensity; Germany, Turkey Egypt and 
Israel are in an intermediate position; North Europe has not very intense trade relations 
with the Mediterranean countries; Portugal shows a weak export intensity and an average 
import intensity.
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In the figure below, the Southern Europe - Maghreb countries stronger trade 
intensities are shown in a different way. Here we have the country by country relation, 
and it is possible to note the very strong relation between France and the Maghreb 
countries; between Spain with Morocco and Algeria; between Italy with Tunisia, Algeria 
and a less strong relation with Morocco, Turkey and Egypt. Germany has its strongest 
relations with Turkey, but the intensity is much less strong than in the French case.
Figure 2-11: Export Intensities o f Southern Europe with selected Mediterranean Countries 
Countries (1991)
1991
A l g e r i a
T u rk I s r a  O t h
E g y p t
----- -  —France
Italy
■ Spain
■ Germ any
2.4.2 Labour
The structure and functioning of labour markets and international migration are of 
crucial importance when modelling Mediterranean African countries’ economic 
relationship with Europe.
In a world of intensifying capital mobility, demographic trends are becoming 
increasingly important determinants of international comparative advantage and this is
41
particularly relevant for the Mediterranean region39. These facts have been recently 
pointed out in a similar context for Latin America with an applied general equilibrium 
model built at the OECD. That model was constructed to examine the implications of 
more liberal trade relations for economic growth in Latin America. One of its main 
conclusions is that the removal of trade distortions could accelerate growth considerably 
if this policy is combined with measures that raise human capital and facilitate efficient 
labour markets.40
Here a few stylised demographic statistics are presented. The North American 
situation is again contrasted with the Mediterranean region to emphasise both differences 
and similarities.
The following two figures show the evolution over the last 30 years of the 
Mediterranean demographic balance. The left panel displays the population shares of 
EU12 and the Mediterranean countries (see Figure 2-1 for a definition of this group). In 
the right panel, the same shares are calculated for the northern (Portugal, Spain, France, 
Italy and Greece) and southern shores (Maghreb + Egypt) of the Mediterranean sea. The 
evolution is basically the same for the two groups: in 30 years the northern population 
share has been reducing from almost 70% to less than 60%. In absolute terms, in 1991, 
the southern shore population was 110 millions, whereas that of the Northern shore was 
170 millions.
The World Bank and UN have presented forecasts up to the year 2020 for these 
regions where the trends shown in the figures below are expected to continue. By the year 
2020 the northern shore weight will be reduced to 37-39%. It should also be noticed that 
the age structure and the dependency rates of the north and south populations will be very 
different. Between 1985 and 2020, the population of the south and east of the 
Mediterranean will be increased by 170-180 million people, and 30% of the population 
will be aged 15 years or less. The population of north will increase by 15-20 million, and 
the people of 65 years or older will account for 20% of the total.
19 See Horton, Kanbur. Mazumdar(1994).
40 See Collado.J.C., D. Roland-Holst, D. van der Mensbrugghe (1995).
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BLM2 and Afcd P o p iJüo n  % share North and ScU h MBd thorn  Popiiabon % 
shares
1980 1370 1980 1991 1980 1970 1980 1991
□  South 
Shorn
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Shore
The picture for North America is shown below. Note the difference in the 
corresponding proportions. In 1991 the US + Canada populations were still more than 
75% of the total NAFTA population. In fact, for North American policy makers, one 
crucial reason for the NAFTA treaty signature had been the hope to stop massive 
Mexican migration. This same reason may apply to the EU-Mediterranean case where the 
forthcoming demographic imbalances may become even worse than those recorded in 
North America.
NorthAm and Max Population %  ahares
100%
90%
1960 1 9 7 0  1980  1991
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*The next figure shows the income differential that is one of the most important 
variables used to explain international migration. Three facts should be noticed. Firstly. 
European GDP per capita varies from about 4 times that of Mediterranean to more than 
10 times, and constantly increases.41 Secondly, the North American differential has been 
decreasing through the first 20 years, with an increase between 1980 and 1991. Even if in 
1960 the North American ratio was higher than the EU-Mediterranean one. the described 
trend resulted in a lower 1991 value. And, thirdly, the North shore / South shore 
differential has been increasing faster than the EU-Mediterranean differential.
North/South GOP per capita ratios
1 9 6 0  1 97 0  1 98 0  1991
■  NorthAm /Mex
■  EU/Med
□  NorthM /SouthM
These points, especially the third one, become clear when considering the evolution 
of international migration towards European and American destinations. During the 
1970s the southern European countries ceased to be countries of origin and became 
countries o f destination for migrant workers. Also the migrant nationalities were 
changing from being southern European to being North African and other third world 
countries.
41 Note that these are measured in current dollars with average nominal exchange rates, the same 
differentials calculated in dollar PPP are obviously less pronounced.
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The combination of pull factors (such as that of the income differential) and push 
factors (such as that of demographic imbalance) is especially important when considering 
the restricted group of southern Europe and North Africa.
The next three figures42 show, for the six most important European receiving 
countries (plus a residual area labelled "other”), the percentage shares of resident 
populations of EU nationals. Non EU and Maghreb respectively. The top figure shows, 
for each of the seven EU receiving countries, the respective population of European 
origin as a percentage of the total EU-12 population. The middle figure shows similar 
percentages calculated using population of non-European origin. Clearly Germany and 
France appear as the largest immigrant receiving countries among EU-12. Notice that 
Italy and Spain, jointly accounting for 33 per cent of total European population, register 
only 8 per cent of total immigrants. The bottom figure displays percentage shares of 
Maghreb immigrants across European destination. France has a dominant role and north 
European countries, except maybe Belgium, register very low percentages. Overall, as in 
the case for trade, south European countries are more intensively linked with the North 
Africa than north European countries.
EU12
42 The next figures are obtained using data for 1991 from EUROSTAT
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France
23%
Maghreb
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France
71%
To look at the situation within specific countries, we can see that the maximum 
percentage share of Maghreb workers over the EU nationals is 2.5% and is registered for 
France. Besides Maghreb workers are certainly the most important foreign population 
resident in European countries.
M aghra b / EU12
Maghreb worker* aa % of other migrant*
■  M aghreb / 
NonEU 12
■  M aghreb / 
Africa
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter’s main objective of introducing the thesis and providing further 
motivation for the subsequent analyses has been achieved in two ways. Firstly, the 
succinct literature survey allows appreciation of earlier results and points out gaps in 
previous studies of the Mediterranean area. In particular, several authors recognise the
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need for additional research on regional trade policy and its consequences. Some also 
indicate that applied general equilibrium models might be more appropriate tools of 
analysis.
Secondly, a compact statistical overview of the main economic relationships in the 
Mediterranean basin permits to identify what is at stake when further regional integration 
is implemented. It appears that southern Europe has a much larger interest in the 
economic development of North Africa than northern Europe. The geographic proximity 
and economic differentials (measured for instance by per capita GDP) make this South 
Europe -  North Africa group quite similar to the NAFTA region.
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3 Data and models: what are the connections?
3.1 Introduction
A fundamental step in any rigorous applied economics study is the compilation of 
reliable and updated databases. In the particular case of regional integration, for which 
the most apt research technique appears to be applied general equilibrium analysis, the 
relevant databases normally take the form of Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs).
This chapter's initial purpose is to present a new' detailed SAM for France and 
Morocco. This SAM offers a sound database on which a quantitative analysis of the 
Euro-Mediterranean economic relationships can be based. Reducing the choice to only 
two countries is motivated primarily by the need to have a tractable SAM, in the sense of 
it being detailed and updated.43 Other reasons favour these particular countries, such as 
their special post-colonial economic ties, their being representative of the broader 
interdependencies between the EC and the southern Mediterranean developing countries 
and their relative similarities to the Mexico-USA case.44
Additional reasons, beyond the mere illustration o f the France-Morocco SAM, 
motivate this chapter.
Firstly, a simple fixed-price multiplier model is constructed to allowing a preliminary 
examination of the main linkages among the countries under study. Although this 
analysis could be encompassed within the subsequent CGE approach, multiplier models 
present some practical advantages and complementarity with more complex CGE 
models. Fixed-price multiplier models are easily implemented and have a very simple 
and transparent structure, which is strongly dependent on the SAM data. For these
43 On the construction of a SAM for Europe see for instance the various articles in Volume 3 of the 
journal Economic System Research ( I99 l) and in particular J.I. Round ( 1991), pages 249 -  268.
44 For the European region as a whole few results from CGE models are available. Most of the discussion 
is on the historical evolution of the EC foreign trade policy, and its main effects for specific sectors and 
countries. For instances of CGE results consult Haaland J.I., Norman V. (I992) and Flaaland, J. (1990). For 
partial equilibrium results see various articles in the volume 28 of the Journal of Common Market Studies 
(1990) or Smith, A. and Venables, A.J. (I988). For an historical perspective see Shlaim A., and G.N. 
Yannopoulos eds (I976), Tovias A. (I977), Pomfret R. (1986), Grilli E.R., (1993) and the previous chapter. 
For the North American region a collection of papers is in USITC (1992); see also Brown, D.K., A.V. 
DeardorfT and R.M. Stem (1992); de Melo, J., and D. Tarr (1992); and Roland-Holst, D.W., K.A. Reinert, 
and C.R.Shiells (1994).
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reasons, a multiplier model highlights the main structural features of the economies under 
study. For instance, it clarifies the inter-industrial intermediate demand structure, 
identifies the most important sectors (in terms of GDP, value added, exports, etc.), clearly 
displays linkages between final demand, production and import activities, illustrates 
income distribution, and shows sectoral and regional trade dependency. In other words a 
multiplier analysis makes clear the fundamental connection between data and models. In 
fact this connection, mediated by extra-SAM elasticity data and a more elaborated 
analytical structure, may not be apparent in a CGE context. In practice. I am advocating a 
two-stage approach: first a multiplier analysis and then a CGE model. By providing 
applications of both types of models to the Mediterranean case this chapter additionally 
fills a gap in the literature, which offers almost no study dealing jointly with these two 
model families.45
A second reason motivating this chapter is given by the study of the sensitivity of the 
multiplier model’s results to changes in the base year SAM. This can be explained in 
more detail.
The magnitude of CGE models results clearly depends on some crucial elasticities 
that define the slopes of demand and supply functions and determine quantity and price 
responses to exogenous shocks. For this reason, the robustness of results should be tested 
by experimenting with different elasticity values. Though quite rarely CGE studies 
include a thorough analysis of the sensitivity of their results to changes in elasticity 
values, almost none of them extend this analysis to other parameters, such as intercepts or 
share parameters. These latter parameters are normally calculated through the calibration 
of the model from the base year SAM. Obviously changes in the base year values may 
affect results as well. Consider, for instance, the case of simulating trade policy reform. 
The solution values for imports will depend, amongst other things, on how demand 
functions are estimated. Normally these are calibrated using initial shares of imported and 
domestically produced commodities and, evidently, the size of these shares has a direct 
influence on the final results of CGE experiments. This chapter provides, for the
45 For a comparison among these two model types see Kraybill (1989) and for an example of the two- 
stage approach (first SAM analysis and then COE model) for NAFTA see Reinert, K.A., D.W. Roland- 
Holst and C.R.Shiells (1993).
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Moroccan-French case, a special instance of share sensitivity analysis. In the context of a 
fixed-price model, multiplier analysis is extended to study the effect of a change in the 
SAM accounting framework.
Given the trade policy focus of the thesis, a particular case of sensitivity analysis to 
import shares is studied. In a SAM imports can be (1) classified by purchasers. (2) 
classified by goods (competitive or complementary imports), and (3) classified by both of 
the above criteria.46 In fact only within the accounting structure of (3), a precise 
calculation of the shares of imported and domestically produced goods in total demand is 
possible. These shares can only be approximated with simple assumptions when imports 
are treated as in (1) or (2) above. The sensitivity analysis conducted here addresses a 
simple question: how much is the multipliers’ size affected by a change in the imports 
accounting structure? The answer is not much.
Although fixed-price and CGE models differ in many important ways, the particular 
experiment of altering the imports accounting structure affects domestic and imported 
shares in the multiplier analysis as well as in the import demand functions of a CGE 
model. The main conclusions of the multiplier sensitivity analysis may therefore be 
extended to the CGE context. Judging from the modest multipliers' variations, one 
important conclusion is that the information loss of going from the comprehensive 
accounting structure of (3) to that of (2) is minor. This conclusion justifies the use of 
CGE import demand functions calibrated on an import accounting structure as in (2), and 
allows expecting no major share sensitivity of CGE results.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next two sections are devoted to the first 
descriptive objective of the chapter. Section 3.2 adds some more information to that of 
section 3.2 of the previous chapter on the main linkages between France and Morocco 
and contrasts them with those in the NAFTA. Section 3.3 outlines the construction of the 
Morocco-France matrix47. Section 3.4 is focused on the second objective of the chapter. It 
presents the methodology for decomposing multipliers, explains their use in the analysis
46 In practice in case (3) we have two separate input-output tables, one for domestic goods and one for 
imported goods.
4 The construction of the single country SAMs for Morocco and France are described in detail in chapter 
4.
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of trade patterns and. by comparing the regional multipliers in the described different 
settings, develops the share sensitivity analysis. Some brief conclusions close the chapter.
3.2 The economic interdependence between Morocco and France
A version of the Mediterranean France-Morocco SAM that will be described in the 
next section very naturally can provide many additional insights to those investigated in 
the previous chapter of the economic linkages between France and Morocco. In this 
section upstream and downstream effects are calculated and contrasted with those derived 
from a similar NAFTA SAM.48
Upstream effects
Upstream effects of changes in final demand can be easily obtained by calculating 
expenditure shares from the SAM. These coincide with column normalisation of the 
SAM, i.e. with the ratios of each matrix element to its corresponding column total.49
A few characteristics of the expenditure structure are worth noting. Firstly, it shows a 
comparatively weak trade dependency of France with Morocco. French expenditure 
shares on Moroccan imports exceed 0.6% only for vegetables and fruits, apparel (textiles 
are at 0.2%) and leather products. Conversely Moroccan trade dependency on French 
imports is higher and expenditure shares exceed 3% for cereals, apparel, paper and wood 
products, metal products, machinery (22%), transport equipment (19%), chemicals, 
rubber and other manufactures. This asymmetry is exactly replicated in the US-Mexican 
case with the highest US expenditure shares on Mexican petroleum, leather products and 
electric machinery not exceeding 1.7%, and with Mexican activities spending up to 40% 
in US capital goods.
Secondly, French expenditure shares on foreign goods above 20% are recorded for 
the following sectors: mining and energy, textiles, apparel, leather products, machinery, 
transport equipment, chemicals, rubber, and other manufactures. For all of these sectors.
4* See tables 7 and 8 in Reinert. K.A., D.W. Roland-Holst and C.R.Shiells (1993), pages 308-315. In fact, 
it was possible to check that the conventions used in the two SAMs are the same. This is a requirement to 
validate the comparison in the text.
49 The SAM of version I of section 3.4.1 below is used here to calculate expenditure shares. Basically this 
version does not properly discriminate between domestically produced and imported goods: its activities 
column/row total values represent the sum of domestic and imported goods. Given the descriptive objective 
of this section, the highest level of product disaggregation suggested the use of this version.
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with the exception of mining and energy, the EC shares exceed those of the non-EC 
world. It can also be noticed that French agricultural sectors50 have, on average, low 
expenditure shares on foreign goods. In the case of Morocco, in 6 out of the 10 sectors 
with highest (above 20%) expenditure shares on foreign goods, imports for France 
records a higher ratio than those coming from the rest of EC. Again a similar pattern is 
recorded for the NAFTA case, where the US rely more significantly on markets external 
to the north American region than Mexico.
The asymmetry in the Mediterranean trade is similar to that in NAFTA, where 
France's strongest linkages are with the European Community rather than with Morocco. 
They also show that the strongest bilateral linkages are in textiles and derived products, 
machinery and transport equipment.
Downstream effects
Receipt shares are calculated as row normalisation of the original SAM. They show 
the percentage distribution of a specific sector supply, illustrating downstream effects that 
originate from deliveries to intermediate, domestic and export use.
French export structure is similar to its structure of imports, reflecting the intra­
industry aspect of its trade. This is clearly noticeable for trade with the EC: textiles, 
apparel, durables, chemicals and plastic products all register very close import and export 
ratios. Morocco is a significant (above 0.2%) export market for French cereals, textiles, 
metal products, capital goods and chemicals. As expected. US exports similarly depend 
on global markets and its receipt shares from Mexico are of comparable magnitude, 
averaging 1% for leather, non-electrical machinery and electrical machinery.
Moroccan dependency on exports to France is much stronger than the reverse. Export 
ratios above 4% are shown for vegetable and fruits (10%), food products, apparel (37%), 
leather products, and machinery. For all these sectors the French share exceeds that for 
the rest of EC and the ROW. Likewise Mexican receipts from the US exceeding 10% are 
petroleum, apparel, rubber and plastic products, non-ferrous metals, electrical machinery 
and other manufactured products.
As far as agriculture is concerned, comparative advantage resulted in the Moroccan 
specialisation in exports of vegetable and fruit and other products (fishing), and,
10 Agriculture is a sensitive issue in the Moroccan-EC negotiations on further regional integration.
53
associated with the EC agricultural policy, shaped the French concentration in cereals and 
industrial crops.
To summarise, regional interdependence is strongest in the sectors producing capital 
goods, textiles and derived products and it is unbalanced, in the sense that Moroccan 
trade dependency on France is higher than vice versa. Despite some sectoral differences, 
the magnitudes of the Mediterranean linkages shown in the French-Moroccan SAM are 
similar to those shown in the NAFTA case.
3.3 The France-Morocco SAM
The two-country France-Morocco SAM was derived from merging two individual 
country SAMs. This process entailed three separate steps. First the commodities/activities 
classification schemes had to be normalised. The common definitions and standards 
adopted in the French and Moroccan national accounts systems facilitated this task. The 
sectoring scheme included 18 activities, which are shown along with the factors of 
production and households categories in Appendix A.
Secondly, Moroccan Dirhams and French Francs were converted into US dollars at 
rates 8.24 and 5.44 respectively. These rates are yearly averages o f market exchange rates 
from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics for 1991. The 
purchasing power parity rate could be considered a more appropriate conversion factor 
for certain components of the SAM and for a discussion see Reinert, K.A., D.W. Roland- 
Holst and C.R.Shiells (1993). Thirdly the bilateral trade flows and other transactions 
(factor payments and transfers) had to be estimated and subtracted from the rest of the 
world accounts. This will be described more fully below.
The result at a macro-economic level is shown in Table 3-5, where transactions are 
recorded among 23 accounts. These are (note that the first two letters in the labels 'Fr' or 
'Mr' denote the country: France or Morocco):
- Activities (production sectors)
- Capital and Labour (factors of production)
- Households, Corporations Government (institutions)
- Capital Account (saving-investment account)
- Indirect Taxes
5 4
- Commercial Margins
- Subsidies
-Tariffs (international trade taxes)
- Rest Of the World (international transactions)
A schematic representation of Table 3-5 takes the form:
'T„ T,2 Ru'
T = t21 t22 Rw
kRj| R 32 R jv
The matrices on the main diagonal of (1) represent within country transactions, 
matrices T 12 and T21 contain the inter-country transactions and matrices R,j record French 
and Moroccan transactions with the Rest of the world (R33 does not contain any relevant 
data either for France or for Morocco).
It can be added that matrices Tu on the main diagonal in Table 3-5 are consistent with 
the national accounts of each country.
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The Activities account51 buys inputs and two types of factor services (from the capital 
accounts), moreover it pays indirect taxes, tariffs and commercial margins on the outputs. 
Thus, commodities are valued at market prices. The Household account (HH) buys 
commodities for its final demand, pays income taxes to the government and saves. It 
receives its income directly from the factors it owns or through transfers from other 
accounts. The government account collects taxes (direct and indirect) and tariffs and pays 
for its final demand, transfers to other institutions and subsidies. The Capital account 
closes the system transforming savings from various institutions into investment demand. 
Off diagonal matrices T,j contain all the relevant data on the economic relationships 
between France and Morocco. At the aggregate level of Table 3-5, it is possible to see 
bilateral trade data, households and other institution transfers.
3.4 The French Moroccan Regional Multiplier Model
This section studies in detail the regional decomposition of multipliers. In particular it 
offers a special case of share sensitivity analysis through an evaluation of the main 
differences in the multipliers emerging from three different versions of the SAM. Version 
I organises bilateral trade data in simple diagonal import matrices, version 2 displays 
distinct domestic and import input-output tables where the latter is obtained from original 
data on imported intermediates,52 version 3 reproduces version 2 with the import IO table 
estimated from the initial IO table.53 It is quite clear that version 2 of the SAM includes 
more information than version 1, in the sense that bilateral trade flows are disaggregated 
by destination of use and not simply recorded as geographical transfers54. The aim of the 
sensitivity analysis is to judge, by the extent of the variation of multipliers, the value of 
the extra information contained in a “true” import IO table, as in version 2. The next three
51 Notice that there is no distinction between activities and commodities. This simplifies the analysis but 
implicitly rules out the possibility of sectors producing more than one commodity.
" Version /  and version 2 correspond to classification (2) and (3) of the introduction.
Version I correspond to treatment (2) in the introduction, whereas version 2 to treatment (3).
'4 The import tables of version / of the SAM “represent transfers which simply augment the receipts of an 
account in one region and simultaneously deplete the same (functional) account in the other region". They 
correspond therefore to geographical (w/er-country) flows as defined in Round (1985). The quotation is 
from that same paper.
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sub-sections detail the construction of the three versions of the SAM and examine 
multiplier decomposition and variation.
3 4.1 Three versions of a two-country SAM55
Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 illustrate versions 1 and 2 of the French-Moroccan SAM. 
The main structure of these SAMs is exactly the same as that described in section 3.2 
where, for simplicity, the sectors have been reduced to 4. The households and corporate 
accounts have been aggregated into one single institutional current account labelled 
"Cons', and two other accounts are considered: 'trade', which accumulates all external 
trade, and "other" account, which consolidates all remaining accounts (government, 
indirect taxes, commercial margins, tariffs, subsidies).
The only difference in the two versions is the treatment of trade flows. Consider the 
highlighted squares of the SAMs. These are the "domestic " input-output tables (cells 1,1 
- 4,4 for France and 9,9 - 12,12 for Morocco56), the bilateral imports tables (cells 9,1 - 
12,4 for France and 1,9 - 4,12 for Morocco), the "domestic" private final demand (cells 
1,7 - 4,8 for France and 9,15 - 12.16 for Morocco), the bilateral imported private final 
demand (cells 9,7 - 12,8 for France and 1,15 - 4,16 for Morocco) and the trade flows with 
the rest of the world (cells 17,1 - 17,4 and 17,7 - 17,8 for France and 17,9 - 17,12 and 
17,15 17,16 for Morocco).
In version 1 - considering the French point of view and its trade relations with 
Morocco - the import table is a diagonal matrix where Moroccan products are 
geographically transferred to the French corresponding sectors. In this case, for example, 
216 millions US $ of agricultural goods are imported by France from Morocco, and then 
delivered by the account FrAgri (on row 1) for intermediate use or final private 
demand57. France's imports from other countries are shown in the "trade' account. In the 
above example, France imports 9,301 millions of agricultural goods. The French 
"domestic” IO table therefore records the use of French intermediates as well as imported
"  The analysis in this section has some precedents in the input-output literature. In particular see the 
discussion on alternative treatments of imports in the 1-0 table in Bulmer-Thomas (1982). pages 105-111.
A sort of spreadsheet convention is used to denote specific portions in the SAMs where the first couple 
of numbers, separated by a comma, indicates the row and column indices of the upper left comer and the 
second couple refers to the lower right comer of that portion.
For the sake of precision they can also be used for investment or re-exported.
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ones. In other words, row 1 sum (102.457 millions) represents the total supply of 
domestically produced and imported agricultural goods available in the French market. 
This format has been used in the multiplier analysis of the NAFTA region in another
study.58
Version 2 of the SAM treats domestic and imported transactions separately. This 
entails two changes in the arrangement of transactions. Firstly, the "domestic” 10 table 
(for France or Morocco) is now truly domestic in the sense that it records intermediates 
use of purely domestically produced goods. Intermediates imported from Morocco are 
found in the import 10 table and those coming from other trading partners are in the 
'trade' row. Secondly, imported final consumption and investment goods are allocated 
directly to final private demand (the 'Cons’ and 'Invest' accounts)5’. In this case 
therefore, considering the previous example, the 216 millions of Moroccan agricultural 
imports are used as intermediates by sectors FrAgri (9 millions). FrManuf (91 millions) 
and FrServ (12 millions), and the remaining 104 millions are consumed by French 
households (and therefore subtracted from the "domestic ” private final demand) or used 
to satisfy investment demand. The further 9,301 millions of agricultural imported goods 
are allocated in the same way.“  Row 1 total sum (92,940 millions) now shows the 
availability in the French market of purely domestic agricultural goods.61
'* Reinert K.A., D.W. Roland-Holst and C.R. Shiells (1993). It should also be added that this format, with 
the import matrices collapsed to vectors, has been used in the calculation of the expenditure and receipt 
shares in section 3.2 ( shown in Appendix A).
The case where imports from partner-country are exported is implicitly excluded.
60 Notice that to show the exact allocation Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 should present the ‘trade’ account 
sectorally disaggregated.
61 The difference in Row I total value between version I and 2 corresponds exactly to 9,517 millions US 
$. the total imports of agricultural goods from Morocco (216 millions) and from other countries (9,301 
millions).
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Data for version 2 - France
The additional information necessary to compile version 2 was obtained differently 
for the two countries.
The French data were provided by the National Statistical Office in the format of an 
import IO table with no disaggregation by country of origin.
The final partner-country* 612 import IO table was then estimated in the following way. 
Firstly the sector specific ratios of intermediate to final use were calculated for total 
imports and applied to the Moroccan imports vector. Then, the vector of Moroccan 
imported intermediates were allocated to the French sectors by use according to the ratios 
computed from the original import IO table. Thus, these two steps together coincide with 
the following formula63:
where:
M “ '  are Moroccan intermediate goods o f sector i imported by French sector j, 
M “ " '  intermediate goods o f sector i imported by French sector j,
Final consumption and investment goods imported from Morocco were allocated 
accordingly to the French ‘Cons’ and ‘Invest’ accounts.64
Data for version 2 - Morocco
In the case of Morocco an indirect estimation procedure was also used. Average 
sector specific ratios of imported to total intermediate demand were calculated from two 
import IO tables available for other developing countries: Costa Rica and Indonesia. The 
main advantage in using these tables was that their sectoring scheme almost perfectly
Parmer countries are the two countries in the SAM, namely France and Morocco. Therefore for France 
the partner country import IO table collects intermediates imported by French sectors exclusively from 
Morocco.
61 This procedure implicitly assumes no distinction between the distribution among sectors (or even
among the intermediate or final private demand destination) of world and Moroccan imports to France.
This is because the original import IO table is not available in versions disaggregated by country of origin.
64 Clearly although this is not a pure version 2, in the sense that it relies on ratios and secondary sources, 
it includes substantial new information.
MIntermediate MOR ij
M
( 1)
total French imports o f goods i,
total French imports o f Moroccan goods i.
61
matched the original Moroccan IO table. Firstly a world import IO table was calculated 
directly by applying the above ratios to the Moroccan (total) IO table. Then a partner- 
country imported IO table was obtained basically using equation (1) with the appropriate 
modifications.
Version 3 of the SAM represents the case where the detailed information on imports 
by origin and sector o f destination is assumed not to be available. It is possible to 
consider two hypothesis: in the first the broad sectoral destination of use of imported 
goods is known, i.e. imports can be classified between intermediates or final demand 
goods, in the second it is unknown. In other words, version 3 in the first hypothesis will 
differ from version 2 only for the imported IO tables, whereas in the second it will differ 
also for the imported final private demand.
Table 3-6, the version 1 SAM, can be schematically represented as:
( sall *12 *1 f, q,N
SAM, = m2, S22 *2 »2 q2
l w, W2 0 0 o,
where:
S„ are the “domestic”  intermediate tables,
m,j bilateral trade (‘A’ represents diagonal matrices).
x, final domestic dem and (includes private final consumption and investment demands), 
f, final foreign dem and (includes private final consumption and investment demands)65, 
q, other accounts (not affected by partner-country trade),
w, value added,
indices i , j = 1 ,2 .
It should be noticed that in this schematic version of Table 3-6, my aggregates 
partner-country and other countries imports (the ‘trade' account).
Consider now version 3, where no prior information about the destination of use of 
the imported goods is available“ . In this case imports are used domestically as 
intermediates and final demand goods. The calculations necessary to construct version 3 
can be summarised using matrix algebra as follows.
Define Ui, the vector sum of domestic use, as:
65 Note that these are zeros initially (in version I).
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U| = Su i + *1 = y i - mi2 - qi 
u2 = S22 i + *2 = y2 - ni2i - q2
where yi are SAM total incomes (expenditures). Domestic use can be disaggregated into 
its imported and domestic components. The following set of ratios are calculated for the 
imported component67: 
ai = AT1 m21 
a2 = Ù2'1 mi2
The estimated intermediate tables Su* , imported IO tables m ,/ , domestic and 
foreign final consumption x,’ and f,* take the form:
Su* = ( I - a 1 ) Su m 21* = à 1 Su Xi* = ( I - à i ) * i  fi* = à 2X2
S22 = ( I - à 2 ) S22 m 12 = à 2 S22 *2 = ( I - à 2 ) X2 f2 = à 1 X|
Finally to estimate the partner-country import IO tables it is necessary to calculate 
the ratio of partner-country imports to total imports and apply it to the m y \ x,* and fi* 
just calculated. This allows also to obtain a 'trade' account as in the original Table 3-6.
3.4.2 The multiplier decomposition68
Consider matrix T of section 3.2. Let row sums of T be represented by a vector of 
incomes y and column normalization of T by the matrix of expenditure shares A. Thus, 
the very well known property of a balanced SAM can be expressed by the following 
identity:
y ~ A y (1)
66 This is the most general case. The other one, where the destination of use of imported goods is known, 
is briefly analysed in Appendix B.
It is possible to define z,, total domestic supply, as total supply (income) minus imports:
*1 =yi - ni2i =  b 1 S|| i +  b 1 X| +  m,2 + qi = b 1 U| + mu +  qi
*2 = y ’ - mi2 • b 2 S221 + b  2 x2 + m2i + q2 =  b 2 U2 + m2i + q2
in words, domestic supply is sold domestically in the intermediate and final private consumption good 
markets and as an export in the foreign markets. The b, ratios for the domestic component take the form: 
bi = O f1 zi -  0 1'1 m i2- O f' qi
b2 =  02'' z2 - 0 2"1 nt2i -  A 2"1 q2
Note that:
i 1+ b , =  I
This follows from the definition of domestic use and the formulas for the ratios >! and b| since:
4,+ b, = fl,'1 ( mj, + z, - m.j- q,) = 0,'1 ( mJ( + y , - mJ( - m „ - q i ) = ft,'1 A,.
61 This section is based on Pyatt and Round (1979), and Round (1985).
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A s s u m in g  m a c c o u n ts  a s  e n d o g e n o u s  a n d  k a s  e x o g e n o u s  e q u a t io n  (1 )  c a n  b e  w rit te n
as:
( 2)
from which endogenous incomes can be calculated as follows:
y  m — A  mm y  m A  mk y  Ic
A mm y » + t (3)
= ( I - A mm  )'' X = M X
x being a m x 1 vector of exogenous injections, and M the multiplier matrix. This matrix 
can be multiplicatively decomposed as follows.
Consider a partition of matrix Amm by country where the subscripts 1 and 2 
correspond to France and Morocco respectively. Equation (3) now takes the form:
from equation (5). endogenous incomes are calculated as 
y „ = B y m+ C y m+x
= ( I - B )"'C y m + ( I - B )"' x (6)
= [I-( I - B y 'C l' 1 ( I - B )■' x = ( I  - D)"'( I - B )■' x = M2 Mi x 
It should be noticed that M|, being expressed in terms of matrix B. measures intra- 
country multipliers effects, and that M2 accounts for the remaining inter-country 
effects.6’ In the following experiments I will consider an additive decomposition which is 
interpreted more easily. This takes the form70
M M2 can be further decomposed as follows
y . -  ( I - D V  ( I + D) ( I - B )•' x -  M j Ma  M, * (7)
In equation (7) M, has not changed, but inter-country multipliers has been decomposed in the so called 
open-loop (M22) multipliers and closed-loop (Mj) multipliers.
° With the open- dosed- loop multipliers the additive decomposition would be:
M-I-M,M2JMi-I-
(4)
Then matrix Amm can be decomposed as
(5)
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M- I  = M2 M| - I
= (M2-I ) M, +M, -I  
= N2 + N, - 1
where N2 =(M2 - I ) and N|= M| . This decomposition can be applied to either version 2 
or version 3 of the SAM since they are consistent and identical in format.
3.4.3 Stylised results
This section presents the main results derived from the application of the multipliers 
decomposition to versions 2 and 3 of a French Moroccan SAM with 13 sectors. 4 
production factors, and 6 households.71 The multipliers shown in the following tables are 
fixed price multipliers, this means that a fundamental assumption in their calculation is 
that any increase in exogenous demand is satisfied by expanding supply. In other words 
this analysis cannot take into account supply constraints, price variations and substitution 
effects. Nonetheless its validity is probably tenable when the exogenous shocks are of 
small magnitude or in the cases of short-run excess capacity and unemployment or long- 
run infinite elasticity of supply of factors of production: in these cases the multipliers can 
approximate marginal variations72. Furthermore, a thorough multiplier analysis can offer 
a clear illustration of the main interdependencies among the various actors in the 
economies under study helping the construction of an effective more complex general 
equilibrium model.
Two subsections follow. The first illustrating the multipliers calculated exclusively 
from version 2, fulfils the purpose of detailing all the main interdependencies of the 
France-Morocco SAM. The second evaluates data intensive frameworks by collecting the 
most relevant differences between version 2 and 3 multipliers and offers some 
conclusions on share sensitivity analysis.
=(Mj - l)M22 M, + (M2j - 1) M, + Mi - 1
= Nj + Njj + N| - 1
Activities, factors and households accounts are endogenous whereas Government, Investment and 
Foreign transactions represent exogenous demand. Endogeneity of the accounts is determined following 
Pyatt and Round (1979). The exogenous accounts include also Tariffs, Commercial Margins, Indirect taxes 
and Subsidies.
7; To be more precise it should be noticed that these are accounting multipliers - i.e. based on averages - 
and not marginal coefficients (for the following analysis this would matter if marginal and average 
propensities to consume were different; assuming them equal is equivalent to impose a unitary income 
elasticity of consumption). See Pyatt and Round ( 1979) page 861.
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SAM multipliers: version 2
Version 2 (the "true" import table version) N| multipliers shown in Table 3-9 are 
interpreted as the intra-country multipliers or as those multipliers that would be obtained 
from two separate SAMs for France and Morocco. An entry of Table 3-9 should be read 
as the income variation of the row sector given an increase in the exogenous demand of 
the column sector (the units are cents per dollar).
Consider firstly injections originating from production sectors (the first 13 columns). 
In fact, these multipliers can be compared to the Leontief inverse and have the expected 
magnitude7’. For both countries, strong linkages are registered on the main diagonal and 
for the service sector. Also, Morocco records very significant interdependencies among 
agricultural, mining and food product activities and the other industries. This confirms 
the relevance of these sectors in the Moroccan economy. However, the quite different 
economic structure and development of the two countries clearly appears in the lower 
part of the table. Here it is possible to appreciate how exogenous demand injections affect 
income distribution among factors of production and households. Consider the rows for 
factors of production. In France, the relative weight of multiplier effect for corporate 
with respect to small capital is much higher, showing more mature and concentrated 
capital markets than in Morocco, where small business capital still plays a very important 
role. The same relative measure for skilled with respect to unskilled labour is lower for 
France, reflecting a more homogeneous work force with lower skill differentials. 
Moreover, the maximum effect for corporate capital originates from French agriculture, 
revealing its hi-tech extensive character, and Moroccan mining, which is dominated by 
huge government enterprises. For small capital the maximum effect results from French 
services and from Moroccan agriculture. Skilled labour highest multipliers are derived 
from French services and Moroccan leather sector, unskilled labour ones from French 
metal product and Moroccan leather sector. The more mature character of the French 
economy is also revealed when the household sector is considered. Although a greater 
degree of uniformity is noticeable with the urban proprietors and professional group
See, for example. Leontief (1953). Notice that these in/ra-country multipliers could be further 
decomposed to obtain M) Mj M, multipliers within countries, and that the activity portion of M| would be 
properly defined as the intra-industry multiplier.
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playing the major role across sectors in both countries, some differences still appear. In 
Morocco, urban government employees, rural farmers and rural agriculture workers, the 
typical greater part of a developing country population, record stronger multiplier effects 
than their French counterparts. The injections generating highest effects, across all 
households, are from leather, services and agriculture in Morocco, and services, capital 
goods and other durables in France.74
Consider now injections from factors of production or households (the rightmost 10 
columns). In this case, multipliers are not immediately interpretable as a Leontief inverse, 
and they essentially measure the income generating effect of an exogenous shock through 
the income expenditure loop of the SAM. An injection to a household group produces 
multiplier effects according to its specific expenditure pattern. Considering activity rows, 
one can note that multipliers do not markedly differ across households for each country, 
reflecting similar consumption patterns. Flowever this similarity is not maintained across 
countries. In fact, the main difference between France and Morocco is represented by 
Morocco showing higher multipliers for basic goods (agriculture, food, beverages, 
apparel) and lower for capital goods than those for France. In the household-to-factor 
multipliers shown in the second panel of the table, it is important to note that although 
households do not directly consume labour or capital, their consumption of final goods 
indirectly cause factoral income effects. Due to this indirect link, these multipliers present 
once more, across households, a fairly high degree o f homogeneity. The size of 
household-to-household multipliers depends in part on inter-household transfers and on 
the indirect income expenditure loops. The multipliers depicted in the factors of 
production columns and activity rows measure an indirect effect, too. An income 
injection to a factor is transmitted to its owners and, through their expenditure patterns, to 
the other SAM sectors/institutions.
An analysis of factor-to-household multipliers reveals some important differences 
among Moroccan and French factoral income distribution. French factoral income 
multipliers seem to be more evenly distributed across households (with the exception of 
rural skilled labour), as shown by Table 3-8 below.
4 The strong effects recorded for services are a direct consequence of the aggregation of the SAMs.
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Table 3-8: Factor-to-House holds .V> multiplier stamlard deviations (SD)
SmalICap_______ CorpCap______ UnskLab______SkilILab
SD urb Fr 3 21 2 2
SD urb Mr 29 26 3 20
SD rur Fr 1 10 16 10
SD rur Mr 36 16 32 6
This implies that injections will have differential effects on the various households 
groups with implications for the income distribution.
The above analysis can be supplemented by examining the injections and leakages 
matrices. These are defined in the following equation:
where:
N| is the intra-country multipliers matrix,
Ji the injection matrix,
L' the leakage matrix,
Amk exogenous account expenditure shares (government, subsidy, investment, export 
accounts)
Akm exogenous account expenditure shares (government, indirect taxes, tariff, saving, import 
accounts)75.
' Refer to equation 2 of section 3.4.2 for a definition of the A matrices.
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The injections and leakages matrices have been reproduced in Table 3-10, with the 
latter transposed.
The values reproduced in columns 1 to 5 are averages of the respective row of the 
multiplier matrix N i weighted by the expenditure shares of the exogenous accounts. They 
can be interpreted as the aggregate effect on the income of a particular row of one dollar 
injection from an exogenous account, holding its expenditure composition constant. 
Those in columns 6 to 13 measure how one76 unit leakage is spent by endogenous 
accounts, holding the expenditure composition on exogenous accounts constant.
Domestic injections (columns 1 and 21 produce comparable multiplier effects on 
French and Moroccan activities and other accounts (factors and households). Services 
exhibit the highest values in both countries. Capital goods and other durables are also 
important for France, while agriculture, mining, and food products register significant 
effects in Morocco77. Corporate capital, skill labour and urban households seems to be the 
most responsive among factors and institutions.
More interesting differences emerge when foreign demand injection (columns 3 to 5) 
are inspected. Clearly, France has important linkages via its exports to the European 
Community and with a diminishing intensity to the remaining European countries and the 
rest of the world. It can also be noticed that its strongest interdependencies are for 
services and durables with multipliers averaging 50 cents. Moroccan export dependency 
is primarily from France and this explains the very low values presented in the Moroccan 
part of columns 3,4 and 5.
As far as domestic leakages (columns 6 to 10) are concerned, direct taxes (column 6 
and household rows) appear to have higher leakage values in France, savings (column 7 
and household rows) are more significant in Morocco, indirect taxes (column 8 and 
activity rows) are more evenly distributed across sectors in France, tariffs are clearly 
important in Morocco and finally commercial margins record similar effects across the 
two countries.
6 Notice that since N, takes into account only intra-country effects, the leakages total values, shown in 
column 14, differ from 100 in several cases.
It should be reminded that for both countries government expenditures are mostly concentrated on the 
service sector and investment demand on capital good sector. This coupled with the fixed composition 
assumption partly explains the multipliers result.
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Foreign leakages show a similar pattern to the corresponding injections. It should be 
added that France displays maximum values for durables, demonstrating the inter­
industry character of its international trade and. as already stated. Moroccan import 
dependency is strongest for capital goods78.
The above observations are clearly summarised by the bottom part of Table 3-10, 
where simple means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are shown for the two countries 
activities, factors and households accounts.
/n/er-country N2 multipliers account for the effects of an increase in the exogenous 
demand in country 1 on incomes of country 2. Their value basically depends on the 
magnitude of the elements in matrix C. that is the pattern of bilateral trade, remittances 
and other transfers.
’ What has been said for Moroccan exports to France, should be repeated for imports and it should also 
explain why total values are below 100 as explained in footnote 76.
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Table 3-10: Ni Injections and leakages matrices (cents per dollari
iw if f l iw ______________________________________ u « k » « s
/ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I I 12 13 14
Gov CaDAc E< ROE ROW Oov CtpA c IdTax T ar CmM a r ,c ROT ROW Tot
FrAgricult 4 2 14 12 7 18 25 9 0 32 8 1 6 100
FrMining 4 3 10 7 9 10 9 29 0 21 II 3 17 100
FrFoodPr 6 4 14 10 10 17 19 12 0 35 10 1 6 100
FrBev Fobac 2 1 4 3 6 14 17 21 0 37 7 0 3 100
FrTextile 0 0 2 ! 1 19 17 10 0 14 28 1 10 9 9
Fr Apparel 2 2 6 6 6 13 II 16 1 40 II 1 6 100
FrLeather 0 0 1 1 2 12 10 17 1 45 9 0 5 100
FrWoodNMetal 6 4 13 8 II 20 19 14 0 27 12 1 7 100
FrMetalProd 2 3 13 10 12 23 20 12 0 17 19 1 7 100
Frt'apGood 5 12 41 35 47 20 17 15 0 23 16 1 8 100
FrChem 3 3 20 18 19 18 17 12 0 25 20 1 8 100
FrOthManuf 1 1 2 1 4 13 II 17 0 47 6 0 4 100
79 48 63 49 60 30 ?8 17 0 8 10 1 6 100
FrSmallCap 3 2 3 2 3 47 50 1 0 1 1 0 0 100
FrCorpCap 19 13 27 21 24 30 53 4 0 5 5 0 3 100
FrUnskLab 7 6 15 12 14 40 23 9 0 II 10 1 6 99
FrSkilllLab 24 16 29 23 29 40 23 9 0 II 10 1 6 IW
FrlPrpPrfH 20 18 21 16 20 42 28 7 0 8 8 0 5 100
FrUNPrGov 15 8 13 10 12 40 21 10 0 II 10 1 6 100
FrULabH 18 7 13 10 13 38 21 10 0 12 II 1 6 99
FrRFarmH 5 5 5 4 5 37 40 5 0 7 6 0 4 KH)
FrRNAgWkrH II 6 9 7 8 39 24 9 0 II 10 1 6 100
FrRAttWkrH 0 0 _ 10 1 5 83
MrAgricult 18 10 0 1 0 9 25 II 6 31 4 2 7 95
MrMining 7 8 0 2 0 10 21 7 24 14 3 3 13 96
MrFoodPr 9 7 0 0 0 7 18 12 9 27 7 3 11 94
MrBevTobac 3 4 0 0 0 4 9 50 5 23 2 1 3 98
MrTextile 2 2 0 0 0 5 13 9 15 33 II 2 8 96
MrApparel 2 2 0 0 0 6 17 9 10 33 6 2 12 96
MrLeather 3 7 0 0 0 10 28 23 5 14 4 2 7 95
MrWoodNMetal 8 13 0 0 0 6 16 15 13 23 7 5 8 94
MrMetalProd 4 10 0 0 0 4 II II 21 25 12 3 7 94
MrCapGood 2 28 0 0 0 3 7 7 28 29 8 3 6 91
MrChcm 6 8 0 1 1 5 13 9 17 29 10 4 8 94
MrOthManuf 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 5 20 48 5 1 7 96
79 81 1 2 1 8 24 21 7 14 ? ____ i_ 10 __?3
MrSmallCap 6 5 0 0 0 11 40 9 5 15 5 2 8 95
MrCorpCap 14 16 0 1 0 22 42 6 3 10 3 2 5 95
MrUnskLab 2 2 0 0 0 9 29 II 6 20 6 3 10 94
MrSkillLah 30 33 0 1 0 9 34 h 6 16 ____ ____ i . 9 94
MrUPrpPrfH 13 14 0 0 10 37 10 5 15 5 3 9 94
MrUNPrGov 14 15 0 0 0 9 34 11 6 15 6 3 9 94
MrULabH 10 5 0 0 0 9 30 11 6 18 6 3 10 94
MrRFarmH 9 9 0 0 0 11 44 8 5 15 5 2 7 96
MrRNAgWkrH 2 2 0 0 0 9 28 II 6 20 7 3 10 94
NIfRAflWkrH 12 6 0 0 0 , _9_ 29 10 _ _ 6_ 21 6 i _  10 94
FrAct • M 9 6 16 12 15 17 17 16 0 28 13 1 7
FrAct - SD 21 13 18 14 18 5 {> 5 0 12 6 1 4
MrAct - M II 14 0 1 0 6 16 15 14 26 7 2 8
MrAct - SD 21 21 0 1 0 3 7 12 8 9 ____2_ 1 _____ s_
It  Fact -M 14 9 18 15 18 39 37 6 0 7 6 0 4
Filaci - SD 10 6 12 10 11 7 Iff 4 0 5 4 _____0-_____ 2_
MrFact - M 13 14 0 1 0 13 36 9 5 15 5 2 8
Mil act • SD 13 14 0 0 0 6 6 2 i ____4__ 1 1 _____ 2_
FrHH -M 12 7 10 8 10 38 26 8 0 10 9 1 5
tlt l l l  - SD 8 6 7 6 7 4 7 2 ____ 0______2 _ ____ i - _ _ _ a . ___L_
MrHH -M 10 8 0 0 0 9 34 10 6 17 6 3 9
Militi - SD _________ i — ____i— ____ Q______Q- 0 _____i _ ____tL 1 ____ i__ ____i — 1 _____SL_____ L_
7 2
Table 3-11 shows the maximum values of the N: multiplier matrix.79 The first column 
records income variations accrued to French sectors and other accounts from an 
expansion of Moroccan demand, the second column shows the reverse relationship: 
Moroccan income growth due to higher French demand (by one unit). The maximum 
values shown in columns 1 and 2 are calculated for injections only in the activities 
accounts. The stronger dependency of Morocco on France is clearly shown by the 
difference in the size of the multipliers in the two columns. The highest degree of 
interdependency is registered for textiles, apparel and durable goods, confirming the 
conclusion of section 3.2. Column 3 of the table presents instead the maximum value for 
Moroccan multipliers obtained from all possible French injections. It should be noticed 
that almost invariably they are derived from injections in French rural agricultural worker 
households.
Columns 2 and 3, while they do not differ in their distribution across rows, diverge in 
the size of the effect and this is due to the remittances of Moroccan workers80.
The highest multiplier values for French factors of production and households 
originate from Moroccan capital goods exogenous demand, whereas the maximum effect 
on Moroccan incomes is obtained from French injections in the textile and apparel 
sectors, another confirmation of the relative specialization of the two countries.
’ This is done for brevity, the other elements of matrix N, will be considered below when commenting 
on version 3 of the SAM.
*° In fact, in the French-Moroccan SAM these remittances are classified as transfers from French to 
Moroccan households, with their highest relative values in the rural agricultural worker household 
category. Notice the advantage of dealing with SAMs: within a simple input-output multiplier analysis it 
would have not been possible to calculate column 3 much higher values.
73
Table 3-11: Inter-country .V-» Multipliers (cents per dollar o f new demand) - Version 2
Fr.M or M or.Fr M or,Fr*
/ 2 3
A gricult 2.09 0.31 10.25
M ining 0.65 0.09 1.76
FoodPr 0.94 0.10 4.66
B evTobac 0.18 0.01 0.64
Textile 0.89 0.27 0  78
Apparel 0.70 0.34 L i t
Leather 0.73 0.24 0.83
W oodN  Metal 2.65 0.03 1 2 8
M etal Prod 4 28 0.02 0.77
C apG ood 8.28 0.02 0.43
Chem 3.60 0 .10 1 84
O thM anuf 0.11 0 .00 0.13
Services 4.92 0.22 7.63
Sm allCap 0.23 0 .07 2.00
CorpC ap 2.22 0.12 3.65
U nskLab 1.56 0.03 0.81
Skilll.ab 2.90 0.16 4 86
l.'PrpPrtH 1.94 0.11 3.10
UNPrGov 1.28 0.08 2.26
LiLabH 1.32 0.14 0 88
RFarmH 0.44 0.08 2.34
RNAgW krH 0.87 0.02 0.45
RAgW krH 0.02 0.09 17 88
C orpor____________ _______ --90______________0.12________ _________ L 6S
Finally an analysis of income distribution can be illustrated from Table 3-12 below. 
This shows how exogenous demand, via trade linkages between the partner-countries, 
affects in quite different ways the factoral and household incomes in the two countries. 
Injections into Moroccan activities lead to enhanced French income for corporate capital, 
skilled labour and urban proprietor and professional households, with the remaining 
factors and households weighting half or below the maxima. The reverse, i.e. injections 
in French activities, generates its strongest effects on Moroccan corporate capital, skilled 
labour and urban labour households. Notice also though that urban proprietors and 
professionals, urban government employees, rural agriculture workers, farmers and small 
capital in Morocco enjoy generally higher multipliers than in France. This seems to 
suggest that expanding its particular trade linkages with France, Morocco may expect 
beneficial effects on its income distribution.
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Table 3-12: .V* Multipliers as a percentage of their column maxima (version 2)
-Asti-----M in— Food— BvTb Text____A dd Leath WNM____M el CapG  Chem  O thM  Scrv
FrSm allCap 10 12 8 10 9 9 10 9 10 8 10 9 10
FrCorpCap 93 85 100 96 99 94 90 87 85 76 84 84 84
FrUnskLab 52 50 45 53 58 56 53 56 65 54 49 58 51
F rS k illU b 100 100 79 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FrlPrpPrtV I 80 81 71 80 80 78 79 75 74 67 71 72 73
FrliN PrG ov 47 46 38 47 48 48 49 46 48 44 44 46 46
F rl'L abH 45 45 37 46 47 47 46 46 49 46 44 47 45
FrRFarmFI 20 19 20 20 20 19 19 18 17 15 17 17 17
FrRNAgW krH 31 31 26 31 32 32 31 31 33 30 29 31 30
1 1 | 1 1 1 1
M rSm allCap 36 27 42 30 41 35 23 28 25 26 29 27 25
M rCorpCap 72 100 75 60 75 58 57 55 53 52 66 54 48
M rUnskLab 15 II 17 13 17 14 15 12 10 10 12 11 10
M rSkillLab 100 96 100 87 100 100 100 82 73 79 93 79 73
MrUPrpPrtFI 60 67 64 51 64 54 49 47 44 45 54 46 41
M rUNPrGov 46 44 46 40 46 46 46 38 35 37 43 37 34
M rUl.abH 85 93 82 100 69 54 55 100 100 100 100 100 100
M rRFarmH 44 45 48 38 48 40 34 35 32 33 38 34 30
M rRNAgW krH 17 15 16 17 14 13 13 16 15 15 16 16 14
M rR A gW krn 79 6? 69 79 ___ S I _ 47 ____i i . ____22 — - . 2 2 . . 69..__ ZL 71 ___ 67
This is further stressed when injections directly from factors or households are taken 
into account. In fact. Table 3-13 reverts the results of the corresponding Table 3-8 
calculated forNi.
Table 3-13: Factor-to-Households standard deviations ofmultiplier/SD)
SmallCaD CoruCao UnskLab SkillLab
SD urb Fr 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26
SD urb Mr 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11
SD rur Fr 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.24
SD rur Mr 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.06
SAM multipliers share sensitivitv: versions 2 and 3 compared
The main advantage of version 3 over version 2 consists in estimating partner-country 
imports tables directly from the original SAM with the simple procedure described in 
section 3.4.1, that is with no need for new data. It is of interest to assess the validity of 
this short-cut method by measuring the differences in the N| and N2 multipliers derived 
from these two versions.
Table 3-14 displays percentage differences in the N| inira-country multipliers only 
for the production accounts. From this table it is possible to get a measure of the 
distortions in the multipliers when these are actually calculated from gross “domestic" IO 
tables. The convention is that a negative entry corresponds to a larger multiplier in
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version 3. In the case of France, it is possible to note how higher version 3 Ni multipliers 
coincide with the mining, textile, apparel and chemical sectors. This can be easily 
explained by noticing that intermediate imports are especially concentrated in these 
sectors, therefore an injection in one of them will exert different effects in versions 2 and 
3 of the SAM. In particular, version 3 over-estimates the domestic income effects derived 
from positive exogenous shocks whereas part of the effect in fact leaks out through 
greater imports, while this is properly taken into account in version 2. The reverse is true 
for agriculture and also in part for the beverage and tobacco sector. In the case of 
Morocco, version 3 over-estimation is particularly intense for the capital goods sectors 
(consider both the row and the column), proving once more its import dependency, 
whereas some degree of under-estimation is recorded for the textile and apparel sectors. 
Table 3-14's main feature is its concise evaluation of the distortions created in the inter­
industry linkages when these are not derived from a proper domestic IO table (as version 
2). A special version of this same table was calculated from a modified version 3, which 
included domestic and non-partner country imported goods. Interestingly the French 
portion of the table recorded values very close to zero proving that its inter-industry 
linkages were almost unaltered, whereas the differences in the Moroccan multipliers only 
marginally diminished in absolute values. This confirms once more the Moroccan 
dependency on France.
Larger differences are shown in Table 3-15. These result from the discrepancies in the 
treatment of bilateral trade in SAM2 and SAM3 and correctly accounted for by the inter- 
country N2 multipliers. The different impact of external shocks requires a separate 
analysis for the two countries.
The case of income effects on French sectors due to an increase in Moroccan final 
demand is displayed in the upper part o f Table 3-15. Flere, a basic characteristic is the 
concentration of the highest positive entries along the capital goods column. Notice that 
version 3 under-estimates (by slightly less than 25% on average) the effects of an 
injection from Moroccan capital goods also for French factors and households.
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Table 3-14: X , intra-country multipliers 1% Differences : Version 2- Version 3)
___ Ann Min Food Bv Tb Text A d d Leath WNM Mr! CaoG OthM
FrAgricult 8 •16 3 3 -63 -21 -9 -3 -2 -2 -13 0 0
FrMining 5 -75 9 II -7 6 5 4 -12 -6 •II -12 2
FrFoodPr • 1 -15 -10 1 -26 -9 -14 -2 -1 -2 -9 0 0
FrBevTobac 1 -15 1 -17 -15 -3 -3 -1 •1 -2 -5 2 0
FrTextile 1 •10 3 6 -50 1 20 8 4 3 -3 17 4
FrApparel •1 -14 0 3 -4 -29 9 -7 0 -1 • 1 10 0
FrLeather 4 -13 2 3 -13 -15 -36 7 0 -1 -6 3 0
FrWoodN Metal 2 •14 5 -3 -9 0 2 -12 0 -2 -10 7 1
FrMetalProd 7 -4 5 9 -16 8 II 6 -9 -3 -4 -2 1
FrCapGood 14 -8 4 6 -14 •1 •1 -3 7 -5 -1 3 1
FrChem -8 -3 -2 1 -44 -6 •II 7 7 0 -42 8 6
FrOthManuf -4 -14 •1 10 -14 -2 0 1 -2 -2 -8 3 0
Fr Services - j -17 0 0 - u ■) -2 -1 -2 ■) •8 2 - |
MrAgricult 1 -9 -1 -6 0 1 •1 1 -4 0 •1 1
MrMining -1 0 5 3 1 -2 -II 7 8 -2 10 -1 3
MrFoodPr -2 1 -13 0 4 4 1 -1 1 -5 -1 -1 1
MrBevTobac -2 -1 -5 0 3 3 -2 -2 0 -5 0 -3 2
MrTextile -4 -6 -6 -2 17 19 -6 14 3 -8 -18 -5 3
MrApparel -1 -1 -5 0 9 10 0 1 1 -5 -3 -2 0
MrLeather -2 -2 -6 -1 5 4 3 • 1 • 1 -6 • 1 -5 0
MrWoodN Metal 0 1 -3 -1 5 6 1 -18 - | -5 -4 -3 -1
MrMetalProd 5 12 8 14 12 II 3 11 - | -5 10 5 5
MrCapGood -17 -3 -13 • 1 -11 -8 -9 -14 -1 -40 •11 -9 -30
MrChem 3 4 2 2 0 6 2 4 2 -II -16 -14 2
MrOthManuf 4 4 -1 4 8 8 5 2 4 -2 3 0 1
Misery m s _________ ___ ____ ____ ______L _ 4 _____ _____ a . _____ ____Q______- j - _____ _____i . _____Q
Similar observations could be made for other durable sectors and chemicals. 
Considering injections directly into Moroccan households in the last 6 columns, over­
estimation is registered for agriculture81, mining and other manufactures, and under­
estimation for textiles, leather products, capital goods and services. Viewing the second 
panel of the table, overall, Moroccan household inter-dependency with French 
households and factors is under-estimated by version 3 with a decreasing intensity 
proportional to the household income.
Moroccan sectors’ income effects due to changes in French final demand are 
especially under-estimated for the cases of textile, apparel and leather, whereas slightly 
higher multipliers are found in version 3 for agriculture. Factors and households 
injections display a rather uniform low over-estimation.
As already noticed, the strongest inter-country multiplier effects accrue to French 
incomes from Moroccan injections and it is therefore interesting to further inspect their 
distortions in version 3.
*' This is reported because agriculture is a sensitive sector. Apparently, examination of version J (with 
estimated import tables) will suggest stronger effects on French agriculture.
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Table 3-16 offers a qualitative analysis of the divergence of the N2 multipliers in the 
two versions. The first 10 columns of the table show the multipliers as a percentage of 
their own column maxima. This provides evidence of the effects on the ranking and 
distribution of income for a given injection to each account. Although some variations are 
registered, it is remarkable that only for two inflows, namely labour and household 
accounts, the maximum multiplier changes its position. It is also significant that 63% of 
the cells show values slightly greater in version 3 (of about 4% on average) and that, as 
shown by the standard deviation figures, dispersion is not affected.
The figures in the leftmost columns represent multipliers as percentages of their own 
row maxima and give an indication of the order and distribution of income effects for 
each account across sources of injection. Once again only in two cases, for food- 
beverages-tobacco and capital accounts, there is a shift in the maximum, and dispersion 
remains almost constant. On average 68% of the entries display a value 10% greater in 
version 3.
It is worth noticing that Table 3-16 result holds also for more disaggregated versions 
of the SAM, in the case of French injections to Moroccan accounts and for the Ni intra- 
country multiplier.
3.5 Conclusion
As stated at the outset of this chapter a thorough quantitative analysis of the regional 
interdependencies in the Mediterranean area needs to be based on a detailed and updated 
SAM. This can also provide indispensable data used in the calibration of CGE simulation 
models. Most previous analyses, with few exceptions, have focused on the North 
American area. Considering the advantages of starting the analysis of the Mediterranean 
regional economic integration from two exemplar economies, this paper offers a new 
Mediterranean SAM for France and Morocco for 1990. A comparative examination of 
this SAM with a similar one built for NAFTA is carried out and some common 
characteristics are outlined, especially the much higher dependency of the developing 
partners on the more advanced regional group.
The more interesting results of this chapter are found in the second part where a 
fixed-price multiplier model is constructed. In an effort to detect the connection between
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data and models, the multiplier analysis is used to highlight some crucial structural 
features of the economies under study and to carry out a special case of share sensitivity 
analysis. The results of the share sensitivity analysis are then used to assess the effort of 
gathering data-intensive full import input-output matrices. 1 conclude that these tables can 
be actually estimated from the original gross domestic input-output table with alternative 
proposed methods without great loss of information, especially in the case in which, at 
least, imports flows can be distinguished between intermediate and final demand goods. 
This is inferred from the observation that the described changes in SAM accounting 
framework induce only modest variations in the multipliers. In the case of France and 
Morocco, this conclusion may be extended to a CGE model in the sense that results 
should not be too sensitive to share parameters in the relevant import demand functions.
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3.6 Appendix A: Accounts classification
Sectoring scheme for France-Morocco SAM
Sectors
1 Cereals 9 TobaccoPr 19 Rubber
Hard Wheat 10 Textile Tire and Rubber Products
Soft Wheat 1 1 Apparel Plastic Products
Barley 12 Leather 20 OthManuf
Maize Leather Products 21 Constructn
Legumes Shoes 22 Electricity
2 IndCrops 13 Paper Wood 23 Commerce
Sugar Beets Wood Products 24 TranspComm
Oil Seeds Furniture T ransport
3 VegFruit Paper Products Communication
Vegetables Printing and Publishing 25 Finanlnsur
Fruit 14 NonMetMinPr Banking
4 Livestock Construction Materials Insurance
5 OlhAgri Glass Products 26 OthService
Other Agricultural Products 15 MetalProd Other Services
Forestry Iron and Steel Public Administration Serv.
Fishery Metal Products
6 MinEne 16 Machin
Mining Agriculture Machinery
Petroleum Other Machinery
Refined Products Electrical Machinery
7 FoodPr 17 TranspEqp
Meat Processing Motor Vehicles
Dairy Products Railroad Materials
Bakery Ship Building
Grain Milling Aircraft Building
Retlned Sugar 18 Chemicals
Other Food Products Basic Chemicals
8 Beverages Pharmaceuticals
Other Accounts: Factors and Households
1 SmallCap Private Small Business Capital
2 CorpCap Private and Public Large Corporate Capital
3 UnskLab Unskilled (or low skilled) Wage Workers
4 SkillLab Salaried & Independent Workers. Employers
1 UPrpPrfH Urban Professional or Proprietor Household Head
2 UNPrGov Urban Non Laborer Non Professional or Government employee Household Head
3 ULabH Urban Laborer Head of Household
4 RFarmH Rural Farmer or Non Agriculture Proprietor Head of Household
5 RNAgWkrH Non Agriculture Worker Head of Household
6 RAgWkrH Agriculture Worker Head of Household
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In order to derive version 3 SAM in the special case where imports can be 
distinguished by their destination of use as imported intermediates or imported final 
demand goods the following calculations are necessary.
Define j i , the vector sum of intermediate deliveries as: 
ji = Sn i 
¿2 = S22 i
0,. the row normalized matrix of intermediates deliveries takes the form:
0 | = j 1 1 S11
0: = j 2’1 S22
m ij* . the new imported IO tables are estimated from 0, and the imported intermediates 
vector m,j (that in this case is supposed to be known): 
i n  21 =  m  21 0 |
m 12 = m 12 02
and finally Sj,’ , the new domestic IO tables are derived as residuals:
Su* = j 1* 0| with ji* = ji - m2i
S22* * j 2* ©2 with j2* = j2 - mu
In this special case of version 3, f,* and Xj* are equal to the corresponding vectors of
version 2.
3.7 Appendix B: SAM v. 3 - Destination of use of imported goods known
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4 A Mediterranean Social Accounting Matrix
4.1 Introduction
A Social Accounting Matrix is part of the benchmark data-set in the construction of 
the fix-price multiplier model of the previous chapter and in the calibration o f the applied 
general equilibrium models presented in the subsequent chapters. Properties and 
advantages of SAMs for this purpose are well established in the recent literature on 
policy simulation modelling: they provide a comprehensive and consistent data 
foundation for policy analysis, as well as ensuring that the share parameters in 
behavioural functions reflect observed facts. Their usefulness has recently been reflected 
in the United Nations and joint agency new edition of the 1993 SNA manual on national 
accounts, which dedicates an entire chapter to SAMs.82
The next two sections detail the data sources and methods followed in the 
construction of the 1990 Moroccan SAM. As far as the French SAM is concerned, only 
the data sources are documented here. Two related facts suggested this choice of 
presentation. Firstly, for historical reasons, Moroccan and French statistical offices use 
the same standards and conventions and both countries’ national accounts (one of the 
main sources for a SAM) which also follow the guidelines of the United Nations System 
of National Accounts (SNA), so describing the SAM construction for one country avoids 
unnecessary repetition. Secondly, Morocco was chosen because its data presented more 
serious deficiencies and inconsistencies and therefore required supplementary adjustment 
and estimation procedures.
The detailed description of the SAM construction should allow us to assess the 
strengths (and weaknesses) of the empirical models built on these data. Moreover, 
although the process of SAM assembly cannot yet be entirely standardised, the methods 
described below are fairly general and can be considered as guidelines in the SAM 
construction procedure and in overcoming many of the most common obstacles.83
See S. Keuning (1994).
"  Data inconsistencies and/or deficiencies are the most common problems and they usually become 
worse at high levels of disaggregation.
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The development o f good economy-wide data should be based on three main criteria: 
detail, consistency, and timeliness. Detail, in the context of CGE models, refers to 
sectoral and domestic institutional (e.g. household) classification. The more 
disaggregated a SAM one can construct, the more flexible its future uses are. Availability 
of transactions among a large number of sectors, factors of production and household 
types allows informative empirical analysis of trade policy, environmental impacts, 
income distribution and factor market adjustments. Different levels of aggregation may 
be needed according to the specific problem investigated. This suggests the construction 
of a fairly disaggregated Mediterranean SAM, even though the complete detail has not 
been used in the subsequent models. As long as the other two criteria are concerned, 
economywide consistency is achieved primarily by reconciling input-output transactions 
and household survey data with standard national macro accounting, and timeliness is 
achieved by choosing the latest year for which the majority of data are available.
Section 4.2 deals with the estimation of the full-blown 133-sector Input-Output table 
for Morocco, including references to all the data sources that were incorporated. Section
4.3 describes the extra steps necessary to obtain the complete SAM from the IO table, 
and the final section provides data sources for the French SAM.
4.2 Construction of the 1990 Moroccan Input-Output table
The general approach to assembling data for the IO table was hierarchical and 
sequential. When direct estimates were available from official sources, these were 
incorporated first. The second category of estimates includes updates of data from 
previous years. Finally, when data were missing or considered extremely unreliable, 
indirect estimation methods, such as share imputation and matrix balancing, were used. 
The use of these conventions is explicitly shown at each stage below.
The main source o f information on the Moroccan industrial structure and linkages 
was the 1990 Input-Output table constructed by the Ministry of Industry.84 This table 
was in turn based on a combination of contemporaneous official data and an inter­
industry table compiled from source in 1980 by the Moroccan National Statistical Office
"4 Ministère du Commerce, de l'industrie et de la privatisation, Morocco (1993).
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(MNSO).8' The later table appears to have updated the 1980 one. combining 1990 final 
demand and value added data with the earlier intermediate table and using a matrix 
balancing procedure to produce a consistent table. Since these represent the most 
detailed official estimates of Input-Output accounts for a recent year, it has been chosen 
as the basis of the present, more detailed, table. The present table is consistent, by 
aggregation, with the latest official table.
The 1990 Ministry of Industry table contains 32 sectors. These include 7 sectors 
covering agriculture (an aggregate), mining (Phosphates. Non Metal Mineral, Metal 
Mineral. Crude Petroleum Products), and energy (Refined Petroleum Products. Electricity 
and Water). These are followed by 18 manufacturing sectors (Food Industry, Other Food 
Industry, Beverages and Tobacco, Textiles. Clothing. Leather and Shoes. Wood, Paper. 
Quarrying. Metal Industry, Metal Products, Machinery, Transport equipment. Electronic 
Products. Precision Instruments, Chemicals, Rubber, Other Manufactures). Service 
activities are decomposed into 8 activities (Construction, Commerce, Transport Services, 
Communication, Banking, Insurance, Other Services, and Public Administration).
The essence of the 1-0 table construction described here was to disaggregate this 
table to 133 activities. To do so it was necessary to rely on a variety of official domestic 
and international data sources. A special effort was made in the disaggregation to detail 
agricultural activities, which in the two previous tables had been represented only by one 
aggregate sector.86 The result is a group of 23 sub-sectors, whose disaggregation is 
described below.
4.2.1 Disaggregation of Agriculture
The agricultural activities detailed in the 133-sector Input-Output table are presented 
in the table below. These sectors aggregate consistently to the figures for Gross Output. 
Trade, Domestic Demand, and Value Added for the corresponding single agriculture 
sector in the Ministry of Industry table. Direct information was available for most of the
Ministère du Plan. Direction de la statistique, Morocco (1986).
Another independent attempt to disaggregate Moroccan agriculture in an input-output framework is to 
be found in the estimates of Sadoulet reported in Mateus ( 1988). These have in turn been used by a variety 
of authors, including Martens el al( 1990), and Rutherford. Rudstrom, and Tarr(l993).
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final demand and value added components of the detailed agriculture sectors. This 
section describes how intermediate demands for the 23 sub-sectors were estimated.
Table 4-1: Agriculture sectors
1 Hard W heat 7 S ugar Beets 13 Bersi m 19 O ther Fruit
2 Soft W heat 8 S ugar C ane 14 Citrus 20 O ther A griculture
3 Barley 9 O il S eeds 15 O lives 21 Livestock
4 M aize 10 Raw  F ib re 16 G rapes 22 Forestry
5 Rice h V egetab les 17 D ates 23 Fishing
6 Legum es 12 A lfalfa 18 A lm onds
For simplicity, it is useful to distinguish the 133 sectors of the IO table in two 
categories: (1) Agriculture (Ag, the first 23 sectors) and (2) Non-Agriculture (N-Ag. all 
remaining sectors). The data available in the Ministry of Industry IO table are -  
considering the column -  total purchases of Ag from Ag (a scalar) and from N-Ag (a 
vector of 32 elements), and -  considering the row -  total deliveries o f Ag to Ag (the same 
scalar considered above) and deliveries of Ag to N-Ag. These data are clearly not 
sufficient to estimate the square (Ag x Ag) matrix of transactions within Agriculture and 
the two rectangular (Ag x N-Ag and N-Ag x Ag) matrices of transactions (deliveries and 
purchases) of agricultural sectors with the rest of the economy. A special study 
commissioned from FAO by the Ministry of Agriculture was used as an additional source 
of information.87 This study considers the evolution of intermediate consumption for 
selected agricultural categories for the years 1969, 1975, 1980, 1985.88 The relevant 
information and the estimation procedure used are shown in Table 4-2. The first column 
contains the broad categories covered by the FAO study, and in the second column are 
estimates for intermediate consumption. The third and the fourth columns show the 
disaggregation of column 2 obtained using output shares for the 23 sectors of the last 
column.89 The fifth column represents updated intermediate demands estimated by using 
the shares of column 4 and the total value of 17,524 million Dh for agricultural output 
recorded in the Ministry of Industry table. The assumption underlying these estimates is 17*9
17 FAO - Ministère de l’Agriculture, Morocco (1988).
** The agricultural sectors considered here are: Cereals, Legumes, Oil Seed, Industrial Crops, Tree Crops 
(Fruits), Vegetables. Forages, Livestock, Forestry and Fishing.
19 As described below, the 23 sectoral gross output values were obtained directly from 1990 official 
statistics.
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that intermediate demand is proportional to gross output and that the composition of the 
more aggregate (FAO) intermediate demands has not changed significantly since 1985.
Table 4-2: Agriculture Intermediate Demand — (Millions of current Dh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S)
FAO sectors_groups Interm ediate dem and 1990 IO sectors
Years 1985 1985 1985 1990
106 Dh 106 Dh shares 10‘ Dh
907 0.079 1383 Hard W heat
937 0.082 1429 Soft W heat
669 0.058 1020 Barley
173 0.015 265 M aize
CEREALS 2716 2 0.000 3 Rice
LEGUM ES 293 293 0.025 446 Legumes
162 0.014 247 Sugar Beets
40 0.003 61 Sugar Cane
OILSEEDS 24 24 0.002 36 Oil Seeds
INDUSTRIAL CRO PS 232 30 0.003 45 Raw Fibre
VEGETABLES 855 855 0.074 1305 V egetables
72 0.006 109 A lfalfa
FORAGE 109 37 0.003 57 Bersi m
314 0.027 479 Citrus
186 0.016 284 Olives
72 0.006 .  110 G rapes
130 0.011 199 Dates
251 0.022 383 A lm onds
TREE CRO PS 1048 95 0.008 145 O ther Fruit
28 0.002 42 O ther Agri
LIVESTOCK 5541 5541 0.482 8452 Livestock
FORESTRY 0 0 0.000 0 Forestry
FISHING 671 671 0.058 1024 Fishina
TOTAL 11489 11489 1.000 17524
The next step was to disaggregate the values in column 5 (the total expenditures of 
Ag) among the Ag and N-Ag delivering sectors. The information contained in the FAO 
study treated delivering sectors at a relatively aggregated level, so it was necessary to use 
the basic data of the Ministry of Industry IO table. Production shares were again used to 
disaggregate the Ag sectors and then obtain agricultural intermediate consumption shares 
for the N-Ag sectors. The industrial sectors of the N-Ag group were further disaggregated 
from the original 18 to 96. To do this, output shares were used within each group. This 
allowed me to obtain both the square matrix Ag x Ag and the rectangular matrix Ag x N- 
Ag. Deliveries of Ag to N-Ag were obtained by disaggregating the row vector of the 
original IO table using Ag output shares.
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The final result obtained by applying the methodology just described was not fully 
satisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Ag x Ag matrix presented some 
unrealistic linkages90. Secondly, the Input-Output technology implied by the above 
approach is very homogeneous across the Ag sectors. To overcome these problems two 
corrections were applied. Firstly, unrealistic linkages (e.g. Sugar to Wheat) were 
eliminated in the Ag x Ag matrix and. using FAO estimates of the feed/seed ratio, 
diagonal elements were corrected for the principal crops.91 The second correction entailed 
modification of the Input-Output coefficients based on data for the same agricultural 
activities in other countries. The best available information in terms of agriculture detail 
and comparability of technology was found in IO tables estimated for Indonesia, Japan, 
and the United States.92 To make these tables comparable to the Moroccan IO table, it 
was necessary to consistently aggregate the sectoring schemes of the other three tables. 
The simple average of three columns of Input-Output coefficients was then applied to 
Moroccan total intermediate expenditures for each of the 23 agricultural sectors.
4.2.2 Gross Output and Related Data Sources
This section describes the data sources and the estimation procedures applied to 
calculate Gross Output. Agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are considered 
separately.
For gross production in Agriculture, basic data for quantities and producer prices 
were obtained from official yearly survey of production and in a study conducted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture.93 The first source reports data on areas, yield and quantities 
produced for all the crops in the new Input-Output table, the second document contains 
producer prices for Hard Wheat, Soft Wheat. Barley, Maize, Sugar Beets, Sugar Cane, 
Cotton (Raw Fibres) Oil Seeds. Since these data are not sufficient to estimate the 
production values for all 23 agricultural sub-sectors, it was necessary to obtain some
90 In the absence of direct information, this matrix was assumed to be diagonal for all crops except Other 
Agriculture and the remaining non zero elements represent linkages for Livestock, Forestry and Fishing 
with the rest of Agriculture.
"I The FAO estimates are contained in the Agrostat Database of that Organisation.
n  For the US IO table see K.A.Reinert and D.Roland-Holst (1992); for the Indonesia-Japan international 
IO table see Institute of Developing Economies ( 1992).
Royaume du Maroc. Ministère de l’Agriculture (1992).
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additional information. In particular, prices for Vegetables. Fruits. Legumes and Forages 
are derived using farm gate prices from of a World Bank irrigation project and FAO price 
estimates.94 For the Fishery' sector, production data were taken from the 1992 Statistical 
Yearbook.95 The production values for Livestock and Forestry are estimated as the 
difference between total production of Agriculture (a value given by the Ministry of 
Industry IO table) and the sum of Fishery and Crops production. This residual value was 
then allocated among the two remaining sectors according to output shares calculated 
from the most recent figures available in the Moroccan National Accounts.96
The current estimates of gross production by the N-Ag sectors should distinguish 
between Industrial sectors. Mining and Energy sectors, and Service sectors. The main 
problem in calculating gross output for the Industrial sectors was to reconcile the 
disaggregated data (96 sectors) with that in the Ministry of Industry IO table (18 sectors). 
An additional problem was the treatment of production from the informal sector. 
Informal activity estimates are derived from a study conducted by the MNSO for the year 
1988.97 This study covers the urban informal activities of the Industrial sectors (only at 
the aggregate level of 18 sectors), Commerce and Services. The other sectors, mainly 
primary sectors and those linked to Public Administration, are excluded. Informal sector 
production was included in the original table and. for 1988, accounted as a whole for 11.5 
per cent of GDP.98 Since, at the 96-sector level of detail, the only data available were 
official figures of gross production,99 the solution adopted for estimation of informal 
production was to assume that sub-sectors belonging to each of the 18 aggregate groups 
had informal activity proportional to their gross outputs, summing to the informal 
estimate for the whole subgroup. This assumption maintains consistency with the more 
aggregate table. A similar procedure was adopted for the service sectors.
94 Data concerning this project are taken from World Bank (1993). Note that for Forages it was also 
necessary to estimate production quantities from yield and area data. Finally, it is noteworthy that the 
project prices were usually quite close to the FAO estimates or to actual prices surveyed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
' See table 3.25 page 64 in Direction de la statistique (1992).
% See table 1.14 page 107 in Direction de la statistique (1988a).
Direction de la statistique ( 1988b).
See chapter II page 51 in Direction de la statistique (1988b).
'*'* These data are contained in files made available by the Ministry of Foreign Trade under concession of 
the Ministry of Industry. The same data are available in the yearly survey of the Industrial sectors, see 
Ministry of Industry (1991).
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All the trade data used for constructing the disaggregated table come from trade 
statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of Morocco.100 The data were contained in text 
files and are organised by product. The available information includes: values (in local 
currency, FOB for imports, CIF for exports), country of origin/destination. import tariffs, 
import tariff exemptions.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade arranged these data following the same scheme as the 
Foreign Trade Yearbook published by the Office des Changes, so that there is exact 
matching between the two sources. This scheme consists of a six-digit product 
classification with 99 merchandise groups. The trade data were first aggregated into three 
regions: EEC, Europe non-EEC (ROEU) , Rest of the World (ROW). Then they were 
further aggregated into the Ag/N-Ag sectoring scheme described above. The first two 
regional groups were constituted as follows:
4 2.3 International Trade
EEC Rest o f  Europe - N on-E E C
1 F rance i Iceland
2 U .E .B .L  (B elg ium  and L uxem bourg) 2 N orw ay
3 N etherlands 3 Sw eden
4 G erm any  (R FA ) 4 Finland
5 Italy 5 S w itzerland
6 U nited  K ingdom 6 A ustria
7 Ireland 7 G ibraltar
8 D enm ark 8 M alta
9 P ortugal 9 Y ugoslavia
10 Spain 10 T urkey
II G reece II A ndorra
12 U SSR
13 G erm any (R D A )
14 Poland
IS C zechoslovak ia
16 Hungary
17 R om ania
18 B ulgaria
19 A lbania___________________
N B. EEC is composed o f 11 countries only, because Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated and it does 
not include the EFT A counties. West Germany is considered separately from East Germany, which is part of 
the ROEl region USSR is part o f ROEU.
The raw trade data were classified into almost 8,000 different products, and a bridge 
between the six-digit product classification and the 133-sector IO table's sectoring
100The only exception is imports and exports of Services.
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scheme was devised to aggregate them. For the N-Ag sectors, this function was already 
available in a bridge table prepared by the Moroccan sources. For agriculture, it was 
necessary to build an original bridge between products and sectors.
4.2.4 Investment by Origin
The basic source for data on investment is the table of the National Accounts, 
reproduced below in its original format.""
Table 4-3: Investment <1990 million Dh)
Matériel et outillage 24.302
Bâtiment 15,542
Travaux publics 9 .599
Aménagem ent et p lan ta tions  898
Bétail____________________________________________ 662
Total 51.004
In constructing its 1990 Input-Output table, the Moroccan Ministry of Industry used 
these values in the following way. First, values for Plantations and Livestock are 
aggregated and allocated to Agriculture. Second, the values concerning Construction 
(Bailment and Travaux Publics) are again aggregated and allocated to the corresponding 
sector. Finally, the remaining 24,302 million Dhs are disaggregated among the 18 
Industrial sectors. The disaggregation takes place in 2 steps. First, imports of capital 
goods are distinguished by sector. Second, the residual value is allocated among domestic 
suppliers. Relevant data on domestic production of capital goods are taken from the 
official yearly survey of the industrial sector.102 For the new Input-Output table, this 
procedure was replicated at the 96-sector level.
For Agriculture, Investment was allocated to Livestock according to the value in the 
National accounts (Bétail 662.2) and to Other agriculture and Forestry according to 
output shares. The remaining values (Travaux publics et Bailment) were allocated to 
Construction. 0
I0| See table 20.6 page 511 in Direction de la statistique, Morocco (1992).
I0‘ See pages 4 and 5 in Ministère du Commerce, de ¡'industrie et de la privatisation, Morocco (1993) and 
Direction de la statistique, Morocco (1988a).
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4.2.5 Variationof Stocks
Estimation of the Variation of stocks is based on a variety of sources of information. 
For the Industrial sectors, basic data are found in the yearly survey.103 For Agriculture, 
estimates are given by the Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales et des 
Légumineuses (O.N.I.C.L.).104 For Mining and the remaining sectors, relevant 
information is available from the Statistical Yearbook and the Input-Output study of the 
Ministry of Industry.105 The estimates of variation of stocks for Agriculture are based on 
the same assumptions employed by the Ministry o f Industry in constructing their table, 
namely that the Cereals and Legumes are the only sectors that keep stocks. The total 
Variation of stocks in Agriculture is then allocated among the Cereals and Legumes sub­
sectors according to output shares. For the Industrial sectors, the variation of stocks was 
estimated at the detailed level, again applying a method employed by the Ministry of 
Industry, i.e. subtracting sales from production. This did not, however, result in estimates 
consistent with the data contained in the 32-sector Input-Output table. In order to 
reconcile the two different estimates, the detailed sub-sector estimates were normalised 
using the 18-sector values as control totals. For the informal sector, it was assumed that 
no stocks are kept. For the remaining primary and service sectors, data on Variation of 
stocks were taken directly from the Ministry of Industry table.
4.2.6 Trade Margins, Private Consumption and Government Demand
The Moroccan Ministry of Industry estimated trade margins from value added of the 
Commerce sector. For formal activities, value added was calculated from statistics of the 
MNSO and then corrected to take into account informal activity. For the new table, gross 
output shares were use to disaggregate the margin values in the Ministry of Industry
Table.
Once Production, Imports, Custom Duties, Commercial Margins and Investment, 
Exports, Variation of Stocks are estimated, a residual value can be computed as the sum
™ Ministère du Commerce, de l'industrie et de la privatisation, Morocco (1992).
See: Ministère du Commerce, de l'industrie et de la privatisation, Morocco (1993).
IM See: Direction de la statistique, Morocco (1992) and Ministère du Commerce, de l'industrie et de la 
privatisation, Morocco (1993).
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of private consumption, government consumption and intermediate consumption. In all 
Moroccan Input-Output tables, government consumption is not sectorally disaggregated, 
and in the absence of additional information the new table follows the same convention. 
Subtracting this from the residual value gives the sum of private consumption and 
intermediate consumption. Data on private consumption are available from two sources: a 
survey on household consumption106 and official data for imports of consumer goods. 
Unfortunately, the information in these sources is not quite sufficient to estimate 
sectorally detailed private consumption. Therefore an estimation procedure was devised 
and applied to private consumption and total intermediate demand.
For Agriculture, data from the household survey are quite detailed and allow private 
consumption and intermediate demand to be estimated separately. The Survey on 
household consumption is the second extensive attempt of Moroccan authorities to 
measure domestic living standards, the first was undertaken in 1984-85. It contains data 
on rural and urban consumption patterns, size of households, head of household 
employment and other factors affecting consumption. The following expenditure 
categories are considered in detail: (1) Food and Beverages, (2) Clothes, (3) Housing and 
Energy, (4) Durable Goods, (5) Health Care, (6) Transport and Communication, (7) 
Education and Leisure. (8) Other Expenditures. To aggregate the products considered in 
the survey in a manner consistent with the IO table sectoring scheme, it was necessary to 
build another bridge. The estimates for private consumption and intermediate demand 
that are obtained in this way, however, are not consistent with the values contained in the 
Input-Output table. To reconcile the two, the RAS technique was used with control totals 
given by the sum of the values of intermediates demand and private consumption.107
For the Industrial sectors, the 18-sector values for intermediates and private 
consumption were used as control totals and further disaggregation was undertaken using 
the shares from the residual values as sub-sectoral weights and the shares between 
Intermediates and Consumption as weights to discriminate between these. For the 
remaining sectors - Mining, Energy, Services, and government Services - the data were 
taken directly from the Ministry of Industry table.
|oi Direction de la statistique, Morocco 1992.
For a survey of RAS and other matrix balancing methods, see Bacharach ( 1980).
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4.2.7 Value Added
The main source of Value Added data was the Ministry of Industry Input-Output 
table whose relevant values are reproduced here in Table 4-4.
The values of this table are taken from the Moroccan National Accounts published by 
MNSO. Due to lack of detailed data on production subsidies and social costs, these were 
included in indirect taxes and wages, respectively.108 Various adjustments were made to 
the values of this table. Since in the new Input-Output table Agriculture is composed by 
23 sub-sectors, it was necessary to disaggregate the values in the above table. Value 
added was allocated to the agricultural sub-sectors according to output shares. This was 
then decomposed into labour and capital payments and indirect taxes according to their 
respective shares for total Agriculture. But this was not entirely satisfactory, since it 
implied the same factor intensities throughout agriculture. Once again this inconvenience 
was overcome by borrowing data from other countries. In practice a simple average of 
factors payments and indirect taxes shares of US, Japan and Indonesia was adopted for 
Morocco. To correct the resulting excessive capital intense technology, that simple 
average was normalised using the Moroccan shares of aggregate agriculture.
For the Industrial sectors, the adjustment implied using estimates of value added 
derived from the official yearly industrial survey. This includes the full 96-sector 
disaggregated level of the new IO table and useful data on employment, indirect taxes, 
and capital value added. For the remaining sectors (Mining and Energy and Services ), 
the value added estimates and its decomposition are taken from the Ministry of Industry 
Input-Output table.
101
See page 5 in Ministère du Commerce, de l'industrie et de la privatisation, Morocco (1993)
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Table 4-4: Value Added Decomposition (million Dh>
________________________ V A L V E  A D D E D _____ » A G E IX D  T A X E S C A P IT A L
A g ric u ltu re 35870 9623 1780 24466
P h o sp h a te s 4494 1489 310 2695
A u tres  M in é r  S o n  M é t 203 67 I4 I22
M in é ra u x  M é ta ll. 656 478 40 138
C o m b u st  S o l  e t  P é tr  B ru t 304 202 4 97
P étro le  R a j fin é 6678 I7 9 184 6 3 14
É lec tr ic ité  e t  E a u 6086 1582 12 17 3286
In d u s tr ie s  A l im e n ta ire s I595 9 I3 303 379
A u tres  In d  A l  i m e  n ia i r e s 3234 I8SI 614 769
B o isso n  E t T a b a cs 5324 6 19 4003 702
T extiles e t  B o n n e te r ie 2905 1306 429 1 168
H a b ille m e n t 3770 2255 I73 I342
C uirs e t c h a u s s u re s 7 4 0 1 4257 1242 1902
A rtic le s  e n  b o is 1687 826 333 527
P a p ier  e t  c a r to n 13 12 6 12 249 450
M a téria u x  d e  c a rr iè re 3272 9 29 948 1394
Industr ie  m é ta lliq u e 7 6 1 489 I79 92
O u vrages  e n  m é ta u x I669 666 324 678
C o n stru c tio n  d e  m a c h in e s 533 318 99 l l 5
M atériel d e  tr a n s p o r t 1177 479 379 3 I7
M atériel é le c tr iq u e 1109 502 249 357
Instu m en ts  d e  p r é c is io n 58 32 13 I3
C him ie p a r a -c h im ie 3 4 4 1 I 6 l l 673 1 156
P lastique e t  c a o u tc h o u c 8 6 1 375 216 269
Autres in d u s tr ie s 155 88 18 48
Bâtim ent. T ra v a u x  P u b lic s 11489 7391 2 I6 0 I937
C om m erce 24095 9536 7473 7084
Transport 10553 5276 I899 3377
C o m m u n ica tio n 3574 1107 784 1683
Institu tion  D e  c ré d it 68% 2895 292 3708
A ssurances 33 253 37 -257
Autres S e r v  M a r c h a n d s 2 5 I9 9 I3999 6108 5090
St’r\' n  m a rc  h  d e s  a d m m 2 5 3 4 1 25279 I4 ___ 48
TOTAL 20l 7 5 I 97497 32773 7 I4 8 0
4.3 A 1990 Social Accounting Matrix for Morocco
This section describes the methodology employed in building a 1990 SAM for 
Morocco. The starting point is the input-output table described in the previous section 
4.2. That table details economic transactions among 133 sectors (intermediate demands), 
sectors and factors of production (Labour and Capital), sectors and institutions (final 
demand, import demand). In order to build a SAM from an IO table it is necessary to take 
into account a variety of other transactions, so that the complete circular flow of income 
is captured. In this particular case this required two main steps: the measurement of non­
production related transactions, and the disaggregation of the household and factor 
accounts.
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Non-production related transactions include those between factors of production and 
their owners (domestic institutions: households, corporations and government, and ROW 
institutions), other domestic and international economic transactions among institutions 
(such as: tax payments, governmental transfers, remittances and other transfers paid or 
received from abroad) and domestic and foreign savings. In order to develop detailed 
household and factor accounts, 1 first constructed a balanced macro SAM109 and then 
disaggregated it to include the complete set of household and factor types. These steps 
are described in more detail below.
4.3.1 The Moroccan Macro-SAM
A macro-SAM main function is to link coherently in a compact matrix format a 
country macro-economic national accounts with an aggregate version of its input-output 
accounts. In this way the main macro-economic relationships in the economy -  private 
income generation, consumption and savings; government budget; foreign balance; and 
investment savings balance -  are clearly recognisable and economy-wide consistency can 
easily be checked. This section presents a brief description of the sources and the 
calculations used in building the macro - SAM shown in Table 4-5.
""An example of how a macro SAM has been built is in Reinert K.A. and D Roland-Holst (1992).
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This macro SAM follows the standard convention that rows represent receipts and 
columns expenditures and that these must be fully balanced so that for each account total 
receipts are equal to total expenditures. Following the SAM ordering and commenting110 
first on the expenditures (columns), we have:
Activities
Payments are made to:
- Activities for intermediate demand (IO table)
- Capital and Labor for factors demand - value added (IO table)
- Indirect Tax for value added taxes (IO table)
- Margins for commercial services (IO table)
- Tariff for custom duties and other import taxes (IO table)
- ROW for imports (IO table)
receipts are from:
- Activities (see above)
- Households for private consumption (IO table)
- Government for public expenditure (IO table)
- Capital Account for investment demand (IO table)
- Inventory for variation o f  stocks (IO table)
- Margins (see above)
- Subsidies for import subsidies (IO table)
- ROW for exports (IO table)
Note that the first row and column are the aggregated version of the IO table.
Labour and Capital 
Payments are made to:
- Households for income generated by their factor endowments. Capital payments 
are equal to value added plus a residual negative value of 163 millions current Dh. This 
residual is calculated as the difference between interest payments on external debt (7816 
millions) and capital revenues received from abroad (7979 millions). Labour payments 
are equal to the value added plus 52 millions. This value corresponds to net salaries 
received from abroad.111
- ROW for value added originated from foreign owned factors o f  production. 
Capital pays a value (1799 m illions) calculated as the difference between total foreign
"''Note that data sources are given in parenthesis or in the footnotes. 
"'Direction de la Statistique (1992). tab 12, page 11.
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capital revenues (9615 millions)112 and interest payments (7816 millions, defined above). 
Labour pays a value equals to wages remitted abroad113.
Receipts are from:
- Activities (see above)
- ROW for capital inflows"4 for the Capital account and wage remittances"' for 
the Labour account.
Indirect Taxes 
Payments are made to:
- Government for indirect tax revenues (IO table).
Receipts are from:
- Activities (see above).
Xlarvins
Row and Column are self-explanatory.
Households 
Payments are made to:
- Activities for final private consumption (IO table).
- Government for Tax payments as results from Table 4-6.116
- Capital Account for domestic private savings, the value is calculated as the 
difference between Gross domestic private savings (52746 millions)"7 and government 
savings (6846 millions)."8
"'Direction de la Statistique (1992), tab 9. page 10.
"’Ibid.
"‘Ibid.
¡"Ibid.
"‘Comptes du Trésor (1993) Unpublished table.
11 Direction de la Statistique (1992), tab 4, page 8. 
"‘Direction de la Statistique (1991), table page 85.
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Table 4-6: Taxes paid by Households and Firms
Impôt ag rico le 1
Patente 549
Impôt su r Bénéfices Prof. 826
Impôt su r les Sociétés 4613
Impôt G énéral R evenus 3457
Prelev. T ra item ents Salariales 811
Taxe U rbaine 38
Taxe de L icence 19
Contribution C om plém entaire 436
Taxe Produits des A ctions 103
M ajoration 62
Taxe Profit Im m obiliers 124
Partecip. S olidarité N ationale 771
Enregistrem ent 2463
M onoooles 1575
Tôt 15848
- ROW for transfers (such as remittances of foreign workers employed in 
Morocco)1l9.
Receipts are from:
- Capital and Labour (see above).
- Government transfers, independent sources
- ROW for transfers 
Government
Payments are made to:
- Activities for public expenditure (IO table).
- Households for transfers (see above).
- Capital Accounts for public investments (= savings see above).
- Subsidies (IO table).
- ROW for transfers (payments of interests on external debt), independent sources. 
Receipts are from:
- Indirect taxes (see above).
- Households (see above).
- Tariffs for custom duties (IO table).
- ROW for public transfers120.
Inventory. Subsidies and Tariffs
"’Direction de la Statistique (1992), tab 9.1. page 10 
'"Bank Al-Maghrib (1992), tab A37.
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Rows and Columns are self explanatory. 
ROW
See other accounts.
A description of the disaggregation of the households and factor (Labour and Capital) 
accounts, and the accompanying factor income distribution are presented in the following 
sections.
4.3.2 Consumption Disaggregation.
Cell 1,4, in the Macro-SAM depicted in Table 4-5, allocates all private consumption 
to one single type o f institution. This poorly describes the actual Moroccan economy, 
where different type o f institutions have different patterns of consumption and resource 
endowments. The approach followed here is that of classifying households according to 
the main source of income of their heads. The aim of such a classification, as suggested 
in the 1993 UN manual on national accounting, is to ensure the maximum level of 
variation, in both income sources and consumption patterns, between household types 
and. at the same time, minimise that within the same groups. For Morocco, the data 
needed for disaggregating the household sector were available in a series of studies which 
will be presented in the exposition below.
The list of representative institutions detailed in the SAM is given in Table 4-7.
Table 4-7: Households and corporation in the Moroccan SAM
Rural Households Urban Households
1.Family Farm ô .P rop rie to r Flead o f  Flouschold
-  Large Farm 7 .L abourer Flead o f  H ousehold
3 Household with A gricu ltu re  W orker H ead 8 ,N on L abourer non professional w orking H. H ead
4 Non Agriculture P rop rie to r H ead  o f  H ousehold ^P ro fe s s io n a l H ousehold H ead
5.Non Agriculture W orker H ead  o f  H ousehold  10 .G overnm ent Em ployee H ousehold Head
Corporations
II Private C orporations
12. Public Corporations
13. Foreign Corporations
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In this section the first 10 Institutions are considered and small and large farms are 
aggregated into one single farm sector. Corporations do not participate to private 
consumption, and their role is analysed below.
The estimation of the rural and urban components of total consumption represented 
the first step in the disaggregation process. In order to implement this disaggregation, it 
was necessary to use data from the 1990 survey on household living standards121 and 
build a bridge between its sectoring scheme and that of the IO table. A summary of the 
survey's data is presented in Table 4-8. This table aggregates into 9 macro-sectors the 
205 types of goods/expenditures included in the survey.
Table 4-8: Macro-sectors DAMP1"  1990-91 (current Phi
Sectors U rban Rural
Food and Beverages 3718.2 2527.5
Clothing 577.4 271.8
Housing and Energy 1706.7 711.1
Durable goods 419.4 180.9
Health care 725.9 211.6
Transport and com m unication 604.5 217.8
Leisure and Education 680.6 140.1
Other Expenditures 483 .6 258.2
Other Expenditures (non  consum ption) 307.2 104,3
Total 9223.5 4623.3
In order to find an optimal allocation of these 205 items into the 133 sector scheme of 
the IO table, the following procedure was adopted separately for the rural and urban 
component. Firstly, the survey goods/expenditures were allocated to an IO table sector 
when their correspondence was easily recognisable.123 Secondly, the remaining 
goods/expenditures were allocated to multiple IO table sectors when they were 
corresponding to more than one single sector because of their generality. The allocation 
was made according to IO table consumption shares.124 Finally, exceptional expenditures 
(and some other minor items) were allocated to all the IO table sectors according to their 
shares.
'"'Direction de la Statistique (1992 b)
"DAMP is a French acronym (Dépense Annuelle Moyenne par Personne) standing for ‘yearly average 
expenditure per person’.
'"’For example: Blé dur en grains (sector 1, in the survey) “  Hard Wheat (sector 1, in the IO table).
L,For example: Légumes et légumineuses (sector 52, in the survey) was allocated to: Legumes and 
Vegetables (sectors 6 and 11 of the IO table) using the IO consumption shares of the latter sectors.
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In this way it was possible to obtain two separate vectors of 133 DAMPs matching 
the IO table sectoring scheme. New consumption shares were calculated from these 
vectors and multiplied by their respective urban and rural total values. These were 
calculated according to Table 4-9.
Table 4-9: Population and Consumption
________________________________Rural__________ Urban__________Total
Total consum ption  per capita 4499 8850
Population_____________________ U W W _______ 12221120______________
total (m illion D h) 61200 106245 167445
The first row in Table 4-9 represents the sum of the 133 DAMPs just mentioned. The 
survey's data on population are shown in the second row, and the last row is the simple 
multiplication of the first two. The total value for consumption derived from this 
procedure is just 14% larger than the corresponding figure of the IO table, however this 
overestimation is not evenly distributed across sectors. To solve this problem, for all 
sectors the urban share of total consumption was calculated from the survey-estimated 
values, and then multiplied by the original IO table vector of final consumption. The rural 
component was then obtained as a residual. This procedure allowed the best use of the 
survey information while maintaining consistency with the IO table.
The next stage consists of a further disaggregation of the urban and rural element of 
private consumption estimated above. Since the desired institutional detail was not 
available in the survey on household living standards, it was necessary to use other 
sources of information and then, to make the obtained estimates consistent with each 
other, employ statistical procedures. The main difficulty in this estimation was 
represented by the fact that the 10 Institutions listed in Table 4-7 were not directly 
considered in any Moroccan study, so that a correspondence between different 
classifications was to be devised. Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 show how the SAM 
institutions are defined in terms of Moroccan classifications.
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Table 4-10: Correspondence Moroccan Categories - SAM Rural Institutions
E m ployeur Indépendants Salaries A ide, apprentis non declare
1 Personnel des prof, sc ien tif. et liberal. N A G P N A G P N AG W N AG W N AG W
2 Personnel com m erc. N A G P N A G P NAGW N A G W N AG W
3 Travailleurs services N A G P N A G P N AG W N A G W N A G W
4 Exploitantes agrie. F F AGW A GW AGW
5 Travailleurs agrie F F AGW AGW AGW
6 Foresters, chasseurs, pecheurs.e tc F F AGW AGW A GW
7 Ouvriers et m anoeuv r non agrie. N A G P N A G P N AG W N A G W NAG W
8 Autres N A G P N A G P N AG W N A G W N AG W
Table 4-11: Correspondence Moroccan Categories - SAM Urban Institutions
E m ployeu r Indépendants S alaries Aide,
apprentis
Travail.
dom ic.
A ssocié
coop.
non
declare
1 Personnel des p ro f  sc ien t, lib. PF PF PF PF PF PF PF
2 Personnel com m erc. PR PR N L N PF N LN PF N LN PF N LN PF N LN PF
3 Personnel ad m in is tra tif PR PR G O V GOV G OV G O V GOV
4 Travailleurs serv ices PR PR N L N PF N LN PF N LN PF N LN PF N LN PF
5 A griculteurs, e lev eu rs , etc PR PR L L L L L
6 Ouvriers et man n o n  agric. PR PR L L L L L
7 Autres PR PR L L L L L
The row and column labels are the Moroccan names for job type and worker status 125
respectively. The actual content of the tables are acronyms of the 10 Institutions. In order 
to clarify how the SAM Institutions result from the above combinations, consider the 
following definitions l26.
The acronyms are defined as follows:
Rural
!• F Family Farm
2. F Large Farm
3. AGW Household with Agriculture Worker Head
•*. NAGP Non Agriculture Proprietor Head of Household
5. NAGW Non Agriculture Worker Head of Household
' In the surveys used here Moroccan authors use these terms: Profession principale and Situation dans la 
profession. For some detailed definition see Direction de la statistique (1993) pages 30-33.
'‘For more details see: Direction de la statistique (1993) pages 30-33, Direction de la statistique (1990) 
pages 21-23 and Direction de la statistique (1992b) pages 33-35.
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Urban
6. PR
7. L
8. NLNPF
9. PF
10. GOV
Proprietor Head of Household 
Labourer Head of Household
Non Labourer non professional Working Household Head 
Professional Household Head 
Government Employee Household Head
While the labels are given by:
Rows
Personnel des prof, scientif. et liberal.
Personnel commerc.
Personnel administratif 
Travailleurs services 
Exploitantes agrie.
Travailleurs agrie 
Foresters, chasseurs, pecheurs.etc 
Agriculteurs, eleveurs, etc 
Ouvriers et manoeuvr non agrie. 
Autres
Personnel of scientific, technical, liberal, professions, 
managers, administrative staff 
Personnel commercial and salesmen 
Personnel of Public Administration (mainly)
Workers specialised in the service sector 
Smallholders (only rural)
Farm workers (only rural)
Loggers, Hunters, Fishermen (only rural)
Agriculture workers (label used for Urban Inst, only)
Non agricultural laborers
Other
Columns
Employeur
Indépendants
Salaries
Aide
Apprenti
Aide, apprenti
Travailleur a domic.
Associé coop.
Non déclaré
A person with his/her own business employing at least one person 
permanently
A person with his/her own business not employing anyone else 
permanently
A person receiving wages from public or private employer 
A person working for another member of the family 
A person less than 25 working to learn some specific job 
The two above together
A person working at home for his/her business or for someone else 
A person working for an association (cooperative)
Not specified
The ideal situation would be to have for each of the 133 IO table sectors Table 4-10 and 
Table 4-11 filled with values for final consumption, so that, with simple aggregations, it 
would be possible to have all the desired institutional detail. Unfortunately these tables 
are not available either at that level o f detail or with the required format. The available 
data consist of population and employment values organised as in Table 4-10 and Table 
4-11 and consumption averages for job type and worker status separately. The population 
estimates come from statistical surveys on rural and urban active populations and from 
the survey on household living standards. As long as the urban population is concerned, a
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table with the same format of Table 4-11 was available in the population survey1*7. For 
the rural region, population figures for the categories of Table 4-10 were available only 
for the year 1987. A RAS estimation for which the controls were derived from the living 
standards survey data was employed to update these statistics. The final results is 
presented in Table 4-12.
Table 4-12: SAM Institutions Population
K L K A L .  A U U K t U A  1 I W _________
Farms
reoDie iuuui 
1167
_______ 12_____
8.58
un -o
4.56
O U l UV.11V
20.65
Household w ith A g H o f  H 3388 24.90 13.23 59.95
N onAgPropriet H o f  H 432 3.18 1.69 7.65
Non Ag W orker H o f  H 664 4.88 2.59 11.75
Inactive-i-Unemployed 7953 58.46 31.06____
total 13603 100.00 53.12
total w ithout Inact/U nem p 5651
URBAN AGGREGATION
Professional H o f  H 355 2.95 1.38 9.57
G ovem Em ployee H o f  H 353 2.94 1.38 9.52
Laborer H o f  H 1627 13.56 6.36 43.90
Proprietor H o f  H 718 5.98 2.80 19.37
N onLabN onProf H o f  H 654 5.44 2.55 17.63
Inactive-U nem ployed 8298 69.12 32.40____
total 12005 100.00 46.88
total w ithout Inact/U nem p 3707
T O T A L  (U rb + R u r )  25609 100.00
Combining the figures for population with the consumption averages, it is possible to 
measure total consumption for each of the rows and columns types of Table 4-10 and 
Table 4-11 separately, but this is not sufficient to estimate the SAM Institutions’ 
consumption. To do that, data considering simultaneously job type and worker status are 
necessary. To clarify consider Table 4-13. This table is a stylised version of Table 4-10 
(or Table 4-11). To calculate total institutional consumption values, bivariate 
distributions of population and average consumption are needed. With the available data 
it was possible to measure the marginal distributions o f total consumption. In order to 
estimate its bivariate distribution two alternative methods can be adopted: either 
assuming independence (in the statistical sense) between job type and worker status or 
applying an RAS estimation technique using the marginal distributions as controls and 
the population bivariate distribution as starting point of the iterations.
' See table 4 .14 in Direction de la statistique ( 1993).
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Table 4-13: Schematic Emnovment Distribution
Personnel d e s  prof. 
Personnel com m erc . 
Others 
Total
Em ployeur Indépendants O thers Total
b ivariate  d istribution marginal
distribution
m arginal d istribution
By adopting the first method, it is implicitly assumed that the consumption behaviour 
of, say, Personnel commerc. does not vary according to its status: Employeur. 
Indépendants, etc. This was not considered satisfactory and therefore the RAS procedure 
was applied generating the results of Table 4-14 shown below.
Table 4-14: Total private consumption
Farms
million u n
5256
O
9.33
loi 0
3.58
Household w ith  A g HofH 14323 25.41 9.77
N onA gPropriet HofH 2648 4.70 1.81
N onA gW orker H o ttl 2657 4.71 1.81
Inactive+U nem ploved 31475 55.85 21.46
total 56358 100.00 38.43
URBAN AGGREGATION
Professional H ofH 5826 6.45 3.97
Govern E m ployee  HofH 5502 6.09 3.75
l aborer H ofH 11206 12.41 7.64
Proprietor H ofH 5609 6.21 3.82
N onLabN onProf HofH 6084 6.74 4.15
Inactive-lJnem ploved 56084 62.10 38.24
total 90311 100.00 61.57
T O T A L < U rb + R u r)  146669 100.00
It should be noted that the overall total consumption (146,669 Million Dh) 
corresponds exactly to the IO table value. This correspondence was obtained by uniform 
adjustment of the consumption averages for job type and worker status before the use of 
the RAS method.128 Up to this point, the described procedure was sufficient to overcome 
the format problem but not the level o f detail one; in other words, it was possible to 
obtain Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 with the correct format only for total consumption with 
no sectoral disaggregation. In order to estimate sector specific consumption figures, the 
following three stages procedure was adopted. Firstly, macro sector specific tables of
108
consumption were estimated for the urban and rural population pooled together. 
Secondly, these tables were then decomposed into urban and rural components. And 
thirdly, a final disaggregation was undertaken to obtain the IO table 133 sectors.
Macro Table Estimation
For rural and urban populations together, new macro sector specific tables were 
estimated by using information from the survey on household living standards and 
combining it with population figures. The schematic tables shown below were a first 
result:
Table 4-15: Schematic Consumption Patterns 1
Sector 1 
Sector 2 
Others
E m ployeur Indépendants O thers Total
Table 4-16: Schematic Consumption Patterns 2
Sector I 
Sector 2 
Others
Personnel des prof. P ersonnel com m erc. O thers  Total
Table 4-15 and Table 4-16 present total consumption by sector and worker status and 
by sector and job type, respectively. They were estimated multiplying population figures 
by average consumption data129. Note that the total consumption values for each sector 
(value “C” for sector 1) coincide for the two tables. Then, applying the same ideas of 
Table 4-13, a RAS procedure was used for each sector, as shown in the following table.
'"'This adjustment was necessary because the two Moroccan sources used here (the 10 table and the 
living standard survey) presented conflicting results, referred to in the comments of Table 4-9.
' The survey on household living standards presents consumption averages (DAMPs) in tables D 04 and 
D 05. at pages 258, 259. The sectoral detail is that of table 4.3 in the text above. Population figures are 
obtained by simple aggregation of data from Direction de la statistique (1990) and Direction de la 
statistique (1993) adjusted as described in the text.
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Table 4 - 1 RAS Estimation
Sector 1
Personnel des prof. 
Personnel com m erc. 
Others 
Total
Em ployeur Indépendants O thers Total
bivariate distribution - RAS estim ates A
B Total -  C
Essentially Table 4-15 and Table 4-16 gave the RAS controls and the final result was 
8 macro sector tables with the format of Table 4-17.130 
Rural - urban Disaeereeation
The macro sector specific tables were then disaggregated into rural and urban tables. This 
was done by adjusting the overall total values “C” of those tables to a rural and urban 
total value according to the original survey data. The resulting urban and rural 
consumption figures for the macro sectors are presented in Table 4-18 and Table 4-19. 
Before further disaggregating these macro sectors into the IO table 133 sectors, two 
adjustments were necessary. First, a RAS estimation technique was used to make Table 
4-18 consistent with the IO table figures. Second, the rural and urban consumption values 
of Inactive + Unemployed were allocated to the other categories with simple share 
imputation. The result is presented in Table 4-19.
Sectoral Disaevreeation
The macro sector specific urban and rural tables were finally disaggregated to the 133 
sectors level. In order to obtain this detail, it was necessary to use three components: (1) 
the urban and rural vectors of private consumption mentioned at the beginning of this 
section (see page 104); (2) the estimates of Table 4-19; (3) a mapping function of the 
relationships between the 205 sectors and the 8 macro sectors of the living standards 
survey and the 133 sectors of the IO table.
'“The 8 -macro sectors correspond to those of Table 4-8.
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4.3.3 Value Added Disaggregation
This section describes the procedures followed to disaggregate the IO table vectors of 
labour and capital value added. The full list of labour and capital categories is shown in 
Table 4-20.
Table 4-20: Moroccan SAM factor o f production txves
Labour_______________________________________________C apital_______________________
1. U nskilled w orkers 1. Sm all Capital
2. Skilled w orkers 2. Public C apital
3. Salaried w orkers 3. Corporation C apital
4. Em ployers 4. Foreign C apital
5. Independent w orkers_____________________________________________________________
The aim of the methodology used in disaggregating capital was to obtain a clear 
differentiation between corporate capital and small business capital and then to 
disaggregate the first into its public, domestic private and foreign components. In this 
way, the obtained results can form the basis for a study of the industrial organisation of 
the various sectors. One objective of future research is in fact the extension of the CGE 
models presented in this thesis to include imperfect competition and economies of scale. 
For this reason, the value added disaggregation procedure is detailed only for the labour 
factor.
Labour Value Added Disaeereealion
This sub section describes the methodology applied to assign to five distinct labour 
categories the aggregate labour value added of the IO table. The first stage of this 
methodology consists of estimating employment data. This was done separately for the 
urban and rural populations, allowing more precise estimations and the distribution of 
labour income to the appropriate household category. Sources of employment data were 
the surveys on Rural and Urban Active populations and the survey on living standards. 
Three basic problems had to be solved. Firstly, the rural data had to be updated. 
Secondly, the unskilled and skilled wage workers categories had to be indirectly 
estimated since they were not explicitly considered in any Moroccan source. And thirdly, 
the sectoring scheme with which the employment data were originally organised was not 
as detailed as that of the IO table, therefore some disaggregation rule had to be
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elaborated. To update the rural data a combination of estimates from the living standards 
survey and a rural active population survey were used. The final result is shown below.
Table 4-21: Rural Active Population Updated (1990. thousands)
E m d IndiD Salar AideADDr AssC ood TravDom Tot
Cereal Legum Fourag 12 489 147 1229 14 12 1904
C ultlndO leag 3 44 58 I I I i 1 218
O thC ult ForstFish 3 96 214 195 8 7 525
Livestock 9 545 60 1134 II 9 1768
lndustry(+M inEne) 1 139 73 250 2 2 466
Construction 2 II 187 7 1 1 209
Com m erce 1 179 23 31 7 6 247
OthServ 2 59 143 15 4 3 225
PAdmin. 0 0 63 0 0 0 63
O ther A ctivities 0 3 10 5 3 3 24
Tot 34 1565 978 2978 51 45 5651
For the urban population a table similar to Table 4-21 was already available in the 
Urban Active Population survey for the year 1990. However, the overall total value o f 
this table was not consistent with the data from the living standards survey and a minor 
adjustment was then required m . The result is shown in Table 4-22 below; note that the 
sectoring scheme is different from that of the Rural Population and that the AideAppr, 
AssCoop and TravDom categories have been aggregated under the heading o f 
OthCategories.
Table 4-22: Adjusted Urban Active Population (000) 1990
O thC ateeories Salar Em olover Indio tot
AgrForFish 25 77 II 19 132
Mines 0 40 0 0 40
IndAlim 5 71 3 1 80
IndTexLeath 266 245 16 23 550
Othlnd 52 166 12 21 251
Reparat 41 43 9 26 119
EleWatGas 0 26 0 0 27
Construction 14 173 15 49 251
Commerce 104 140 20 301 565
RestHotel 7 73 6 6 91
TranspCommun 14 114 3 34 164
Hankins 3 53 4 5 65
PersServ 18 166 6 38 229
PubIServ 8 283 4 7 301
PAdmin 0 315 0 0 315
ülhAclivities 4 3 0 1_____ ________8
Tot 562 1989 107 530 3189
"The total values for urban active employed people were: 3.618 million for the Urban Active Population 
survey and 3.188 million for the living standards survey. Therefore the adjustment ratio was .88.
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The estimation of employment data for the two categories of Skilled and Unskilled 
wage workers was necessary to overcome the second problem. The basic assumption was 
to use school attainment as a proxy for the worker’s skills. Data concerning school 
degrees were available in the population surveys. The following simple procedure was 
adopted: firstly, people with no degree or very basic ones were pooled into an unskilled 
set. secondly the ratios between skilled and unskilled were calculated for different 
categories of workers and, finally, these ratios were multiplied by the AideAppr. 
TravDom, AssCoop values of Table 4-21 and Table 4-22 to calculate total employment 
figures. In other words, since for Salary workers. Employers and Independent workers, 
there is an exact correspondence between the SAM factors and the categories of Table 
4-21 and Table 4-22, the residual groups of those tables were allocated to the Skilled and 
Unskilled wage workers sets using the school attainment ratios defined above.
Employment figures derived from Ministry of Industry data and Labour Value Added 
per cent shares from the 10 table were used to sectorally disaggregate Table 4-21 and 
Table 4-22. The Ministry of Industry data allowed the calculation of per cent shares only 
for the manufacturing group and they were applied to the following categories of Table 
4-21 and Table 4-22, respectively: Industry (+MinEne); IndAlim, IndTexLeath and 
Othlnd. This allowed to obtain the full IO table detail for the manufacturing group. The 
other sectors were disaggregated according to Labour Value Added shares from the IO 
table assuming implicitly constant average productivities across worker types.
The second stage in the Labour Value Added disaggregation procedure considers 
labour income distribution estimation. No Moroccan official estimates of average wages 
were available, so it was necessary to develop an indirect estimation procedure based on 
data from a recent OECD study l32. In particular Table 4-23 below is calculated from two 
analogous tables133 showing, in the Morrisson study, average incomes and employment 
data. A few remarks are necessary. Firstly, the sectoring scheme is derived from the 
Moroccan one. Secondly the columns labels include in the wage earners category: 5. 
Higher management. 4. Middle management. 3. White-collar workers, 2. Specialised or
;;;c. Momsson (1991).
'See Tables I 1 and I 2 in Momsson (1991).
1 1 4
qualified workers, 1. Unskilled workers, 0. Specialised or unskilled workers in the 
traditional sector; and in the non-wage earners category: a. Employers, b. Independents 
(with premises), c. Independents (without premises) l34.
Table 4-23: Income Distribution in 1980 (Ilf Dht
wage earners non-wage earners
SECTORS 5 4 3 2 1 0 tot a b c tot
1 CerlndLivForFruVeg 1530 0 0 0 0 10581 12111 32850 38540 43463 114853
CitrFruit 300 0 0 0 0 940 1240 2550 441 143 3134
3 EarlyVeg 0 0 0 0 0 500 500 1850 320 0 2170
4 Fish 240 480 0 0 950 0 1670 600 202 0 802
5 Phosp 690 950 180 0 1656 0 3476 0 0 0 0
6 Mines 145 210 40 0 365 0 760 0 0 0 0
7 Mines(met) 200 280 50 0 480 0 1010 0 0 0 0
8 OilFuels 114 80 67 130 173 146 710 0 0 0 0
9 Ditto, Refin 84 59 50 96 128 109 526 0 1050 0 1050
10 EleWat 530 370 310 600 800 682 3292 0 0 0 0
11 Foodlnd 391 365 147 617 893 1246 3659 1029 2570 220 3819
12 OthFoodlnd 453 243 250 320 691 1044 3001 1133 840 250 2223
13 BevTob 167 186 207 4M 411 138 1520 0 23 5 28
14 Text 600 368 257 1064 1341 1580 5210 177 3880 4530 8587
15 Cloth 125 47 42 175 363 1419 2171 229 4130 1180 5539
16 Leath 102 99 99 236 271 744 1551 64 2160 240 2464
17 TimbWood 170 116 78 177 309 1069 1919 52 2440 350 2842
18 Paper 289 175 179 476 308 174 1601 165 150 20 335
19 Quarr 377 406 200 524 740 565 2812 149 1200 170 1519
20 Metallnd 45 21 14 36 84 161 361 0 43 26 69
21 MetalObj 434 349 224 590 654 891 3142 198 2800 410 3408
22 Machin 162 89 64 179 150 0 644 283 260 40 583
23 TranspEquip 195 163 214 539 158 0 1269 219 116 15 350
24 ElectrEquip 282 148 153 215 310 0 1108 81 135 16 232
25 Preclnst 7 5 3 4 20 0 39 0 32 6 38
26 Chemie 693 557 356 641 832 263 3342 1013 256 42 1311
27 Rubber 205 90 185 206 322 47 1055 109 145 12 266
28 OthManuf 9 3 4 9 20 202 247 33 345 113 491
29 Constuction 1720 1110 630 4070 5469 6463 19462 719 14320 1300 16339
30 Comm 1410 920 510 3360 4520 5353 16073 2641 47201 4799 54640
31 Transp 1520 MIO 860 1910 2540 3076 11016 1226 6300 1800 9326
32 Communic 165 130 500 770 450 35 2050 0 0 0 0
33 Banklns 590 475 1780 2737 1590 120 7292 0 0 0 0
34 OthServ 1900 1230 690 4510 6060 7184 21574 4494 23160 4620 32274
7100 1714 21400 32886 19120 1490 83710 0 0 ___s_ 0
Total 22944 12548 29743 57488 52179 46222 221123 51864 153059 63769 268691
"'‘For more details see Morrisson (1991) pages 125, 126.
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In what follows a brief description of the steps necessary to estimate labour income 
distribution for the 1990 year is presented. The first step consisted of building a 
correspondence between the SAM Labour factors and Table 4-23 workers categories. 
This is shown in Table 4-24. Then, new average incomes were calculated for the SAM 
factors as simple weighted averages of the two original Morrisson's Tables.
The next step was to disaggregate this new average incomes table to obtain the detail 
required for the full IO table’s 133 sectors. Unfortunately, not having any other 
information, it was assumed that average income did not vary within the macro sectors of 
Table 4-23.
Table 4-24: Factors Correspondence
Categories of Table 4-23________________________ SAM Categories
5 Higher management Salaried Workers
4 Middle management Salaried Workers
3 White-collar workers Salaried Workers
2 Specialised or qualified workers Skilled Wage Workers
i Unskilled workers Unskilled Wage Workers
0 Specialised or unskilled workers (trad sect) Unskilled Wage Workers
a Employers Employers
b Independents (with premises) Independents
c Independents (without premises)_____________ ___ Independents___
This permitted estimation of a fully detailed table of average incomes (or wages). 
This was then multiplied by the total (rural plus urban) employment table and a final 
Total incomes table was obtained135. From this table, factors shares were calculated for 
each sector and then multiplied by the Labour Value Added vector of the IO table. 
Basically this procedure corrected the compositional distribution of labour incomes of 
Table 4-23 using employment data and then updated the result with the IO table data. 
Finally by assuming the same average incomes in the rural and urban areas and applying 
regional specific employment data, it was possible to decompose the Total incomes table 
into a rural and urban component.
"Note that all these three tables: average incomes, employment data and total income have the same
dimensions, namely they are 133 IO sectors by 5 SAM labour factors tables.
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4.3.4 Factor Income Allocation, Transfers, Savings and Tax Payments 
Disaggregation
The next step was the allocation of income from different categories of capital and 
labour to the household types. This entails detailed transactions between 9 factors and 10 
households. The fundamental rule employed to allocate factors income was based on the 
criterion of private ownership. Each household was receiving income according to its 
factor endowments. The following table illustrates this procedure in more detail.
Table 4-25: Factors Income Allocation
Mou« holds (  oinDOitd b t : W orker S um » • Job  Type R tc t i t t  Income from
IRBAN
Professional HofH
GovemEmployee HofH 
Laborer HofH 
Proprietor HofH
NonLabNonProf HofH
(URAL
Indipend.Employer.Salar et al - Pers ProtScLib (1)
Salar et al - Pers Admin.(3)
Salar et al - Agric and other (5,6,7) 
Indipend.Employer-all job types excl.ProfScLib (2-7)
Salar et al - Pers Services and Commerce (2,4)
1 Small Capital in Ser
2 Empl .lndipend LaborVA in Ser 
Unskill.SkillWageWrk and Salar. in sector 133 
Unskill.SkillWageWrk and Salar. in Ag and Ind
1 Small Capital in Ind and MEn
2 Empl.lndipend. Labor VA in Ind and MEn 
Unskill.SkillWageWrk and Salar. in Ser
Farms Indipend.Employer - Agriculture (4,5,6)
Household with Ag HofH Salar et al - Agriculture (4,5,6) 
NonAgPropriet HofH Indipend.Employer - non Agric ( 1,2,3,7,8)
NonAgWorker HofH Salar et al - non Agric ( 1,2,3,7,8)
1 Small Capital in Ag
2 Empl.Indipend. Labor VA in Ag 
Unskill.SkillWageWrk and Salar. in Ag
1 Small Capital in Ind and MEn
2 Empl .Indipend.LaborVA in Ind and MEn 
Unskill.SkillWageWrk and Salar. in 
Ind.MEn.Scr_________________________
The first column of Table 4-25 lists the SAM household types, column 2 reproduces 
the concordance rule of Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 (the numbers in brackets are the rows 
numbers of those tables) and the third column lists the types of factors and the sectors136 
of activity from which the income is generated. The urban and rural components of the 
labour value added (in its different forms: Unskilled, Skilled, Salary), whose calculation 
was described in the previous section, were used here to estimate regionally distinct 
allocations. So, for example, the urban component of labour value added in Ag was 
allocated to the Laborer HofH, whereas its rural part went to Household with Ag HofH. 
The same procedure could not be used to regionally discriminate the capital value added. 
Then, for the dubious case of Small Capital in lnd and MEn for Proprietor HofH and 
NonAgPropriet HofH, it was decided to allocate to the rural institution the Small Capital
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of the following sectors: food processing, leather and shoes and wood products, the rest 
went to the urban institution.
Households also receive income from two sources: the Rest of the World (mainly 
remittances) and government. Consider the values shown in Table 4-26. They are the 
SAM resulting budget surpluses of households after they have received all the available 
factor income and spent it on consumption, but before their allocation for savings, tax 
payments and transfers to the rest of the world. The fourth column clearly shows which 
are the poorest households that were considered recipients of the government transfers. In 
fact the latter were distributed to the Labor HofH and to Agri HofH according to the 
percent shares calculated from the expenditure column shown in column 5.
Table 4-26: Government and Rest o f the World Transfers
Receipts Expend itu res D iffe rence ExpShare 
___°A.
U rban -ru ra l
%
Urban-rura l
DOD%
ProfesHotW 20542 15373 5169
G ovE H ofH 20544 14517 6027
LaborH ofH 14160 29569 -15409 0.48 0.64
P roprH ofH 21769 14800 6969
N L b N P rf 20112 16053 4059
Farms 20796 11904 8892
A gri H o fH 8259 32440 -24181 0.52 0.36 0.84
N A gP rpH oH 8263 5997 2266
N A a W kH o H 12917 6017 6899 0.36 0.16
The Row transfers were allocated to three categories (considering the available
studies on Moroccan migration137): Labor HofH, Agri HofH and NAgWkr HofH. The per 
cent shares used for this allocation are shown in columns 6 and 7138. First the shares in
column 6 are used to estimate the rural and urban components of the ROW transfers, then 
the last column shares are used to distribute the rural component to the two appropriate 
households. After having allocated all the mentioned transfers, the total values of tax 
payments and savings were distributed to the households according to the shares 
calculated from the difference between expenditures and receipts. The last step was to
1,6 Ser' stands for all services, ‘Ag’ for all agriculture, Ind’ for manufacturing, MEn for mining and
"B y -
See for instance Faini and de Melo (1993).
Column 6 contains the shares of rural and urban migrant workers derived from Direction de la 
statistique ( 1988) tab 3 page 18. Column 7 shows population shares for the two relevant rural households.
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disaggregate the Rest of world account in order to obtain three regions: European 
Community (EC), Rest of Europe non EC (ROEU) and Rest of the World (ROW).
Consider first the column (expenditures of Rest of the world). Exports were 
disaggregated using data from the lO table. Transfers to the Small capital, government. 
Capital Accounts, were assigned to the various regions according to the Moroccan 
exports shares as shown in Table 4-27.
Table 4-2'T: Rest o f the World Disavvreeation
M oroc.ExD % Sm all cap ita l G ovem m CaD A cc
EC 26547 0.65 1063 1158 543
ROEU 2728 0.07 109 119 56
ROW 11546 0.28 463 504 236
Toi 40821 1.00 1635 1781 835
Transfers to households are disaggregated according to the shares of Moroccan 
workers resident in the three regions. For the row (receipts of Rest of the world), imports 
were disaggregated using data from the IO table. Transfers to the Small capital were 
distributed to the various regions according to their FDI shares. All the other data were 
disaggregated using the three region GDP shares.
4.4 French SAM main data sources
The following is a list of the main publications that have been used to assemble the 
data for the construction of the French 1990 SAM.
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) Les tableaux 
entrées - sorties (TES) 1990-1993.
INSEE Madior Fall, Les Comptes de Revenu des Ménages par catégorie 
socioprofessionnelle 1984-89. Emploi - Revenus No 42.
INSEE Recensement de la population de 1990. Population Active. Démographie - 
Société No 25.
INSEE Recensement de la population de 1990. Nationalités. Démographie - Société
No 21.
INSEE Recensement de la population de 1990. Ménages - Familles. Démographie -
Société No 22-23.
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INSEE Marie-Noelle Suin. Tableaux d’analyse financière 1988. Système productif 
No 65.
INSEE Ministère de l’Agriculture. Les compte national de l’agriculture -
Méthodologie de la base 1980.
OECD Economie Surveys. France (various years).
Additional data on international trade, households, corporations and agriculture were 
provided on electronic media by researchers at INSEE.
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5 Is there a Trade-off between Trade Liberalisation and 
Pollution Abatement in Morocco? A Computable General 
Equilibrium Assessment
5.1 Introduction
This chapter develops one of the main themes of the thesis, namely the examination, 
in the specific Mediterranean context, of the interdependencies of environmental and 
commercial policies.
Trade and environment linkages are under increasing scrutiny, and a vast literature 
has emerged on the subject.'39 Important relationships have been identified and major 
conclusions have been drawn in terms of policy prescriptions. Pressures to use trade 
instruments to protect the environment have been debunked as a blunt and inefficient 
approach to environmental policy.140 Even in a second best world, the optimal policy to 
abate emissions would be a targeted uniform tax per unit of pollution, as this would 
directly discourage the emissions of pollutants.141 However, many questions still remain. 
Most countries, while being aware of environmental problems, are now engaged in a 
trade liberalisation process and the coherence between environmental and trade policies 
is a major concern. Will the realisation of comparative advantages induce a risk of 
specialisation in dirty activities? Will the implementation of domestic environmental 
taxes affect international competitiveness? Given the lack of robustness of qualitative 
results shown in theoretical work concerning these issues,142 most recent studies have 
been focused on measuring quantitatively the interdependencies of environmental and 
commercial policies. Empirical research tends to confirm that developing economies 
specialise in ‘dirty’ industries.143 However, other studies do not find strong evidence that 
OECD countries stricter environmental regulations per se have influenced
See Dean (1992), Cropper and Oates (1992), Beghin, Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (1994)
for surveys.
1411 See Anderson and Blackhurst (1992).
I4| Perroni and Wigle (1994), Braga (1992).
I4! Copeland and Taylor (1995).
145 Hettige. Lucas and Wheeler (1992), Low and Yeats (1992), Birdsall and Wheeler (1992).
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competitiveness.144 This could suggest that developing economies have a real 
comparative advantage in dirty productions, and hence a trade-off between trade 
liberalisation and environmental preservation could occur.
These questions have been typically addressed by using Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models.145 Their main advantage lies in the possibility of combining 
detailed and consistent real world databases with a theoretically sound framework. This 
chapter extends this line of investigation by offering a new quantitative analysis of the 
linkages between economic activity and the environment in Morocco, and specifically by 
evaluating the joint impact of environmental and commercial policies.
The study presented in this chapter significantly differs from previous trade and 
environment analyses in three ways.
Firstly, earlier research focused on global environmental problems and trade relations. 
These typically considered just one or two toxic substances, normally greenhouse gases, 
and included just a few productive sectors and households' types. When the issues of 
interest are not global but centred on a single country’s policy alternatives, the earlier 
levels of detail are not enough. By embodying a high level of disaggregation for 
pollutants, products, sectors and types of households the model presented here can be 
used to simulate abatement policies targeted to specific air emissions, measuring, at the 
same time, the effect on related water and soil pollutants. From a domestic policy maker 
point of view, this sort of information may be crucial for a successful implementation of a 
green tax policy. At the same time, trade policy reform through resource reallocation and 
expansion or contraction o f specific activities has differentiated environmental 
consequences. The product disaggregation of the model, by signalling critical 
environmental outcomes of trade policy, might permit prompt adoption of corrective 
measures. Moreover, income distribution issues arising from environmental and 
commercial policies, and the question of the redistribution of environmental taxes 
receipts, are briefly discussed and can be further investigated due to the detailed 
classification scheme of households.
144 OECD (1993), Tobey (1990).
Lee and Roland-Holst (1994), Perroni and Wigle(1994).
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A second distinctive feature of the present study is the explicit inclusion of dynamics. 
The model simulations run to year 2004. allowing the introduction of exogenous factors 
such as productivity shifts and demographic changes that affect capital accumulation and 
the growth trajectory. Comparing the trends of output and emissions derived from 
different scenarios reveals the dynamic interdependencies of environmental and 
commercial policies.
Third, most economy-wide studies on growth and environment linkages rely on 
effluent intensities associated with output, and do not allow for substitution between non­
polluting and polluting factors.146 Abating pollution is then achieved principally by 
reducing output in pollution intensive sectors, with a significant cost in terms of growth. 
By contrast, in the current model pollution emissions are linked to polluting input use, 
rather than output. Technical adjustment by substituting non-polluting factors to polluting 
factors may therefore be assessed.
The investigation in this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, trade liberalisation, 
resulting from a free trade area (FTA) agreement between Morocco and the European 
Community, is examined from the standpoint of the environmental consequences. In this 
case, I find that the risk of specialisation in dirty activities is very high for Morocco. In a 
second scenario pollution abatement policies are considered, holding trade policy 
parameters constant, and their effects on growth, sectoral allocation and trade are 
measured. An important result is that the cost in terms of growth of abating emissions is 
marginal, and that targeting one type of emission de facto reduces all the others 
pollutants. In a third and last scenario, I combine environmental and trade policies and 
show how they mitigate each other in terms of negative effects (trade-induced pollution 
and anti-growth effects of environmental policy). This last combined scenario shows how 
free trade and environment protection can coexist without growth-environment trade-off, 
by setting targeted effluent taxes.
The following section describes the most important features of the model.147 Section
5.3 presents some reasons supporting the application of this study in the Moroccan case 
and briefly surveys this country’s trade policies and environmental concerns. It also
j* Lee and Roland-Holst (1994)
1,7 The model is more fully described in the technical appendix.
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presents the main linkages between the Moroccan economic structure and its 
environment as they result from the model basic run. Section 5.4 illustrates the 
benchmark scenario, where no economic policy is altered. Against it. scenarios of 
alternative environmental and commercial policies are contrasted in section 5.5. The final 
section summarises the main conclusions.
5.2 The model
The model used in this chapter is fully described in the next appendix and is 
calibrated on data contained in the Social Accounting Matrix estimated for the year 1990 
and described in detail previously. The version of the SAM used here includes 10 
household categories (5 urban and 5 rural), 48 sectors, 3 labour types, 3 separated trading 
partners and 13 different polluting emissions.148 The model is dynamic and solved 
recursively for the years 1990, 1992, 1995. 1998, 2001, and 2004.149 It includes 
approximately 100 generic equations describing agent behaviour, market clearing and 
other accounting relationships. The following sub-sections briefly illustrate the model’s 
main characteristics.
Production
The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) constant returns to scale production 
function is a nested structure taking into account the assumed substitution possibilities in 
the choice of production factors. Output results from two composite goods: non-energy 
intermediates and energy plus value added. The intermediate aggregate is obtained 
combining all products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure). The value added and 
energy components are decomposed in two parts: aggregate labour and capital, which 
includes energy. Labour is a composite of 3 categories. The capital-energy bundle is 
further disaggregated into its basic components.150 By distinguishing between “new” and
l4‘ A more sectorally disaggregated SAM could have been derived from the original 133-sector SAM and 
used to calibrate the model. The 48-sector SAM though combines enough detail with reasonable 
tractability. Moreover, this aggregation captures the most important trade-production-emission linkages and 
it merges sectors together in a manner that requires the prior 133-sector disaggregation.
IW The main reason for choosing these time intervals is practical. The model could be solved for each 
single year but it would take more computer resources or longer time, besides time intervals do not affect 
the model results.
1,0 The particular production function of this model treats energy as a separate factor of production rather 
than an intermediate input. Energy use is typically highly polluting and the specific nesting structure 
adopted here allows monitoring more closely energy-related emissions. Moreover bundling energy together
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*"old" vintages, the capital existing at the beginning of each period, or already installed, 
can be separated from that resulting from contemporary investment (putty/semi-putty 
production function).151
with capital is motivated by the fact that new technologies, embodied in new capital goods, are usually 
energy saving (i.e. energy substituting).
11 In the short run capital is usually sector-specific, whereas in the long run it can be perfectly mobile 
across sectors. The “vintages" approach allows integrating in the present dynamic model both short run 
capital immobility and long run capital mobility. In the modelled economy new capital (equal to the 
previous period's level of investment) is perfectly mobile and old capital only partially mobile across 
sectors. Another advantage of the “vintages" approach is that it allows introducing different degrees of 
substitutability of capital with other factors. In fact, old capital vintage is less substitutable with energy, 
labour and other inputs than new capital. Both these features add realism to this environment and trade 
model where enhanced openness should increase investment opportunities and new capital goods should 
embody cleaner technologies and greater adjustment possibilities.
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Finally, the energy aggregate includes two energy substitutes: oil and electricity. 
Figure 5-1 depicts the nested decision process in the choice of production factors.
Substitution elasticities reflect adjustment possibilities in the demand for factors of 
production originating from variations in their relative prices. Consider particular 
values1' 2: 0.00 between intermediates and value added with old capital plus energy; 0.50 
between intermediates and value added aggregate incorporating new capital plus energy; 
0.12 between aggregate labour and old capital-energy bundle; 1.00 between aggregate 
labour and new capital-energy bundle; 0.40 among different types of labour; 0.00 
between old capital and energy; 0.80 between new capital and energy; 0.25 among 
different sources of energy associated with old capital; 2.00 among those associated with 
new capital.
Income Distribution and Absorption
Labour income is allocated to households according to a fixed coefficient distribution 
matrix derived from the original SAM. Likewise capital revenues are distributed among 
households, corporations and rest of the world. Corporations save the after-tax residual of 
that revenue.
Private consumption demand is obtained through maximisation of household specific 
utility function following the Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES).m Household 
utility is a function of consumption of different goods and saving. Income elasticities are 
different for each household and product and vary in the range 0.20, for basic products 
consumed by the household with highest income, to 1.30 for services.152 *54 Once their total 
value is determined, government and investment demands155 are disaggregated in sectoral 
demands according to fixed coefficient functions.
152 These elasticities are derived from the most recent relevant literature. In fact, they are mostly derived 
from background studies done for the construction of the OECD GREEN model. See for instance Burniaux, 
Nicoleni and Oliveira-Martins (1992).
1,1 A useful reference for the ELES approach is found in Lluch (1973). More detailed explanations of this 
modelling choice are given in the technical appendix.
154 Among the various sources for these elasticities see Blanciforti and Green (1983), Eastwood and 
Craven (1981), Lopez ( 1989) and Maki ( 1988).
Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government expenditures are
exogenously fixed.
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International Trade
In the model we assume imperfect substitution among goods originating in different 
geographical areas.156 Imports demand results from a CES aggregation function of 
domestic and imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modelled as a Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Producers decide to allocate their output to 
domestic or foreign markets responding to relative prices. The model implements a two- 
stage procedure for determining both import demand and export supply. For imports 
consider Figure 5-2. At the first stage aggregate demand is decomposed into a domestic 
component and an aggregate import component. At the second stage, aggregate import 
demand is allocated across the various trading partners.
Export supply is treated in a symmetric fashion (see Figure 5-3). Producers allocate 
production between domestic sales and aggregate export sales. At the second stage, 
aggregate exports are sold to the various trading partners based on the relative price the 
exporter can receive in each market.157
* Armington (1969).
Elasticities between domestic and foreign products are of comparable magnitude for imports demand 
and exports supply. Their values are 3.00 for agricultural goods, 2.00 for manufactured goods and 1.50 for 
services. Similar values are used for the second nesting.
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As Morocco is unable to influence world prices the small country assumption holds, 
and its imports and exports prices are treated as exogenous. The balance of payments 
equilibrium is determined by the equality of foreign savings (which are exogenous) to the 
value for the current account. With fixed world prices and capital inflows, all adjustments 
are accommodated by changes in the real exchange rate: increased import demand, due to 
trade liberalisation must be financed by increased exports, and these can expand owing to 
the improved resource allocation. Price decreases in importables drive resources towards 
export sectors and contribute to falling domestic resource costs (or real exchange rate 
depreciation).
Model Closure and Dynamics
The equilibrium condition on the balance of payments is combined with other closure 
conditions so that the model can be solved for each period. Firstly consider the 
government budget. Its surplus158 is fixed and the household income tax schedule shifts in 
order to achieve the predetermined net government position. Secondly, investment must 
equal savings, which originate from households, corporations, government and rest of the 
world.
The dynamic structure of the model results from the equilibrium condition between 
savings and investment. A change in the savings volume influences capital accumulation
"" Its initial value is determined in the 1990 SAM.
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in the following period. Exogenously determined growth rates are assumed for various 
other factors that affect the growth path of the economy, such as: population and labour 
supply growth rates, labour and capital productivity growth rates and energy efficiency 
factor growth rate. Agents are assumed to be myopic and to base their decisions on static 
expectations about prices and quantities. The model dynamics are therefore recursive, 
generating a sequence of static equilibria.150
Emissions
Emissions are determined by either intermediate or final* 160 consumption of polluting 
products. In addition, certain industries display an autonomous emission component 
linked directly to their output levels. This is introduced in order to include some polluting 
production processes that would not be accounted for by only considering the vectors of 
their intermediates consumption. It is assumed that labour and capital do not pollute. 
Emissions coefficients associated with each type of consumption and production are 
derived from a previous study161 on the determinants of polluting intensity for the US and 
here adapted to the Moroccan case.162 A change in sectoral output, or in consumption 
vectors, both in levels or composition, therefore affects emission volumes. Formally, the 
total value for a given polluting emission takes the form:
£ = 1 + +1 «,x r —
i i i i
where i is the sector index, j the consumed product index, C intermediate consumption, 
A0“p“' output, xArmmg'on final consumption (at the Armington composite goods level), a, 
the emission volume associated with one unit consumption of product j and p, the
The model’s long-run properties are discussed in the technical appendix.
160 Final consumption, in this context, is restricted to households, government and investment demand. 
Expons are not considered since the analysis is limited to local emission.
1 1 See Dessus, Roland-Holst, van der Mensbrugghe (1994). Instead of focusing on pollution output at 
individual industrial sources, they advocate moving back up the production process. Factories producing 
pollution can be numerous and very dispersed geographically. The evidence reported in their study 
indicates that only a few commodities are responsible for determining pollution levels when they are 
consumed as intermediates. Their econometric estimates indicate that over 90 per cent of the variation in 
emission of most toxic pollution can be explained by consumption of less than a dozen intermediate 
commodities. Their calculations are based on a 345 sector US input-output table (see Reinert and Roland- 
Holst (1992)) and on the 1987 IPPS (Industrial Pollution Projection System) database developed at the 
World Bank for the US (Hettige, Martin, Singh, Wheeler (1994)).
' The actual values used in the model are shown in section 5.7.
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emission volume associated with one unit production of sector i. Thus, the first two 
elements of the right hand side expression represent production-generated emissions, the 
third one consumption-generated emissions.
There are 13 types of polluting substances. Their volume is independently determined 
and measured in metric tons. Toxic emissions in air (TOXAIR), water (TOXWAT) and 
soil (TOXSOL) depend primarily on the consumption of chemicals (especially fertilisers 
for water pollution), oil derived products and mineral products. Bio-accumulative 
emissions differ from the previous ones for their long term effects on bio organisms, due 
to their high lead (or other heavy metal) concentration. Again, these are distinguished 
according to the medium where they are released: into the air (BIOAIR), water 
(BIOWAT) and soil (BIOSOL). These emissions are a result of the use of mineral and 
metal products, generally found in construction-related sectors. There are 5 types of toxic 
substances released in the air: sulphur dioxide (S02), nitrogen dioxide (N02) and carbon 
monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and suspended particulates (PART). 
Their levels depend primarily on fuels consumption: oil and coal derived products. 
Finally, two additional categories of water polluting substances are considered: 
suspended solids (SS) and those measured by their biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). 
These emissions are related to the consumption of mineral products.
The household utility functions do not include among their arguments any term 
directly related to environmental qualities. In other words, pollution levels are assumed 
not to explicitly affect household utility. Despite the theoretical validity of the utility- 
environment relationship, empirical applications would require estimates for utility 
values that household assign to environmental qualities. Unfortunately statistical 
information on which these estimates can be based is still too limited.163 Likewise, 
environmental degradation is not assumed to affect production factors productivity. 
Productivity gains resulting from new investments in greener technology are not 
measured in this model. Thus, the potential gains from environmental protection policies 
are almost certainly going to be under-estimated.
163 r»
Perroni and Wigle(l994).
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P o lic y  I n s t r u m e n t s
The model includes a variety of important instruments of economic policy: direct and 
indirect taxes on production, consumption and revenues, tariffs and other taxes and 
subsidies on international transactions. Each of these taxes/subsidies is differentiated by 
sector, product, household, production factor, consumption type or income source. A 
uniform tax on each unit of polluting emission (for type of toxic substance) is also 
introduced and paid by the polluter agents. This tax can be endogenously determined if 
specified levels of emission (abatement) are to be targeted, otherwise it can be 
exogenously fixed. In this latter case, emissions levels become endogenous.
5.3 Economic Activity and Environment in Morocco
A single-country CGE model has been constructed to investigate the links between 
trade and environment policies in Morocco. Several reasons make Morocco an especially 
instructive case study. Morocco's sustained growth, and openness rate slightly below 70 
per cent164, make its economy very sensitive to commercial policy reforms. Its exports 
are concentrated in the primary sectors and textiles, whose production requires extensive 
use of polluting chemical intermediates. Abatement policies would impose additional 
costs and would modify its export competitiveness. This would also result in a different 
income distribution between rural and urban households. In contrast, a more open 
commercial policy would imply an increase in polluting production.
In addition new pressures on implementing environmentally sound policies can arise 
from Morocco’s main trading partners, namely the EU. In fact, the new Euro- 
Mediterranean policy platform promulgated by the EU includes environment 
conservation policies among the crucial issues for a sustainable development of the area. 
For example, the latest EU financial policy agreement, the 1992 agreement, although still 
making crop diversification and export promotion a priority, explicitly includes the 
environment as a new concern. Consequently, training, technical assistance and investment 
related to environmental conservation are eligible for assistance. Demographic pressure is
IM Defined as the sum of exports plus imports on total income and measured for 1990.
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also mentioned as a factor in environmental degradation (Article 3-2) and therefore family 
planning is eligible for financing if requested by the country in question.
The same emphasis is found at a national level when considering aid flows. France. 
Italy and Spain, the main aid donors for Morocco. Algeria and Tunisia.165 recently 
proposed the promotion of debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) to reduce indebtedness and at the 
same time promote sustainable development projects. Since the first DNS with Bolivia in 
1987, more than 30 agreements have been implemented. Although most DNSs went to 
Latin America, some African countries, and more recently Tunisia (1992-93) have also 
benefited. In relative terms, the face value of such commitments is small: the average face 
value of DNS over 1987-93 was $5.7 million. In Tunisia’s case, the Swedish government 
swapped $1.8 million in ODA, while Tunisia made the counter-value in local currency 
available for projects directed towards environmental preservation. This clause was 
integrated in the Moroccan 1990 rescheduling agreement.166
In summary, although Morocco made considerable progress in negotiating increasing 
access of its export markets, the progressive tightening of European Community and 
national rules as regards environmental issues, and the harmonisation of EC arrangements 
for industrial standards, have the potential to become significant non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Thus, any comprehensive approach to the Morocco-EC relations should take into 
account the environmental implications of commercial policy changes and the economic 
implications of environmental policy implementation. By tracing all direct and indirect 
linkages between the economic activity and the environment, the present Moroccan 
environment and trade model represents an ideal approach to study the co-ordination167 of 
these policies. However, before using the model to examine the dynamic evolution of the 
environmental and economic variables, this section presents a detailed account of the 
basic pollution intensities of the Moroccan production and consumption. This offers a 
reference point useful for evaluating the potential environmental effects due to economic 
growth and increased trade.
165 These three countries, notwithstanding political instability in Algeria, accounted for more than $1 billion 
of bilateral aid in 1991-92. See Fontagni & Piridy (1995).
See Fontagni & Piridy (1995).
Co-ordination here is intended in the sense of simultaneous use.
From a static perspective. Table 5-1 depicts the estimates for the sectoral emission 
intensities for production in 1990. i.e. the volume of emissions per unit of output. The 
Moroccan economy has been disaggregated (for a summary presentation) into 9 sectors: 
food agriculture (FAg), export agriculture (ExpAg). mining and other primary products 
(Min), food products (FPr), Textiles (Texl), highly polluting manufacturing (PollM), 
other manufactured products (OthM), polluting services (PollS) and services with low 
rates of pollution (NPollS).168 The last column displays economy-wide averages weighted 
by sectoral outputs, the last 3 rows show respectively per cent shares of sectoral 
production, export to output ratios and EC per cent shares of total export. From this 
summary table, it is possible to observe the distribution of emissions intensities across 
sectors. This depends on the initial input-output structure of the Moroccan SAM (for the 
term a,Cv) and on the vector of output (for the term p ^ ! >ulpu'). A sector » would then have 
a higher pollution intensity (E/X,°u,pul) the more polluting intermediates it consumes and 
the higher the value of its own ¡5, coefficient. By considering the relative weights shown 
in Table 5-1 (last three rows), it is also possible to see which are the most polluting 
industries in volume terms and what might be the environmental consequences of 
increased market access of Moroccan products in the EC.
Consider first pollution intensities. The aggregate PollM certainly records the worst 
case in terms of bio-accumulative substances, oxides and air polluting materials. A tax 
proportional to emission intensities will therefore result in higher production costs for this 
sector. Conversely, a specifically targeted tax levied on toxic emissions and BOD 
substances is likely to affect mostly the polluting services. Export agriculture is notably 
more polluting than food agriculture (with the exception of bio accumulative substances). 
Textiles, which record the highest EC share of total expions, enjoy relatively low 
emission intensities whereas Mining shows the highest export to output ratio and fairly 
severe emission intensities.
Food agriculture consists mainly of basic staple crops (cereals) and livestocks plus oilseeds. Export 
agriculture includes vegetables, fruits, fishing and other agricultural products. Highly polluting 
manufacturing aggregates pulp and paper, chemicals, oil refinery, iron and steel and construction materials 
industries. Polluting services (PLSV) are transports, electricity and construction.
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Table 5-1: Sectoral emission intensities for production - 1990 (Ksper l ( f  Dirham)
FA g ExpA g M in FPr Texl Po llM  OthM____ P o lls  N PollS  Total
TOXAIR 1.0 1.3 3.8 2.7 14.0 19.7 3.0 19.5 2.5 8.3
TOXW AT 3.5 4.9 6.7 5.4 0.7 24.1 4.5 33.1 5.4 11.2
TOXSOL 2.4 3.1 14.7 6.7 0.5 99 .2 10.0 129.1 7.3 36.2
BIOAIR* 1.2 0.7 39.5 1.5 0.1 608 .4 34.7 153.6 0.9 129.8
BIOW AT* 1.2 1.5 2.2 0.5 0.1 3 3 .0 0.3 14.3 4.2 9.3
BIOSOL* 25.4 15.6 824.2 29.4 0.6 12778.6 211.5 3161.3 16.5 2700.2
S 02 5.2 7.2 1 1.0 8 8 0.3 34.8 2.1 9.3 4 8 10.8
N 02 3.0 4.2 6.4 5.1 0.2 23.8 1.3 5.4 2.8 6.9
CO 0.5 0.7 4.2 0.9 0.0 53 .7 0.2 13.1 0.5 11.6
v o c 1.3 1.9 3.5 3 8 0.4 8 .2 3.3 2.4 2.4 3.3
PART 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.2 0.0 10.0 0.3 2.4 0.7 2.6
BOD 0.1 0.1 1.3 4.7 0.0 5 .8 1.0 17.2 0.8 3.6
TSS 2 4 1.5 78.1 2.7 0.0 1219.6 0.0 296.7 1.4 256.4
O utput % II 4 2 8 9 18 4 11 34 100
X /Output 0 28 59 II 21 12 II 6 2
X to EC /Tot X 65 69 _____S 2 _ ____ 71__ ____ 8S_ 47 72 65 65
• Bio-accumulative pollution intensities are in grams per billion of Dirham
In terms of volumes, emissions from manufacturing and polluting services represent 
82 per cent of the total toxic emissions, 99 per cent of total bio-accumulative pollutants, 
80 per cent of total oxides, 65 per cent of other air pollutants and 99 per cent of other 
water pollutants.
Although production activity is the dominant environmental agent in the economy, 
final consumption of goods and services can equally cause considerable pollution, 
especially for specific emission categories. Analogous results of emissions intensities for 
consumption are shown in Table 5-2. These estimated intensities refer to consumption of 
final goods (and services) and do not consider households’ waste. Except for water bio- 
accumulative, consumption generates emissions only in correspondence of polluting 
manufactured products, as in the case of consumption of refined fuels or chemicals. Bio- 
accumulative metals and toxic waste released through consumption, similarly to 
production, usually degrade soil.
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Table 5-2: Sectoral emission intensities for final consumption - 1990 (Ke per I l f  Dirham)
FAg ExpA g___ Min FPr Text PollM O thM P olls N PollS Total
T O X A IR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
rO X W A T 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5
I O X  SOL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9
B IO A IR * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
BIOWAT* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 275.3 0.0 39.3
B IO SO L* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8
S 0 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 59.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0
N 0 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5
CO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
v o c 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5
P A R T 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
BO D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
r s s 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C o n s % ____ L£________ _____ o______LQ__ 4 _____ 10 11 14 28 ___1HQ
* Bio-accumulative pollution intensities are in grams per billion of Dirham
5.4 The Benchmark Scenario
The definition of a plausible evolution for the Moroccan economy is based on several 
simplifying hypotheses. The following simulations should therefore not be considered as 
a forecast exercise, for CGE models are not adequate forecasts tools. In fact, the 
definition of a growth path, supported by exogenous assumptions, serves the purpose of 
establishing a scenario with no policy interventions. Impacts of different economic 
policies are then evaluated against this reference scenario by measuring the variations in 
the economic aggregates. Fixing values for exogenous variables within a realistic 
confidence interval seems to imply no major consequences: the relative variations of the 
different economic aggregates measured during the evaluation of alternative policies with 
respect to the reference scenario seem uninfluenced by those a priori choices.
Growth hypotheses
Crucial growth rates have to be fixed in order to define the reference scenario. The 
GDP growth rate up to the year 2004 is exogenously determined so that the capital 
productivity growth rate can be estimated.169 A yearly average growth rate was estimated 
at 4.0 per cent, corresponding to the historic growth rate of Morocco in the years 1930-
In the reference scenario real GDP growth rate is fixed and the capital productivity growth rate is 
endogenously determined. In the alternative policies simulations the previously estimated capital 
productivity growth rate is exogenous and GDP growth rate becomes endogenous.
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1990.'70 Population and labour force are supposed to grow at the same exogenously fixed 
rate of 2 per cent per year.
A further hypothesis concerns the monetary transfers among agents in the economy 
and public expenditures. These are supposed to be growing at the same rate as GDP. The 
government budget surplus is assumed to decrease during the simulation period so that it 
reaches balance at the year 2004. The last hypothesis on exogenous growth rates assumes 
that the energy efficiency factor increases at a yearly rate of 1 per cent and labour 
productivity at 1 per cent for skilled labour and 0.5 per cent for unskilled labour.171 Apart 
from the latter assumptions about efficiency, no other modification affects the current 
technology. However, this can become less polluting because of factors substitution due 
to changes in tax structure, production and consumption. The remaining part of this 
section focuses on the joint evolution of Moroccan economic activity and pollution in the 
benchmark scenario.
Growth and emissions
The joint evolution of economic activity and emission volumes can be seen in Table 
5-3 where the long-term pollution elasticities with respect to production and consumption 
are depicted. These are measured as the ratio of the yearly average growth rates of 
polluting emissions to those of production (and consumption, during the period 1991 - 
2004) obtained in the benchmark scenario, i.e. without any policy change.
Notice that aggregate pollution grows more or less at the same rate of economic 
activity, as the elasticities are very close to unity. In other words, given that output 
growth rate has been exogenously fixed at 4.0 per cent per year, without policy 
intervention, we expect this same rate (or a very close one) for the growth of the 13 
pollutants considered. In addition the relative weights of production and consumption 
generated emissions do not vary significantly during the simulation period.
1 " This yearly average growth rate results from the estimation of a linear trend of the logarithm of GDP 
at constant (1987 base year) prices (in parenthesis are shown t-Student values): 
y -  24.6 + 0.043 / R2 -  0.97
(602) (31.7)
See the technical specification of the model for details.
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Table 5-3: Emission elasticities - Benchmark scenario 1991 -  2004
O utput_________________ C onsum ption
rO X A IR 1.07 1.04
TO X W A T 1.01 1.01
r o x so L 1.13 1.05
BIOAIR 1.15 1.36
BIO W A T 1.13 1.37
BIOSOL 1.15 1.36
S 02 0.74 0.98
N 0 2 0.78 0.98
CO 1.12 0.98
v o c 0.90 1.02
PART 0.92 0.98
BOD I I I 1.12
ISS__________________ 115 __ Q
The analysis of the decomposition of emission by origin, as shown by Grossman and 
Krueger (1992) can be instructive. Three types of effects are distinguished in the 
variation of emission levels: the composition effect takes into account the modification of 
the proportion of polluting products in the aggregate output; the technological effect 
reflects changes in pollution due to alteration in the production technology; the scale 
effect describes the impact of increased volumes of output on the environment.
Consider the following identity, which simply states that total emission (for each type 
of pollutant) is equal to the sum of sectoral emissions:
/ x ou,nu, E
I y  ( )u tp u t y  ( )u tP u,
I '  ^  to t  ^  i
The total variation in emission levels can then be measured as the sum of the 
mentioned three effects by differentiating the shown identity:
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terms), E, the sectoral emission volumes and A',"“'’" the sectoral outputs. A similar 
formula is used in the case of emissions originating from final consumption.172
The determinants of variations in the levels of emissions due to changes in production 
or consumption vectors are displayed in Table 5-4. Observing the values in the scale 
effect column, it clearly emerges that the predominant role in environmental degradation 
(across all types of emission) is played by the increase in activity volumes. The 
proportion of polluting goods and services produced and consumed expands from 1991 to 
2004. thereby increasing, with the exception of sulphur and nitrogen oxides emissions, 
the aggregate pollution volumes (composition effect). Finally, production technologies 
appear to be cleaner at the end of the period, specifically because of the improvements 
derived from the assumed gains in the energy efficiency factor and from some 
substitution in production factors (technology effect). Bio-accumulative emissions are 
once more the exception, but register very low magnitudes.
The actual mechanics of the technology effect deserve sbme additional elaboration. 
The production technology specification was briefly described in the previous section, 
but it is worthwhile highlighting again some of its important characteristics. In the current 
CGE model production technology is defined as a combination of intermediate inputs and 
primary factors. Some substitution among these two groups is possible, while 
intermediate inputs are combined among themselves in fixed proportions. The primary 
factor bundle is composed of three substitutable components: energy, capital and labour, 
with energy producing toxic emissions when used. Energy is furthermore decomposed in 
oil products and electricity, with each of them having different polluting characteristics. 
Therefore a producer may reduce its emissions at any of the described levels by 
substituting intermediates and factors, or by replacing energy with non-energy factors, or.
w h e re  c? is  th e  d if f e r e n t ia l  o p e ra to r ,  E  to ta l e m is s io n  v o lu m e . to ta l  o u tp u t  ( in  rea l
1 " In this case, the technological effect is absent, given that each component of final consumption is 
associated to an emission coefficient invariant with time. The emission volumes variation due to a modified 
consumption vector takes the form:
where x  is total final consumption (of the Armington composite good) in real terms and
X  pma| consumption jn real terms of product i.
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finally, by switching among energy sources. Actual substitutions result from alterations 
in relative prices of the constituents (intermediates and factors), and relative prices are 
changed, among other things, by indirect tax variations. For instance, in the basic 
scenario where a real exchange rate devaluation is registered, increases in the price of 
imported oil induce the energy demand to shift towards electricity, thus causing a 
reduction in the emission intensities of domestic production (consider column 3 in Table 
5-4). This effect is particularly evident in the hydrocarbon gas categories (S02 and N02), 
where emissions grow more slowly than production or consumption (see Table 5-3).
Table 5-4: Decomposition analysis ofemission variations. 1990-2004 (Benchmark scenario)
Production Consumption
___ Composition lechnoloev Scale Composition Technoloec Scale
Variations in Volumes (¡000 metric tons)
TOXAIR 1.7 -0.3 28.0 0.1 0.0 2.6
TOXWAT 1.7 -1.4 36.3 0.0 c.o 6.0
TOXSOL 12.0 -0.7 125.1 0.2 0.0 5.4
BIOAIR* 50.0 -0.7 454.9 0.2 0.0 0.7
BIOW AT* 3.1 0.0 32.2 16.2 0.0 61.9
BIOSOL* 1052.9 -14.1 9469.3 1.6 0.0 6.0
S02 -1.1 -5.0 30.6 -0.1 0.0 8.0
N02 -0.5 -2.9 20.0 -0.1 0.0 4.6
CO 4.0 -0.5 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
voc 0.1 -0.8 10.1 0.1 0.0 3.3
PART 0.2 -0.7 8.0 -0.0 0.0 1.1
BOD 1.0 0.0 12.4 0.0 0.0 0.4
ISS 100.5 -1.3 899.4 0.0 0.0 ____£L0
l ariations in percentages
TOXAIR 6 -1 95 3 0 97
TOXWAT 5 -4 99 1 0 99
TOXSOL 9 -1 92 4 0 96
BIOAIR 10 0 90 20 0 80
BIOWAT 9 0 91 21 0 79
BIOSOL 10 0 90 20 0 80
S02 -4 -21 125 -1 0 101
N02 -3 -18 120 •1 0 101
CO 9 -1 92 -1 0 101
VOC 1 -8 108 2 0 98
PART 3 -9 106 -1 0 101
BOD 7 0 93 8 0 92
ISS __________ LB___ 0__________ 90___________________ 0___________0_____ ______2
Bio-accumulative pollution intensities are in metric tons
Even if this specification incorporates a quite complex adjustment process, it should 
be noticed that some important links between pollution and technology are not precisely 
taken into account. For instance, innovation or technology transfers, which may explain 
how substitution among factors and inputs can be realised, are not explicitly modelled. 
Besides, emissions reduction, cleaning and other end-of-pipe techniques are not
1 3 9
considered. The basic mechanism is governed by an endogenous response to changes in 
relative prices of factors/inputs and its flexibility is limited by empirical substitution 
elasticities.
In summary, with no policy intervention, economic activity growth results in a 
significant increment of emissions despite output and consumption shifts towards less 
polluting products and the implementation of cleaner technology.
5.5 Trade and Environmental Policy Scenarios
Having defined a ’Business as Usual' (BaU) base scenario, this section examines the 
interactions between international trade policy and the environment, between 
environmental policy and the economy, and finally the effects obtained by a joint 
implementation of these two policies. In most cases, the links between the environment 
and economic activity are significant. Their complexity though should discourage policy 
makers from adopting corrective measures based on a heuristic approach or partial 
analyses. In particular, I estimate that trade liberalisation, in the form of a free trade area 
with the European Community, results in remarkable increase in both levels and 
intensities of major pollutants in the absence of any environmental policy. Moreover, 
policies aiming at a direct reduction in emissions may obtain quite positive environmental 
results but with prejudicial and unintended effects on economic growth. Finally, co­
ordinated policies may in a certain measure realise the two objectives of improving 
growth opportunities and reducing environmental damage. The fact that the FTA with 
Europe will ultimately imply some sort of harmonisation with emissions restrictions of 
the Community, makes it reasonable to think that Morocco will be forced to adopt some 
regime of policy co-ordination.
The first scenario simulates a policy of trade liberalisation through a progressive 
reduction in import tariffs. These international trade distortions are decreased ad valorem 
by 5 per cent with respect to the benchmark case in 1992, by 27.5 per cent in 1998, by
58.5 per cent in 2001 and completely abolished at the end with a perfect convergence of 
domestic and international prices.
The second round of simulations consider a progressive reduction of each type of 
emission (i.e. it consists of 13 different experiments). A target in terms of emissions
140
abatement is exogenously fixed as follows. Emissions levels are reduced with respect to 
the reference scenario by 2 per cent in 1992. 8 per cent in 1998, 17 per cent in 2001 and 
25 per cent in the end of the period. The instrument used to reach this target is a uniform 
tax per unit of emission paid by the agent causing that pollution and endogenously 
determined by the model.173
Trade liberalisation
Moroccan import protection is relatively high for international standards and it is also 
fairly dispersed across sectors.174 Even if these distortions do not seem substantial when 
measured as weighted averages against imports, they confer price advantages to 
particular domestic production sectors such as, for instance, agriculture. This section 
explores the effects of the FT A agreement between Morocco and the European 
Community. Within the discussed exogenous growth hypotheses, the model simulates a 
reduction of Moroccan restrictions against imports originating in the EC. This 
liberalisation, according to the letter of the agreement, eliminates tariffs progressively in 
four years and non-tariff barriers in six years. There are some important differences 
between the simulated and the agreed FTA liberalisation. Firstly, the simulations do not 
exempt agricultural goods as in the current version of the agreement. Secondly, it is 
assumed that the Moroccan government budget does not vary and that increasing 
households’ direct taxes compensate revenue losses from reduced import duties. This 
particular scenario, by eliminating negative fiscal effects, allows to better isolating the 
pure and simple effects of the trade policy.175
In order to render more- legible our results presented in the following tables, emissions 
are aggregated into five groups: toxic pollutants (TOXAIR, TOXWAT, TOXSOL), bio- 
accumulative metals (BIOAIR, BIOWAT, BIOSOL), oxide emissions (SO2, NO2, CO), 
other air pollutants (VOC, PART) and other water pollutants (BOD, SS). These
11 See the technical specification of the model for more details. 
!’* See chapter 7, Table 7-3.
1,5 A detailed account of different closures is given in chapter 7.
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aggregations are consistent in physical terms and do not hide relative variations of 
opposite sign. In fact, emissions show a high correlation degree within each group.176
Table 5-5 summarises the main results in terms of emission elasticities. The figures in 
this table correspond to a percentage change in emission groups with respect to 1 per cent 
change in total production or consumption. The first row (BaU) shows for each emission 
group the elasticities of the reference scenario, so that, for instance, average yearly 
growth rates for bio-accumulative emissions in the period 1991 -  2004 in the reference 
case are estimated to be equal to 1.15 times the average growth rate for production; or, 
considering consumption originated emissions, 1.37 times the corresponding growth rate 
for final demand.
Table 5-5: Emission elasticities. Separated em’ironmenlal and commercial policies
W ith respect to  production With respect to  consum ption
Tox Bio Nox A ir W a t Tox Bio Nox A ir
BaU 1.09 1.15 0.91 0.91 1.15 1.03 1.37 0.98 1.01 1.12
E C  F T A 1.26 1.63 1.11 1.05 1.64 1.15 1.43 1.00 i n 1.17
T O X A 1 R 0.67 0.20 0.49 0.63 0 .20 0.73 1.05 0.95 0.87 0.52
T O X W A T 0.59 0.43 0.16 0.36 0.43 0.52 0.80 0.73 0.80 0.20
T O X S O L 0.68 0.32 0.50 0.64 0.31 0.77 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.45
B IO A IR 0.92 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.62 0.96 1.29 0.98 0.97 1.07
B I O W A T 0.73 0.54 0.60 0.71 0.53 0.96 0.80 0.98 0.97 1.08
B IO S O L 0.92 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.63 0.96 1.30 0.98 0.97 1.07
S 0 2 1.03 1.16 0.57 0.63 1.16 0.92 1.28 0.67 0.86 0.94
X 0 2 1.00 1.14 0.55 0.62 1.14 0.90 1.23 0.67 0.86 0.85
C O 0.91 0 .59 0.68 0.75 0 .59 0.95 1.29 0.97 0.96 1.06
I O C 0.85 0.41 0.17 0.29 0.41 0.73 1.34 0.63 0.57 1.11
P A R T 0.81 0 .49 0.33 0.48 0 .49 0.84 1.19 0.73 0.83 0.88
B O D 0.77 0.97 0.70 0.78 0 .96 0.83 0.75 1.00 1.02 0.13
m ________ 0.9? Q.6? . 0.71 0.78 0.64 0.96 1 .1 0 - 0.98 0.97 107
Notes : Tox: toxic pollutants; Bio: bio-accumulatives metals; N o x : sulfur, nitrogen and carbon oxides; Air: other air pollutants; Wat: 
other water pollutants.
The second row in Table 5-5 shows emission elasticities for the FTA case and the 
differences with the reference case are remarkable. It clearly appears that trade 
liberalisation vis-à-vis the European Community, in the absence o f counteractive 
measures, will result in increased pollution intensities for both supply and demand in 
Morocco across all emissions categories. In fact, for some cases, emissions intensities 
increase considerably with trade opening. The main reason for this effect is the
' 6 In the following sub-sections the results from the above simulations are presented. For the sake of 
clarity only global or very aggregated results are shown, even though the model is run with about 50
1 4 2
intensification of Morocco's traditional comparative advantage. This is causing a stronger 
specialisation towards more polluting activities compared to the benchmark, in particular 
activities linked with export agriculture, mining, and polluting manufacturing record 
significant growth rates.
Table 5-6 shows how changes in emissions induced by the European FT A can be 
decomposed. It clearly appears that both composition and technology effects contribute to 
increase pollution elasticities, with the first being the larger component.
Table 5-6: Decomposition analysis o f emission variations. 1990-2004 (EC FT A scenario)
Production_________________________________________C onsum ption
C om position Technology Scale ComDosition Technology Scale
V a r ia tio n s  i n  V o lu m e s  ( 1 0 0 0  m e t r i c  t o n s )
TOXAIR 6.9 0.1 39.3 0.4 0.0 3.1
TOXW AT 1.9 -0.6 42.1 0.7 0.0 7.1
TOXSOL 31.6 1.4 159.6 0.7 0.0 6.3
BIOAIR* 250.6 4.3 681.4 0.4 0.0 1.0
BIOW AT* 14.5 0.4 46.1 19.3 0.0 71.2
BIOSOL* 5413.5 89.9 14331.8 3.4 0.0 7.9
S02 -3.5 -3.9 33.9 0.0 0.0 8.9
N 02 -2.2 -2.3 22.0 0.0 0.0 5.2
CO 21.4 0.0 59.7 0.0 0.0 0.8
VOC 0.5 -0.5 12.1 0.4 0.0 4.0
PART 1.4 -0.5 10.2 0.0 0.0 1.2
BOD 0.5 0.2 13.9 0.1 0.0 0.4
TSS 523.5 8.5 1368.3 0.0 0.0 ____ 0JJ
1 a r ia t io n s  i n  p e r c e n t a g e s
TOXAIR 15 0 85 II 0 89
TOXWAT 4 -1 97 9 0 91
roxsoi. 16 1 83 10 0 90
BIOAIR 27 0 73 29 0 71
biowat 24 1 76 21 0 79
BIOSOL 27 0 72 30 0 70
S02 -13 -15 128 0 0 100
N 02 -13 -13 126 0 0 100
CO 26 0 74 0 0 100
VOC 4 -4 100 9 0 91
PART 13 -5 92 0 0 100
BOD 3 1 95 20 0 80
IS S ___________ 22_____________ 0_____ _____22_____ 0 _________ Q______ ______ 0
* Bio-accumulative pollution intensities are in metric tons
In other words, Moroccan specialisation in polluting activities is mainly explained by 
a shift in the output composition towards more pollution intensive products rather than by 
the use of dirtier technologies across all industries. This composition effect reflects the 
full exploitation of Moroccan comparative advantage in polluting sectors.
sectors. Detailed results, averaging more than 3000 values per period are available.
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The technology effect is generally positive in this FTA scenario for two reasons. 
Firstly, import liberalisation reduces relative prices of various polluting inputs, among 
which are chemicals. Secondly, prices of oil products originating in the EC fall with 
respect to oil coming from other sources and domestic electricity. The first effect induces 
trade diversion and the second a technological shift towards a more polluting energy 
product.177 The scale effect plays the most important role, significantly raising aggregate 
emissions levels. Similar reasoning applies to consumption.
It appears then that trade liberalisation in the form of a FTA with EC will give rise to 
higher levels of local pollution in Morocco. Not only the total volume of emissions will 
increase, but also, in the absence of environmental policies, it will grow at a faster rate 
than total production and consumption.
To better clarify the links between trade liberalisation and emissions. Table 5-7 
presents, for the FTA case, sectoral results for production, consumption, and total 
emissions.
Table 5-7: Sectoral adjustments resulting from an EC FTA
Real Real Total Production  Em issions Ratio
Food Agri
rro u u cu o n
0.32
consum ption___
1.30
___ _______________
0.75 10.74
________ _a__
0.16 0.02
Exp Agri 7.98 1.90 9.99 4.30 0.06 0.01
Mining 12.51 0.00 15.00 1.87 0.58 0.31
FoodPr -2 .69 4.19 -0.04 7.62 0.18 0 .02
Textile 14.15 6.74 15.84 8 86 0.05 0.01
PollMan 7.57 10.67 10.49 18.15 84.89 4.68
Oth Man -4.76 19.65 -4.34 3.55 0.30 0 .09
PollServ 6.99 6.23 9.24 10.96 13.25 1.21
NPollServ 5.72 2.27 7.96 33,96 0.53 __________0.02
lea l_______ 100.00 100.00
The first 3 columns show percentage differences with respect to the BaU case. The last 3 columns are calculated form the 1990 base 
year data.
Even at this relatively aggregate level, the sources of pollution caused by trade 
liberalisation become apparent. Considering the production side, these include export 
agriculture, mining, textiles and polluting manufacturing. These are the Moroccan sectors 
that enjoy traditional comparative advantage. The last column shows that for two of these 
macro-sectors, mining, and polluting manufacturing the emission intensities are well
' 7 Notice that in this FTA scenario S02 and N02 still record negative values but their reduction is lower 
than in the benchmark case (confront the relevant rows in Table 5-4 and Table 5-6).
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above the average.178 Direct pollution from export agriculture does not seem to be above 
average, but its upward linkages with chemical products bring about significant 
emissions.
Final consumption growth generates additional emissions especially in the polluting 
manufacturing and polluting services (particularly in transport services and electricity). 
These are typically expanding sectors of a growing economy and adequate regulation 
should be put in place.
Environmental policy
Although the apparent negative environmental consequences of the described FT A 
agreement for Morocco, it has been established that import protection is an inefficient 
policy for environment protection.179 Pollution taxes directly targeted to affect polluting 
agents' behaviour are much more efficient, but they may have some costs in terms of 
economic growth. In this section, the Moroccan trade and environment model has been 
used to determine the effects of these environmental taxes.
The last 13 rows of Table 5-5 correspond to the hypothetical implementation of a 
specific emission tax. This takes the form, for each of the 13-emission types, of a uniform 
tax levied on producers and consumers so that an exogenously assigned emission 
reduction with respect to the benchmark level is achieved within the period considered.180 
For instance, if a uniform tax were levied on water pollutants (TOXWAT) so that 25 per 
cent abatement with respect to the benchmark were the target for the year 2004, average 
yearly growth rates for bio-accumulative emissions would be equal to 0.43 times the 
average growth rate for production. Or, considering consumption originated emissions. 
0.80 times the corresponding growth rate for final demand (consider the forth row in 
Table 5-5).
Form the figures of Table 5-5 it clearly appears that targeted emission taxes have 
considerable reduction effects. For each simulation and across pollutant groups, 
emissions elasticities with respect to production are smaller than in the benchmark. The
1 * In fact, also polluting services register emission intensity above the average, but their export to output
raho is very low (see Table 5-1) making their trade-related contribution to pollution less important.
1 ’ See Beghin. Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (1995) and Perroni and Wigle (1994).
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only exception is represented by the policies targeted at sulphur oxides: in this case a 
slight increase (0.01 points) with respect to the benchmark is registered in the elasticities 
for Bio emissions and water pollutants. It is also worth noting that a specific abatement 
policy not only reduces its targeted toxic emissions but also those of other pollutants. 
Substitution effects among different types of emission are not induced in the production 
processes. This may be explained by two related facts: firstly specific intermediates (for 
example oil) are used in the production of most goods and generate emissions of most 
types, and secondly, given the Leontief structure of intermediate consumption no 
substitution is possible among them. Thus targeting a specific effluent has the connected 
beneficial effects of reducing other pollutants.
Aggregate reduction in the emission volumes is primarily the result of the decrease in 
production generated emissions. And this is due to a shift of production towards less 
polluting activities as well as. within each activity, to the implementation of cleaner 
technologies. A detailed analysis decomposing the various reduction effects would show 
a significantly lower output for those sectors producing highly polluting goods (POLL), 
up to 20 per cent with respect to the reference scenario in the year 2004 (composition 
effect). It would also illustrate that emissions abatement in the other industries is obtained 
through diminished pollution intensities (technology effect), as the result of substitution 
of toxic intermediates with more labour and capital and cleaner energy sources.
Table 5-8: Real GDP, exports and imports srowth rates (per cent average yearly rates 1991-
BaU
A ir
Tox
W at Sol A ir
Bio
W at Sol S 0 2 N 0 2
other
C O  V O C PA R T BOD T S S
ave. FT A
RGDP 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 4 .0 3.9 4.6
Kxport 4.7 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3 4 4 4.7 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.4 I I I
Import 3.5 3 .0 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 9.0
Once the efficiency of the emission taxes has been shown, the next important 
question concerns their cost in terms of reduced economic growth. Judging from the
1,0 For an exogenous reduction rate in emission volumes the model endogenously calculates the tax rate. 
The result is analogous to the implementation of tradable pollution rights where the equilibrium price of 
these rights is equal to the applied tax.
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results of Table 5-8, the different progressive abatement policies examined have quite 
low costs in output terms. The average yearly GDP growth rate in the simulations is 
found in the range of 3.8 and 4.1 per cent, very close to the benchmark rate of 4.0 per 
cent.
This low cost may be explained by several related reasons. Firstly, as explained 
above, the composition effect plays an important role and even if certain sectors reduce 
considerably their output, and consequently their factor demands, other industries expand 
and take advantage of the non-polluting resources released by the contracting sectors. 
Moreover, these expanding activities may also benefit from the assumed substitution 
possibilities between different inputs and factors, shifting their technologies towards 
cleaner input combinations, thus avoiding rising costs due to the emission taxes.181
Secondly, the redistribution scheme of the emission tax revenue seems to almost 
cancel out the distortionary effect of these same taxes. It should be noticed that in the 
simulations with abatement policies, savings are higher, even in the current model with 
myopic agents who do not anticipate future emission taxes. This is due to the tax 
redistribution scheme. Revenues from emission taxes are redistributed to the households 
as a function of their income tax rates.182 In the Moroccan case, households with higher 
income tax rates also record larger savings rates, hence a large part of the increased 
government transfers they receive is saved. This results in larger investment possibilities 
and faster capital accumulation, a sort of double dividend effect. Besides new capital 
vintages enjoy larger production substitution elasticities helping the economy to adjust 
more quickly without compromising aggregate growth rates.
It should also be noticed that environmental policy does not significantly affect 
Moroccan external competitiveness, for its aggregate exports (in real term) growth rates 
are at most (in the case of an air toxic emission abatement policy) decreased by 0.3 
percentage points, with respect to the benchmark. The same reasons justifying the limited
1,1 Table 5-11, in the annex to this chapter, shows the initial pollution coefficients for both production and 
consumption (the a 's  and P’s of equation at page 129). It clearly appears that, in the Moroccan case, these 
coefficients are concentrated in a few sectors. In fact, targeted emission taxes considerably affect only that
small number of industries that are making an intense use of the polluting inputs. This, jointly with the 
other reasons exposed in the main text, explains why additional relative price distortions caused by 
emission taxes are not spread to too many sectors, and why aggregate growth is not affected in a marked 
way.
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reduction of production growth rates might be applied for the international 
competitiveness case. In addition, given their initial input combinations and the emission 
coefficients’ concentration in a few sectors, relative price changes due to emission taxes 
do not greatly affect Moroccan export activities.183
Abatement policies seem to be much less effective on the emission volumes 
generated through final consumption. This can be explained considering two facts. 
Firstly, in the model households' reactions to emissions taxes are sluggish, in the sense 
that there is no "technological" improvement in their consumption pattern. This slow 
reaction is also confirmed by empirical data observed in the OECD countries context,184 
and is primarily due to the households’ lower, as compared to enterprises, replacement 
rate of appliances and other durable equipment (housing, vehicles) which are the main 
source of pollutants (fuels, chemicals). Secondly, most of the tax burden (in percentage of 
total revenues) is on producers, these being the main polluters through their production 
activities.
Co-ordinated environmental and commercial policies •
The rewards in terms of positive environmental results of pollution abatement 
policies and the economic gains of trade liberalisation suggest the possibility of a co­
ordination of these policies. This section presents a menu of different options that 
combine an EC FTA agreement with specific targeted emission taxes.
Apart from the intuitive attractiveness of this policy co-ordination, the Moroccan 
current trade liberalisation without connected corrective environmental measures seems 
unsustainable for several supplementary reasons. On one hand, given the current 
Moroccan comparative advantage structure, tariff elimination will favour the most 
polluting sectors. This tendency could be exacerbated if Moroccan trade partners, among 
which EC countries play a major role, tighten their environmental policies. In these 
countries production costs of locally polluting goods will rise further promoting cheaper 
imports from Morocco.185 On the other hand, anti-pollution pressures could originate
'*■ These are calculated from the base year SAM.
1,5 See footnote 181.
See Dessus ( 1989).
A country exporting goods intensive in polluting inputs is also exporting a pollution service, retaining 
domestically the effluents emissions effects of the production and saving to the importing countries the
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from neighbour countries thus inducing the Moroccan government to adopt higher 
environmental quality standards. These demands could even arise locally, once a more 
developed society discounts disutility from pollution at a higher rate. All these factors 
contribute to make a combination of trade liberalisation and abatement policy the most 
plausible scenario for Morocco in future years.
Table 5-9 shows pollution elasticities for 13 experiments with co-ordinated 
environmental and trade policies. Notice that both policies are now jointly implemented 
and that their time paths and rates are exactly the same as in the previous simulations.
The co-ordination of environmental and commercial policies produces positive 
results: it significantly reduces emissions and yet allows income and consumption to 
grow. Invariably, in all experiments pollution taxes mitigate the negative effects of a pure 
trade policy, and pollution elasticities are below the values registered when that policy is 
implemented in isolation. In some cases, co-ordination even reaches elasticities values 
below those o f a pure abatement policy (compare for instance row “TOXAIR+L” in Table 
5-9 with the corresponding row in Table 5-5), in other cases it appears less effective 
(oxides).
I  M e  5-9: E m is s io n  e la s t ic i t ie s  C o -o r d in a te d  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  a n d  c o m m e r c ia l  p o l i t ie s  ( t- C  F T A  ta s e l  
W R T  Production W RT C onsum ption
T o x Bio Nox A ir W a t Tox Bio Nox A ir W at
BaU 1.09 1.15 0.91 0.91 1.15 1.03 1.37 0.98 1.01 1.12
EC FT A Lib. 1.26 1.63 i n 1.05 1.64 1.15 1.43 1.00 1.11 1.17
TOXAIR+L 0 .63 0.08 0.43 0.59 0.08 0.83 I I I 0.97 0 .96 0.62
TOXW AT+L 0 .58 0.40 0.12 0.32 0 .40 0.62 0.87 0.78 0 .9 0 0.30
TOXSOL+L 0 .6 7 0.28 0.44 0.58 0.28 0.90 1.03 0.99 1.04 0.60
b i o a i r + l 0 .8 9 0.61 0.65 0.72 0.61 1.05 1.30 1.00 1.06 1.12
BIOWAT+L 0 .6 9 0.45 0.52 0.65 0.45 1.05 0.83 1.00 1.06 1.13
BIOSOL+L 0 .9 0 0.61 0.65 0.73 0.62 1.05 1.31 1.00 1.06 1.13
S02+L 1.18 1.59 0.79 0.78 1.59 1.05 1.34 0.69 0 .96 1.02
N02+L 1.16 1.58 0.78 0.78 1.59 1.04 1.31 0.71 0 .97 0.95
CO+L 0 .88 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.57 1.05 1.30 0.99 1.05 1.12
VOC+L 0 .78 0.26 0.06 0.21 0 .26 0.82 1 34 0.68 0 .66 1.17
PART+L 0 .7 9 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.47 0.97 1.22 0.80 0 .95 1.00
BOD+L 0.91 1.37 0.85 0.87 1.37 0.95 0.84 1.02 1.12 0.20
JSS+L 0 .90 0.62 0,66 0.73 0-62 1.03 131 1 00 1.96 ___L l l
environmental cost. This effect should be distinguished from the “pollution heaven" effect that is a capital 
markets response to differentials in environmental standards.
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In the co-ordination simulation, emission elasticities with respect to consumption are 
almost always slightly higher. In other words, consumption-generated pollution is highest 
in the EC FTA case, lowest in the pure emission abatement policy case, and somewhere 
in between when the two policies are combined. This is due to the fact that trade 
liberalisation increases households' incomes and this shifts consumption towards more 
polluting products.186
Output of polluting products (POLL) increases according to Moroccan comparative 
advantage. In the co-ordinated policy case, the composition effect is less important but is 
compensated by more substantial factor substitutions that reduce the emission volumes 
per unit of output. In fact, this technology effect is reflected in the substitution of toxic 
intermediates with more labour and capital value added. Larger savings, generated from 
increased households' incomes, reduce capital rental rates and allow enterprises to make 
the new investments necessary to reduce emissions without excessively rising output 
costs.
Finally, although all the above results referring to trade reform have been obtained 
simulating a FTA policy with respect to the European Community partners, the model 
allows experimenting with other regional specific liberalisation policies. In particular. 
Table 5-10 shows the results for co-ordinated environmental and commercial policies 
when these consist of a full unilateral liberalisation vis-à-vis all trading partners.187 The 
main point here is that no significant qualitative change is registered. These results are 
not surprising given the importance of the Moroccan trade with the EU. A detailed 
analysis of these results requires a precise assessment of the differences in the trade 
patterns Morocco shows with respect to its commercial partners. A further chapter is 
focused on this particular issue, so that Table 5-10 and Table 5-9 can be compared with 
the results obtained below.
Il<’ The income elasticities for consumption of services used in the model are larger than unity. This 
enhances the consumption shifts towards polluting services due to the income increase caused by trade 
liberalisation.
" The last row displays the pure policy of global trade liberalisation.
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Table 5-10: Emission elasticities. Co-ordinated emironmental and commercial policies (Global 
trade liberalisation case)
W RT Production  
T o x _______ B io ___ N o « A ir W a t
W RT C onsum ption  
T o x  B io  N o x A ir W a t
BAU 1.09 1.15 0.91 0.91 1.15 1.03 1 .37 0.98 1.01 1.12
Global Lib. 1.83 2.81 1.84 1.59 2.82 1.34 1.55 1.07 1.23 1.25
TO X A IR+L 0.63 0.06 0.49 0.63 0.06 0.89 1 0 8 1.16 1.07 0.64
TO X W A T+L 0.56 0.43 0 .1 0 0.29 0.43 0.67 0 .8 0 0.93 0.98 0.31
TO X SO L+L 0.65 0.30 0.46 0.58 0.31 0.96 0 .9 5 1.20 1.15 0.62
B IO A IR ^L 0.87 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.59 1.10 1.21 1.21 1.16 1.12
BIO W A T+L 0.68 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.50 111 0 .7 7 1.20 1.16 1.13
BIO SO L+L 0.87 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.59 1.10 1.22 1.21 1.16 1.12
S 02+ L 1.33 1.95 0.99 0.92 1.95 1.08 1.35 0.74 1.00 1.00
N 02+L 1.31 1.95 0.99 0.92 1.95 1.06 1.31 0.77 1.01 0.92
CO+L 0.85 0.54 0.62 0.69 0.54 1.10 1.21 1.19 1.15 1.12
VOC+L 0.75 0.23 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.85 1 .27 0.81 0.72 1.18
PART+L 0.74 0.44 0.26 0.41 0.44 1.01 1.13 0.96 1.04 1.00
BOD+L 1.05 1.73 1.05 1.01 1.73 1.02 0 .7 9 1.21 1.22 0.16
TSS+L 0-87 0-39 0-66 0 ,7 2 0-60 1.10 1-22 1.20 1.16 1.12
Notes : T ox  toxic pollutants. B io  bio-accumulatives metals; Vox: sulfur, nitrogen and carbon oxides; A ir . other air pollutants. W at. 
other water pollutants
5.6 Conclusion
From a policy analysis point of view, two general lessons may be learned from this 
research, which support the main conclusions from previous studies as well as providing 
new insights.188 Firstly, in Morocco there are strong linkages between trade flows and the 
environment and a co-ordinated approach of commercial and environmental policies is 
necessary to avoid undesired secondary effects. Secondly, these linkages are rather 
complex and policy makers who base their decisions on simple intuition or unsuitable 
empirical methods will not be able to conceive nor implement policies that even approach 
optimality.
More specifically, the results obtained above indicate that, in the absence of a 
counter-balancing environmental policy, an agreement of the type Morocco has 
negotiated with the European Community will shift the economy towards more polluting 
production and consumption structures. For certain major effluent categories, pollution 
may increase by as much as 65 per cent more rapidly than GDP. Consequently the
Consider Beghin, Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1993), 
ECC (1994), and Perroni and Wigle (1994).
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considerable economic gains resulting from trade liberalisation may cause significant 
environmental degradation.
The analysis of the isolated environmental policy proved three main advantages of 
fiscal instruments targeted to specific emissions. Firstly, sectoral outputs and emission 
volumes no longer grow at the same rates. Secondly, the economic costs (in growth 
terms) of a similar policy appear to be quite low. Thirdly, even when a single specific 
emission is taxed little substitution towards other pollutants is induced: this is a direct 
consequence of linking emissions to input use (and the technology assumptions) rather 
than simply to output. It can be added that emission taxes are much more efficient in 
reducing pollution than an indirect measure such as trade barriers. These in fact do not 
have a particularly beneficial environmental effect unless raised to unrealistic and very 
costly (in terms of GDP) levels.I8l)
A final set of results illustrated the advantages of a co-ordination in environmental 
and commercial policies. When implemented in concert with the FTA agreement, 
emission taxes may realise appreciable pollution reduction without neutralising most of 
the gains from trade liberalisation. In particular, in the co-ordination case, structural 
adjustment in the direction of a more efficient resource allocation induced by trade 
reforms is guided towards cleaner sectors.
Future research may improve the current model specification in some new 
directions. In particular, future versions may include the relationship between factor 
productivity and environmental degradation, an explicit modelling of new technologies, 
and the incorporation of household preferences towards the environment. Removal of the 
existing limitations will probably result in higher estimated gains from well-conceived 
abatement policies and their co-ordination with trade liberalisation.
Another interesting direction for future research may be a more complete study of 
the green tax redistribution mechanism and its potential linkages with income distribution 
and growth.
Although this is not shown, a simulation was conducted in which trade barriers were raised in order to 
obtain the same 25% reduction in emissions levels. The resulting tariff levels were above 100% for a 
considerable number of sectors.
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5.7 Annex: Moroccan emission coefficients
Table 5-11: Emissions coefficients for Output
( ß  - e x p r e s s e d  in  p o u n d s  M illio n  D irh a m  90)
TOX BIO OTHER
__AiL___ Wat Sol Air Wat w S02 N02 CO v o c PART BOD TSS
HardWheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SoftWheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barley 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legumes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sugar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OilSeeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Raw Fibre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Citrus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Olives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grapes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Almonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OthAgn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Livestock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forestry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PhosphMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Elect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AgroFood 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .  0 0 103 05 0
Animal Feed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beverage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 46 0 0 0
Textile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carpets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apparel 843 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leather 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wood Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 202 72 253 59 61 54 0 0
PaperPub 44 91 766 41 122 53 0 0 0 324 33 143 62 119 18 0 41 21 287 21 302 85
StoneCeram 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.223 37 1.243 18 0 0 256 79 0 0
Metals 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metal Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NonElecMch 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 64 80 0 0 0
Vehicles 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FlecMach 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ChemFert 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OtherChem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 398 26
OthMfg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commerce 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Communic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BanklnsRe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OthPrivSrv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PublicAdm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 5-1 Kcont.t: Emissions coefficients for Consumption
(a ,  - e x p r e s s e d  in  p o u n d s  M illio n  D irh a m  90)
TOX BIO OTHER
_____A ll_ _____W iL _____ S s l_ __ Air Wat Sol S 0 2 N 0 2 C O v o c PART BOD TSS
HardW heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SoftW heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barley 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M aize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legum es 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sugar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O ilSeeds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Raw Fibre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Citrus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Olives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
G rapes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alm onds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OthA gn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Livestock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forestry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PhosphM in 3.198 3 0 17.800 4 174 3 9 7 3.736 6 0 0 14.945 3 0 1 .3144 0  360.081 4
Petroleum 189 9 1 .1 6 4 9 491 3 0 0 0 4.167 9 2 .424  7 360 9 650 5 577 1 0 0
Elect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AgroFood 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Am m alFeed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beverage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Textile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carpets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apparel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leather 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W oodProd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PaperPub 7 3 7 353 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
StoneCeram 2.351 4 4 .4 5 0  8 16.810 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.573 3 0
Metals 0 0 463 4 6 5 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metal Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NonElecM ch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Elec Mach 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ChemFert 993  0 3 .603  3 2.375 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 698 0 0 0 0
OtherChem 66 9  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 965 8 0 0 0
OthMfg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construct 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commerce 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Communic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BanklnsRe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OthPrivSrv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PublicAdm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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6 The Technical specification of the Environment and Trade 
model
6.1 Introduction
An overview of the Environment and Trade model, together with a discussion of its 
main characteristics, have been provided in the previous chapter. This chapter describes 
in detail the algebraic structure of the model dealing with its static equilibrium and the 
transition equations used in recursive dynamics. This Environment and Trade model was 
constructed for this thesis and its basic equations are derived from a prototype model 
constructed at the OECD Development Centre and another model built for the Moroccan 
government's Ministry of trade.™ It incorporates characteristics from both of these 
previous models, creating in this way a new environmental and trade model for the study 
of Morocco. In particular, the main differences of the current model with respect to the 
OECD prototype include a more complex treatment of trade with the disaggregation of 
rest of the world account into three separated trade partners. This was necessary to 
simulate region specific trade liberalisation, such as the negotiated FTA agreement 
between Morocco and the European Community. Moreover, in the new model 
corporations’ appear as an additional institution, and the 'households' account is 
disaggregated into 10 different household types. This implied several modifications to the 
modelling of consumption and income distribution. Several equations have been 
amended to include the green tax redistribution mechanism. These additions incorporated 
here allow a more precise study of the Moroccan case and a more complete analysis of 
the income distribution-growth linkages than existed in either of the earlier modelling 
exercises.
The remainder of this section introduces the dimensions of the Environment and 
Trade model utilised in the previous chapter.
1,0 See Beghin, Dessus. Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (1996) and Bussolo, Roland-Holst and 
van der Mensbrugghe (1995).
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There are four main dimensions: sectors, regions, households types and labour skills, 
and time. Some of these broad dimensions are split into sub-dimensions (or subsets to use 
the GAMS terminology).
The base data set is constructed around a 48-sector database, derived from the 
Moroccan SAM presented previously. The sectors are defined in Table 6-1. The usual 
indices are shown under each table title. In the case of multiple indices, they are simply 
synonyms (or aliases) for each other. Table 6-2 provides the definition of the regions. 
Table 6-3 defines the household type and labour skill dimension. Table 6-4 defines the 
time dimension.
Table 6-1 : Sectoral Definition
1. H ard W heat
( i j )
25. Beverage
2. Soft W heat 26. Textile
3. Barley 27. C arpets
4. M aize 28. A pparel
5. Rice 29. Leather
6. Legum es 30. Shoes
7. Sugar 31. W ood P roduct
8. O il Seeds 32. P aper P ublishing
9. Raw  Fibre 33. S tone C eram ic
10. V egetables 34. M etals
I I . C itrus 35. M etal P roducts
12. O lives 36. N on E lectric  M achines
13. G rapes 37. V ehic les
14. D ates 38. Electric M achines
15. A lm onds 39. C hem ica ls  Fertiliser
16. O ther A griculture 40. O ther Chem icals
17. L ivestock 41. O ther M anufacturing
18. Forestry 42. C onstruction
19. Fishing 43. C om m erce
20. P hosphates M ining 44. T ransport
21. Petroleum 45. C om m unication
22. Elect 46. Bank Insurance Real Estate
23. A gro Food 47. O ther P rivate Services
24. A nim al Feed 48. Public A dm inistration
Table 6-2: Regional Definition
(r.O
1. European C om m unity  3. R est o f  the World
2. O ther E uropean C ountires
1 5 6
Table 6-3: Household types and Labour Skills
<h )
I. Urban p rofessional
2. Urban governm ent w orker
3. Urban labourer
4. Urban proprietor
5. Urban non-professional
6. Small fam ily farm
7. Large farm s
8. A gricultural lab o u re r
9. N on-agricultural rural labourer
10. N on-agricultural rural proprietor
r o
j U nskilled labour
2. Skilled labour
3. O ther labour ( independen t w orkers, em ployers)
Table 6-4: Time Definition
0)
i. 1990
2. 1992
3. 1995
4. 2001
s. 2004
6.2 Model blocks
6.2.1 Household Consumption
In many CGE models household expenditure behaviour functions are derived from 
the maximisation of Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility. 
The limitation of using these functional forms for consumption is that they imply unitary 
income elasticity of demand. This fails to account for the way changes in income affect 
the structural adjustment of the economy to exogenous shocks. In order to avoid such 
drawbacks, consumption demand in the current model is determined by using the utility 
function associated with the extended linear expenditure system (ELES). The ELES is
1 5 7
similar to the LES or Stone-Geary system191, but incorporates household saving into the 
utility function.
Consumers under the ELES are assumed to maximise the following utility 
function:192
C is consumer spending, 5 is saving (in value), V* is disposable income, F* are 
consumer prices, and // and 9 are the ELES parameters.193 The Engel aggregation 
condition194 requires the following constraints on the parameters p:
The usual interpretation of this demand function is that consumption is composed of 
two parts. The first part has been referred to as the subsistence minima (or floor 
consumption), 9. The term in parenthesis represents residual income, or supernumerary 
income, i.e. it is the residual income after subtracting expenditures on the subsistence 
minima. Therefore the second part of consumption is a share of supernumerary income. 
Note that there is no minimal consumption of savings, i.e. 9, is 0. Saving can be 
determined via the budget constraint:
See Stone (1954).
1.2 Note that the same specification has been used for each household type.
1.2 In the utility function, S  needs to be deflated by an appropriate price, which would represent the 
consumer spot price of future consumption. This price does not need to be specified for the model since 
household saving can be derived as a residual from the budget constraint. For welfare calculations, the 
consumer price index, cpi, has been chosen as the saving deflator since there is no forward-looking 
behaviour in EMMA.
1,4 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) page 16.
subject to the budget constraint:
'£ p ; c ,+ s =  YJ
+V. =1
The following demand functions can be derived:
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S = Y J - ^ P II CI
The income and price elasticities are given by the following formula:
n, = tL
X,
£, =
<9,(1
C,
The income elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal propensity to consume good 
/ out of supernumerary income, p, over the average propensity to consume good / out of 
income.
The relevant model equations are presented in Table 6-5. Equation (6-5.1) defines 
supernumerary income. The subsistence minima are calibrated in the base year on a per 
capita basis, therefore they are multiplied each period by the total population (pop) in 
order to grow with population. The indices i and h identify the consumer goods and 
household type respectively. Equation (6-5.2) defines consumer demand in terms o f 
Armington composite. X,hiC. Equations (6-5.3) and (6-5.4) define specific (ShH) and total 
(Slo,H) household saving.
Table 6-5: Household Consumption
(6-5.1) K - Y t - P o p ^ P i e *
I
(6-5.2) x :  =0,hPoPll+^ r h
*ih
(6-5.3) =
I
(6-5.4)
Table 6-6 describes consumer prices. Equation (6-6.1) simply sets the consumer price 
equal to the Armington price. Equation (6-6.2) defines the consumer price index.
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T a b le  6 - 6 :  C o n s u m e r  P r i c e s
(6-6.1) = PA,
I « '
(6-6.2) /»"' ‘
6.2.2 Other Final Demands
Apart from household consumption, final demands include government current and 
capital expenditures, and private capital expenditures (private investment). These are 
integrated into a single final demand matrix component. All these final demand vectors 
are assumed to have fixed expenditure shares.
Equation (6-7.1) determines the composition of final demand components. The 
demands for goods are determined as constant shares of the volume of total final demand 
Du d . The index/ covers government current and capital expenditures (f=g), and private 
investment (f=inv). Equation (6-7.2) determines the value of final demand expenditures, 
Ditfd . Equation (6-7.3) determines the price of final demand expenditures, which, 
without any taxes or subsidies, is equal to the Armington price.
terms. Total nominal government expenditures, GExp, is determined in Equation (6-8.1) as
Table 6-7: Final Demand Expenditure Equations
(6-7.1) X f = a
(6-7.2)
(6-7.3) P ? -P A ,
Government aggregate expenditures on goods and services (DgTFD) are fixed in real
1 6 0
the sum of total value of expenditures on goods and services (Dg‘TFD as in Equation (6- 
7.2)) plus two exogenous elements: transfers to the rest of the world, f c,ou\  and transfers 
to households, 7*°. Equation (6-8.2) defines the government expenditure deflator. /,G.
Table 6-8: Government Expenditure Equations
(6-8.1 ) Ghxr = D'gTm + E 'Mre £  F1/" '“ + £  P,nda Th’
r  h
(6-8.2) PaD™  = ' £ K DK C
l
6.2.3 Production
The production inputs choice is modelled as a nested structure with different degrees 
of elasticity of substitution (CES) at the different levels.
At the top level, the producer chooses a mix of value added aggregate (V*) and an 
intermediate demand aggregate (¿V°). The optimisation problem takes the following form:
min P' V,A +P,riNl)
subject to the production function:
* VX  ]
where P,1 is the aggregate price of value added, P,N is the price of the intermediate 
aggregate, a,1 and a ?  are the CES share parameters, and p  is the CES exponent. The 
exponent and the CES elasticity are related via this relationship:
note that in the model, the share parameters incorporate the substitution elasticity using 
the following relationships:
a : = { a 'J  and a , " = ( * T
The solution to this minimisation problem yields Equations (6-9.1) and (6-9.3) in 
Table 6-9. Notice that because of the existence of vintage capital, each producing sector 
is modelled as comprising two distinct technologies, producing an homogeneous good, 
but with different production parameters. Hence, intermediate and value added aggregate
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demands are indexed by vintage (using the index v). Moreover, due to the importance of 
energy in terms of pollution, the demand for energy has been separated from the rest of 
intermediate demand, and incorporated in the value added nest. Hence, the equations 
below are not specified in terms of a value-added bundle, but a value added plus energy 
bundle. Equation (6-9.1) determines the volume of aggregate intermediate non-energy 
demand, by vintage. Nv°. Equation (6-9.2) determines the total demand for non-energy 
intermediate inputs (summed over vintages), N°. Equation (6-9.3) determines the level of 
the composite bundle of value added demand and energy QEEL.
(6-9.1) <  = <
Table 6-9: Top Level Production Nest
v a P-
PXv„
p v\  J
XPv..
(6-9.2) =
(6-9.3) O f '• = a KEt
P X v \
pJCfil.
K  V
XPv..
The next level of the production nest concerns on one side aggregate intermediate 
demand N°, and. on the other side, the QKEL bundle. The relevant equations are shown in 
Table 6-10. In Equation (6-10.1), N° is split in its single inputs components (at the 
Armington level, i.e. before disaggregation into import demand and demand for 
domestically produced commodities) assuming a Leontief technology. The index n f 
identifies elements pertaining to the set of non-energy commodities. Notice that in 
Equation (6-10.1) aggregate intermediate demand is determined directly (i.e. summing 
over vintage), since non-energy intermediate demand is not dependent on the vintage. 
The matrix a, is the matrix of input-output coefficients for non-energy intermediate 
inputs.
At the same level, the Q?EL bundle is split into aggregate labour demand on the one 
hand LA. and the QEE bundle on the other. This is done using a CES function with the
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substitution elasticity o ^ , which is assumed to be vintage specific. Equations (6-10.2) 
and (6-10.3) provide the reduced form first order conditions for this level of the nest. The 
decomposition of aggregate labour demand into labour demand by skill type is 
independent of vintage therefore it is summed directly in Equation (6-10.2) where L4d 
represents aggregate sectoral labour demand. PKEL is the aggregate (or CES dual) price of 
the QEEL bundle, fV4 is the price o f aggregate labour in each sector, and PKE is the price of 
the Qke bundle. The share parameters are ot for labour, and aEE for the QKE bundle.
(6- 10.1)
(6- 10.2)
(6-10.3)
Table 6-10: Second Level CES Production Equations
< = z < c r
(  pK f .L \  
r )'>
WAV J '
o f
(  p K E L  ^
rr>
p i tv V  /
The next level of the CES nesting disaggregates the QKE bundle into the energy 
bundle on one side, and capital demand on the other side. The equations in Table 6-11 
provide the reduced form first order conditions for demand for Ep and Kv.
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Table 6-11: Demand for the Energy Bundle and Capital
(6- 11.1)
(6- 11.2)
(6-11.3)
aKEA
Qk (  p K E \ p '>
Ep is demand for the energy bundle (by vintage), PEp is the price of the energy 
bundle, Kvd represents capital demand by vintage, and R is the vintage specific rental rate 
of capital. The share parameters are o f  for the energy bundle, and at' for capital. Capital 
demand incorporates changes in capital factor efficiency. Equation (6-11.3) determines 
aggregate sectoral capital demand.
There remain two more bundles to decompose: aggregate labour and the energy 
bundle. Table 6-12 list the equations for determining labour demand by skill type and 
energy demand by fuel type.
There is a single nesting for labour by type which implies that the substitution 
between any pair of labour skills is the same. Ld represents demand for labour of type / in 
sector j ,  the CES share parameters are e /s, and the CES substitution elasticity for labour 
is </. Labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors which implies a uniform 
economy-wide wage rate. However, we allow for the possibility of differential sectoral 
wages (for the same labour skill) to take into account observed data which reflect specific 
institutional features. The parameter to is fixed and determines the relative wage across 
sectors, where W represents the equilibrium wage for skill /. Finally, the parameter XL 
incorporates labour efficiency improvement.
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T a b le  6 -1 2 :  D e m a n d  f o r  L a b o u r  b y  S k i l l  T y p e  a n d  E n e r g y  b y  F u e l  T y p e
(6- 12.1)
(6- 12.2)
- a ,  L± [ 4 ^
a,
L lj
" 4 l J
VAP
- z <
K  f  *
HPp
JV
a '.j
V4 H PA
atpA
Energy demand is vintage specific, and the substitution possibilities across fuels are 
generally lower for old capital than for new capital. The current version o f the model uses 
a single energy nesting, i.e. the decomposition of the energy bundle into the fuel 
components requires only one CES function. The index e represents the fuel commodities 
in the sectoral disaggregation. Equation (6-12.2) determines the demand for each fuel and 
incorporates energy efficiency improvement which is both sector and vintage specific 
(but not fuel specific).
This completes the description of the production structure. Starting from output, XPv, 
the nested CES tree structure of production unfolds until at the end of each branch a basic 
commodity (at the Armington level) or factor of production is specified. The next section 
will describe the formulation of prices in the production sector. The description of prices 
proceeds in the opposite direction. It starts at the bottom of the tree, using the 
fundamental (or the economy's equilibrium prices), and moves up the tree to define the 
price of the different CES aggregate bundles.
A graphical description of the production structure is given in Figure 5-1 in the 
previous chapter.
6.2.4 Production Prices
In this section it is assumed that all equilibrium prices are given. The equilibrium 
prices include the Armington prices and the factor prices. The aggregate prices are all 
determined going from the bottom up. Table 6-13 describes the (CES) price of the energy 
bundle. It is an aggregation of the Armington price of the individual fuels.
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T a b le  6 -1 3 : P r i c e  o f  t h e  E n e r g y  B u n d le  in  P r o d u c t i o n
(6-13.1)
Similarly, Equation (6-14.1) defines the aggregate price of labour by sector. It is the 
CES dual price of the skill-specific wages.
(6-14.1)
Table 6-14: Aggregate Price of Labour
Table 6-15 provides the equations describing the remaining prices in production. The 
price of aggregate non-energy intermediate demand, specified in Equation (6-15.1), is 
given by adding up the unit price of non-energy input goods. Equation (6-15.2) 
determines the CES dual price of the capital-energy bundle, PKE. The price of the QKEL 
bundle is provided by the formula in Equation (6-15.3). Equation (6-15.4) determines the 
CES dual price of production by capital vintage, PXv. Equation (6-15.5) determines the 
average unit cost of production, PX, averaged over both types of capital. Finally, 
Equation (6-15.6) provides the producer price, PP, which is equal to the cost of 
production plus an indirect tax.
1 6 6
(6-15.1)
Table 6-15: P r i c e  o f  t h e  QKE a n d  QKEL B u n d le s ,  a n d  U n i t  P r o d u c t i o n  C o s t
n f
(6-15.2)
(6-15.5) P X j  X P j = £  P X v ]v X P V j,
v
(6-15.6) PP, XP, = PX,(1 + r f)XP,
6.2.5 Equilibrium in the Factor Markets
This section describes the determination of factor market equilibria. There are two 
parts to this section: the labour markets, and the capital markets.
There are as many labour markets as there are labour skills. Labour demand by skill 
type is determined by production decisions. A simple labour supply curve is implemented 
in Equation (6-16.1), with labour supply a function of the real wage.
Table 6-16: Equilibrium on the Labour Markets
(6-16.1)
(6-16.2) =
1 6 7
Equation (6-16.2) is the market clearing condition and determines the equilibrium on 
the labour markets.
For the capital market it is necessary to distinguish between comparative statics and 
recursive dynamics.
In comparative static mode, all the dynamic transition equations are left out of the 
model definition. The putty/semi-putty structure of production is also irrelevant, and only 
old capital exists (i.e. only the old production elasticities are used). The sectoral supply of 
capital is determined using a CET supply function. An elasticity o f substitution of zero 
implies sector-specific capital, and an elasticity of infinity implies perfectly mobile 
capital195.
The equations in Table 6-17 determine sectoral capital supply in comparative static 
mode. In the case of finite elasticities, Equation (6-17.1) determines the aggregate (or 
average) rental rate using the definition of the CET dual price function. Equation (6-17.2) 
determines the sector-specific capital supply as a function of the sector specific rental rate 
relative to the average rate of return. Equation (6-17.3) determines the sector-specific
Table 6-17: Equilibrium on the Capital Market (comparative static)
(6-17.1)
if <u* <00
K! if 0)k = 00
(6-17.2)
if 0)k = 00.
(6-17.3)
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rental rate through a market equilibrium equation. If the CET elasticity is zero, it is easy 
to see through Equation (6-17.2) that capital supply then becomes sector-specific.
If capital is perfectly mobile, i.e. the CET elasticity is infinite. Equation (6-17.1) 
determines the economy-wide (i.e. uniform) rate of return on capital, in other words, this 
equation is a market equilibrium equation. Equation (6-17.2) trivially sets the sectoral 
rental rate to the uniform rate, and Equation (6-17.3) trivially equates sector supply to 
sector demand.
In a long-term model, profit rates across sectors should be equal and therefore capital 
is usually assumed to be perfectly sectorally mobile. In a short-term model, the opposite 
is observed, i.e. that sectors register different rates of profitability, and this leads to model 
capital as sector specific. The recursive dynamic framework used in the model allows us 
to have an intermediate situation between these two extremes by combining short term 
capital immobility (or low degree of mobility) for the old (or installed) vintage of capital 
and long-term perfect mobility for new capital.
In order to do that it is first necessary to determine the supply of old capital. At the 
beginning of a period if a sector is expanding, its supply of old capital, KCf, is 
insufficient to produce its expanding output and therefore it will demand new capital. In 
this case it is assumed that the rental price o f the old capital is the same as the rental price 
of the new capital. There is a unique economy-wide rental rate on new capital. If, 
however, a sector is declining, it will want to disinvest its beginning of period capital 
stock. In the case of a declining sector, the rental rate on old capital is sector specific. The 
disinvestment function is based on the relative rates of return of old capital versus new 
capital. The following equation determines the supply of old capital to a sector in decline:
KOld’j = KO’,
Old / r,,
uia / New
rU-1 ' rU-1
In the current comparative static version of the model capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across 
sectors.
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Supply of old capital196 will increase with the rental rate of old capital, with an 
absolute limit when the rental ratio of old and new capital is equal to 1. The equilibrium 
condition for old capital is that supply must equal demand, therefore, in the equation 
above, we replace directly the supply for old capital by demand for old capital, in other 
words the above equation is combined with the equilibrium equation. Finally, the above 
equation is inverted and solved for the rental ratio. This leads to Equation (6-18.1) in 
Table 6-18, where R* is the ratio of the rental rate of old capital to the rental rate of new 
capital, and rf is the disinvestment elasticity. The rental rate ratio is bounded above by 1.
Table 6-18: Supply of Old Capital in Declining Sectors
(6-18.1) R* = min
f
R,r, ,
y< 1
, i
L W j J >
The single rental rate on all capital, which is not part of a declining sector, remains to 
be calculated. In other words, the single rental rate which applies to all new capital, plus 
old capital in expanding sectors, plus old capital being disinvested by declining sectors 
has not yet been determined. Equation (6-19.1) determines the rental rate of new capital, 
R \  which is a single economy-wide rental rate. Equation (6-19.2) determines the sector 
specific rental rate of old capital. This could be determined as well by an equilibrium 
condition, but this was already integrated into Equation (6-19.1). Therefore the rental rate 
of old capital is simply determined by multiplying the rental rate ratio, by the rental rate 
of new capital. Finally, Equation (6-19.3) sets the rental rate of new capital.
It is possible by simply subtracting KO, ' form both sides of the above equation, to represent the
supply of disinvested capital as: KOI, — KOId‘t = KOI, 1 -
(  0 1 4
' l , l  '  ^1,1
„ O ld  / „N e w
v V i 1 r,j-1
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(6-19.1) 2 X + - C1
(6-19.2) R!>u = RA R,‘
(6-19.3) R?~ = RA
6.2.6 Determination of Vintage Output
In each period, producers are faced with the decision to optimally allocate production 
across vintages. The model implements a simple rule. First, producers will use all the 
capital installed at the beginning of the period, i.e. old capital. If demand for output is 
greater than what can be produced with the installed capital, producers will demand new 
capital to produce the residual amount. If demand is less than what producers desire to 
produce with the installed capital, i.e. if a sector is in decline, producers will market the 
surplus capital on the second-hand market. The production allocation decision of the 
producer can be derived from the optimal capital/output ratio for each type of capital. The 
optimal capital/output ratio can be derived from Equations (6-9.3), (6-10.3), and (6-11.2). 
Equation (6-20.1) provides the capital/output ratio for each vintage type. The optimal 
capital/output ratio will depend on all the prices in the nested CES structure and will only 
be constant if the entire production structure is a Leontief technology. Equation (6-20.2) 
determines output produced by old capital. It uses the capital/output ratio to determine the 
optimal production with installed capital. If the latter is less than production, than that 
quantity is assigned to “old” production. If the quantity is greater than total demand, than 
the quantity produced with old capital will be set equal to total demand, and the residual 
capital will be disinvested. Finally, Equation (6-20.3) determines the quantity of output 
produced with new capital. It will simply be the difference between total production and 
the amount produced with old capital.
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T a b le  6 -2 0 :  A l lo c a t io n  o f  D o m e s t ic  P r o d u c t i o n  a c r o s s  V in t a g e s
(6- 20.1)
(6-20.2)
(6-20.3)
%, = « ,
{  W J . ) a KEj y
(  p K E L  \rjv
ktl
a kjy
f  p K E  \  A /vr yv
p K E L
\  V  J
p K E
\  V  J
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JC i JC i
K D 5
XPv°u = XP, if > XP,
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6.2.7 Income Distribution
Production generates income, both wage and non-wage, which is distributed to three 
main institutions: households, government and financial institutions (both domestic and 
foreign). In Table 6-21, Equation (6-21.1) determines operating surplus (net of 
depreciation allowance), YK. It is the sum across sectors and vintages of capital 
remuneration, and it incorporates factor payments from abroad. Equation (6-21.2) defines 
the depreciation allowance on the total capital stock of the previous period. yDEPR is the 
value of the depreciation allowance, S  is the depreciation rate (defined on the aggregate 
capital stock), and R* is the economy-wide rental rate. Equation (6-21.3) defines 
company income, it is equal to a share of net operating surplus (the rest being
distributed to households and to foreigners). Equation (6-21.4) determines corporate 
direct taxes, CTAX, with the base tax rate given by the parameter t f .  Equation (6-21.5) 
defines retained earnings, i.e. corporate saving. Corporate saving is equal to a residual 
share o f after-tax company income, net of transfer to the rest of the world.
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Table 6 -21: C o r p o r a t e  E a r n i n g s  E q u a t i o n s
(6-21.1) Y* = Z  X  R"KV" + £RAn: Z  FrK -  Y‘>hPR
(6-21.2) y M H R  =  g  R  A K
(6-21.3) Y < o * p  — y K
(6-21.4) q T A X  _  ^ C O R P  y (  ()R P
(6-21.5) StOKF = ( l
 ^ h '  r
Household income derives from two main sources, capital and labour income. 
Additionally, households receive transfers from the government and from abroad. 
Equation (6-22.1) defines total labour income, Y1 as the product of total labour demand 
and the wage rate. There are two adjustments. One comes from wages earned abroad, the 
other concerns wages remitted to foreign labour. In the former case foreign wage income 
is assumed to be constant (in value), while, in the latter case, a fixed share ( Zi ) of total 
domestic labour income is assumed to be distributed to foreign labour.
Labour income is distributed to the households. Equation (6-22.2) defines total 
households income, Y". It is the sum of labour income, distributed capital income and net 
company income, and transfers from the government 7*c and from abroad FrJ .  Capital 
and company income are distributed using fixed shares. Households direct tax, H  , is 
given in Equation (6-22.3), where is the tax rate. The adjustment factor ¿FTAX becomes 
endogenous with the fixed government budget closure. In this case, when government 
revenues are changed during a policy simulation, the household tax schedule shifts in or 
out to achieve net government balance. Finally Equation (6-22.4) defines household 
disposable income Y°. Disposable income is equal to total household income less taxes 
and transfer payments to the rest o f the world.
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Table 6-22: H o u s e h o l d  I n c o m e
(6-22.1)
(6-22.2)
(6-22.3)
(6-22.4)
y,L - z t " Z tt>',W'Ii + E ,u7* '£ F i
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+  p l n J „ T ( ,  +  p R A T F .  ^  p T m  
r
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6.2.8 Trade Equations
Import Structure
Demand by all economic agents has now been specified at the Armington level of 
aggregation, i.e. a composite demand of goods produced domestically and imports. In the 
current model, it is assumed that import demand by all agents is identical, in other words, 
we will not differentiate between producer’s and consumer's propensity to import. This 
implies that we can aggregate the Armington demand across all agents before 
determining the optimal allocation of the Armington demand between domestic goods 
and imported goods197.
Recall that the Armington assumption simply posits that goods are differentiated with 
respect to region of origin. The model has implemented this assumption using a nested 
structure. At the top level, each domestic agent optimises some objective function (e.g. 
cost minimisation or utility maximisation). This leads to demand for a composite 
commodity that has been referred to as the Armington commodity. At the next level, 
agents minimise the cost of the Armington bundle, subject to an aggregation function 
between goods produced domestically and an aggregate import bundle. In the case of this
1,7 I explained in chapter 3 how this formulation is less data intensive and that it does not necessarily 
result in distorted estimations.
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model, this is a CES aggregation function. At the next and final level, agents minimise 
the cost of the aggregate import bundle, again subject to an aggregation function over 
imports originating in each region of the model, namely the EC region the other 
European countries region and the Rest of the World.
The mathematical formulation leads to:
min/»" D + PM M
s.t.
X = [aJD‘’ +amM ’’] P
where X  is the demand for the Armington good, D is demand for domestic 
production, M  is aggregate import demand, P° is the price of domestic sales, and PM is 
the domestic price of imports (tariff inclusive).
The first order conditions lead to the following demand functions:
D = aJX [ j f j  where a J~ a°
M =a^ { j£ )  where <
and the substitution elasticity is given by:
1 a - 1a  --------o  p = -------
1 -  p  a
PA is the (Armington) CES dual price determined using PD and PM:
1
[
I—<T 1-ff ”] | _
a ,/» "  +a„PM j “7
Table 6-23 specifies the equations relative to the first level of the Armington nest. 
Equation (6-23.1) determines aggregate Armington demand, XA, i.e. the sum of 
Armington demand across all agents. Equations (6-23.2) and (6-23.3) decompose the 
aggregate Armington demand into respectively the domestic component, XD, and the 
aggregate import component, XM.
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Table 6-23: Arm ington Decomposition
(6-23.1)
* /
(6-23.2)
(6-23.3) x r = a : x A , ( f y
Equation (6-24.1) in Table 6-24 determines the Armington price, PA, which is the 
CES dual price of the Armington component prices, i.e. P° and PM.
(6-24.1)
Table 6-24: Arm ington Price
i
The next stage in the Armington decomposition is to decompose the aggregate 
Armington demand across the regions of the model. Again, the CES functional form is 
used to implement the imperfect substitutability of commodity demand across regions.
Equation (6-25.1) in Table 6-25 determines import volume by sector and region of 
origin, . The relevant import price, is the partner-specific import price P“*’g, in 
domestic currency and inclusive of partner-specific import tariff. Equation (6-25.2) 
determines the price of the aggregate import bundle, Ptu , which is the CES dual price. 
Equation (6-25.3) defines the domestic import price, PrM*‘K, which is equal to the import 
price of the trading partner converted in local currency, and inclusive of the partner- 
specific tariff rate.
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Table 6-2S: Second-Level Armington Equations
(6-25.1)
(6-25.2)
(6-25.3)
C  =
(  p M  \  
jMReg
PM =
p K  ‘
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Export Structure
Export supply is treated symmetrically to import demand. Producers are assumed to 
differentiate between the domestic market and the export market. Producers are modelled 
as maximising sales between the domestic and export markets subject to being on a 
production possibilities frontier. The model uses the Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) specification to implement the production possibilities frontier. 
The resulting equations are similar to the CES first order condition with reversals in signs 
to reflect that producers are maximising revenues, as opposed to the CES where agents 
are minimising costs. As for the Armington specification, there are two levels in the 
export supply structure. Exporters are assumed to differentiate across regions, in response 
to changes in relative regional export prices.
Equation (6-26.1) and (6-26.2) provide the first order conditions for determining the 
producers supply decisions. Equation (6-26.1) determines the optimal supply of goods for 
the domestic market, X°. Notice the change from the CES functional form. A rise in the 
domestic price (with respect to the producer price), leads to a rise in domestic supply. 
The computer implementation of the model allows for the possibility of infinite CET 
elasticities in which case the producer does not differentiate between domestic and 
foreign markets. Under this assumption, the domestic and foreign sales price are 
identically equal to the producer price. Equation (6-26.2) determines export supply, E r. 
Equation (6-26.3) is the CET dual price function which replaces the primal CET function
1 7 7
in the case of finite elasticities.|l>* In the case of infinite elasticities, output is equal to the 
simple sum of domestic supply and export supply.
(6-26.1)
(6-26.2)
(6-26.3)
Table 6-26: CET Decomposition
X = XP
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The final trade equations determine the second nest of the CET decomposition of 
exports. The regional disaggregation of exports is given in Equation (6-27.1). Equation 
(6-27.2) determines aggregate export price PE.
The primal function is given by the following formula:
j  T'»:
XP,= < x ?  +a’u E?
where the following relations hold:
o\ + 1 ___ / 1p, = — —  <=><*,=- and adu  = (af, ) P' a‘tJ = [a 'j )
P \~  I
\I-PJ
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Table 6-27: S e c o n d - L e v e l  C E T  E q u a t i o n s
(6-27.1)
( PE*"*
EsrR,n  -  a??E?\
(6-27.2) P,H =W<**?[PE?'K]
i
i.q;
Table 6-28 presents the equations which determine export demand by the regional 
trading partners, and the export market equilibrium condition. Equation (6-28.1) defines 
export demand by the trading partner E°. Since it is assumed that Morocco has no market 
power in its export markets (small country assumption), the export demand elasticity is
f
infinite, i.e. it is a flat demand curve which determines the fixed price of exports. 
Equation (6-28.2) defines the export market equilibrium, i.e. th'e equality between export 
supply and foreign demand.
Table 6-28: Export Demand and Market Equilibrium
(6-28.1) p E R'* = EMTEpKW,,rU
(6-28.2) = £""**
6.2.9 Government Revenues and Saving, and Macro Closure
Table 6-29 presents the government revenues and closure rules. Equations (6-29.1) 
and (6-29.2) determine respectively the government’s tax revenues from the production 
tax and the import tax. Note that in Equation (6-29.2) the regional indices are explicitly 
used. The tariff rates are trading-partner specific, i.e. the tariff rate is allowed to vary 
depending on the region of import. Equation (6-29.3) identifies miscellaneous
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government revenues, these are all revenues minus household direct taxes. Equation (6- 
29.4) provides total nominal government revenues, Gnv.
Table 6-29: Government Revenues and Saving
(6-29.1) y l S i n A X  =  £  r'-pXXP,
i
(6-29.2) y T A R I F  _  £ R A T E ^  J *  p W o r t d j ç M R t g
r  i
(6-29.3 ) y M is c R e v  _ y t N D T A X  y T A R I F  ç ^ T A X  j f R A T E
r
(6-29.4) ç j R e v  _ y  M is e  R e v  ^
h
(6-29.5) s g =  PUDPs g
(6-29.6) Sg =  Gr‘' — G Hxp
The government closure rule is specified in Equation (6-29.3): government saving is 
fixed (in real terms). Government saving is simply the difference between government 
revenue and government expenditure and is determined by Equation (6-29.4). With 
exogenous government saving the household tax schedule is endogenous. Household 
taxes are determined by solving Equation (6-22.3) for ^ rTAX, i.e. ^ rTAX is the equilibrating 
variable to achieve the fixed government balance.199
Table 6-30 includes the equations for the closure of the saving and investment 
account, and other macro closures. Domestic investment is equal to domestic saving plus 
a fixed level of foreign saving. Under this rule, foreign saving does not react to regional 
changes in relative rates of return. In this case, the value of investment, D ” '" ,  is 
determined by Equation (6-30.1). Aggregate investment (in value) is the sum of saving, 
plus depreciation. Saving includes retained corporate earnings, & ORP, household saving,
In the reference scenario, government saving is held fixed at its base year level which implies that, as a 
share of GDP. government saving (or the deficit) declines over time.
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S"Tot* government saving, Sg. and total foreign saving. X  S'r . Foreign savings are
r
exogenous in each time period.
Table 6-30: Determination of Aggregate Investment and Macro Closure
(6-30.1)
(6-30.2)
(6-30.3)
(6-30.4)
(6-30.5)
D'Zm  = S "m> + S" +SK + + Yl>hPR
E RA,h: Y . X t r X Z *  = XS PErT +ERA" X Sr
I r I r r
-I  O-jOX'WÌ +
/ I r
- z rYK + e ^ Y  r*
r  r
_  £ •  H 4  T E  ^  ^  ^ p ' T o u t  _  f T m \ _p R A T E  ^  |  p O o u l  _  p O m  j
r  h r
= X S'® X +1ZI I  V I
- X ^ Z ® * ^ + X Z w ^ « i
p  I n d e x  _ X 'l>p
In the model, Walras law has been defined to be the equality of the trade balance and 
the (negative) of foreign saving. Equation (6-30.2) defines Walras law. On one side of the 
balance sheet are exports, evaluated at world prices, net total foreign saving, and net 
transfers and factor payments. On the other side of the balance sheet is the sum of 
imports evaluated at world prices (excluding tariffs). Due to Walras' Law, one equation is 
redundant, and Equation (6-30.2) is dropped from the model.
The final equations of the model. Equations (6-30.3)-(6-30.5) are used to calculate the 
domestic price index which is used to inflate real domestic transfers. Equation (6-30.3) 
calculates the current value GDP, t f JDP. Equation (6-30.4) defines real GDP, XRGDP, as 
the sum of factor demands in efficiency units, evaluated at base year prices. Equation (6-
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30.5) defines the GDP deflator, Plnd‘x. The GDP deflator is defined as the value of factor 
payments, divided by the sum of factor volumes.
Any price in the model can be chosen as the numeraire. In the current version of the 
model, the foreign price index, ERAn\  has been designated as the numéraire, and its value 
is always set to 1.
6.2.10 Aggregate Capital Stock and Productivity Growth
This section, and the next, provide the key equations for describing the transition 
from one period to the next. The aggregate capital stock is not pre-determined because it 
depends on the current level of investment. The one-year gap transition equation is given 
by:
where K is the aggregate capital stock, 8  is the annual rate of depreciation, and /,./ is 
the level of real investment in the previous period. A problem appears when the gap 
between solution periods is greater than 1 year. Since investment in the intervening years 
is not calculated assumptions must be made in order to integrate the stream of 
investment. The transition equation for a multi-period gap expanded has this form:
The model does not calculate investment between periods. A linear growth model is 
assumed to explain investment in intermediate years, i.e.:
K, = (1
K, = (1-<?)[(1-< ? )* „ ,+ /, ] + /,_,
n
/, =(1 + r ')/y-l
where
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where the annual growth rate of investment is derived from the annualised growth rate of 
investment in the current period compared to investment in the previous period. We can 
re-write the multi-year transition equation to be:
k, = (i - s)" +¿0 - ¿y-'a+/ r J
The transition equation is then derived and given by Equation (6-31.2) in Table 6-31, 
where the growth parameter /  is determined in Equation (6-31.1). The capital stock is 
only pre-determined in Equation (6-31.2) if the gap between periods is equal to one year. 
Due to base year normalisation rules (the rental rate is set to 1 in the base year), the 
aggregate stock of capital, K, is normalised to yield IC (Equation (6-31.3)), which is the 
level of capital used in determining equilibrium on the capital market.200
Table 6-31 : Aggregate Capital Stock
I
(6-31.1)
' ‘ - { t z Ï -
(6-31.2) K, = ( \-S )nK,
(6-31.3)
K s
k : = ^ - k ,
(1 + y , )m - ( \ - s y  , 
r ‘ + S
Productivity
The efficiency growth of labour and energy is always assumed to be exogenous. The 
efficiency growth of capital is normally exogenous, but in the reference scenario, the
200 The following numerical example may shed some light on the normalisation rule. Assume the value 
of capital in a region is 100. Assume, as well, that capital remuneration is 10. Capital remuneration is 
simply rK where r is the rental rate and K  the demand for capital. In this example, rK is equal to 10, which 
implies a rental rate of 0 .1. EMMA uses a different normalisation rule. It assumes that the base year rental 
rate is 1, and normalises the capital data to be consistent with this normalisation rule, in other words, the 
normalised capital demand is 10, and it is really an index of capital volume. The non-normalised level of 
capital is used only in the accumulation function (Equation 16.1.2), and in determining the value of capital 
depreciation allowance. All other capital stock equations use the normalised value of capital.
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capital efficiency factor is calibrated in order to achieve a target growth rate for real 
GDP. Since there is only one target growth rate for real GDP per region, there can only 
be one instrument to achieve this target. In the current version of the model, it is assumed 
that capital efficiency is uniform across sectors and vintages. The capital efficiency 
parameter is only endogenous in the reference (or business-as-usual) scenario. In all 
shock simulations, the capital efficiency parameter is exogenous.
Equation (6-32.1 ) determines the real growth rate of GDP, / ,  in most simulations. 
However, in the reference simulation, /  is exogenous, and Equation (6-32.1) is used to 
determine the capital efficiency growth parameter, / .  Equation (6-32.2) determines the 
cumulative capital efficiency factor.
Table 6-32: Productivity Factors for Capital
(6-32.1) x*mF = ( i+ry)"x,Tp
(6-32.2)
The remaining equations deal with the pre-determined variables, which are updated at 
the beginning of each period. These are transition equations do not rely on any 
contemporaneous variable, hence are not directly an endogenous result of the model.
Table 6-33: Initial Supply of Old Capital
(6-33.1) KO’,= (i-syK ?,_„
In Table 6-33 Kff represents the installed old capital at the beginning of each period 
by sector.201 It is simply equal to the sector’s previous period's total (depreciated) capital
201 The base year data does not provide capital stock data by sector only capital remuneration by sector. 
Since the price of capital in each sector is set to I in the base year, the sectoral capital stock data should be
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stock. The end of period stock of old capital (in a given sector) may be less than the 
initial stock. If the sector is declining, old capital will be disinvested and the actual stock 
of old capital will be less than the initial stock.
Table 6-34: Other Pre-Determined Exogenous Variables
(6-34.1) a,, = ( \ +
(6-34.2) Pop, = (1 + y ?)* Pop,_n 
(6-34.3) D ™ = ( \  + y > ) ' D ™
In Table 6-34, Pop, is the population at time t. DgTFD is the level of total real 
government expenditures on goods and services is assumed to grow at the same rate as 
the economy.202 Equation (6-34.1) determines the labour supply shift factor which is 
equal to the previous period’s labour supply shift factor multiplied by an exogenously 
specified labour supply growth rate.
The energy efficiency factors are also exogenous and pre-determined leading to the 
following set of transition equations:
Table 6-35: Energy and Labour Efficiency Factors
(6-35.1) A?,=(l +
(6-35.2) * „ « (1
seen as an index volume and not a volume, which has been observed. Since it is further assumed that the 
aggregate capital stock is the sum of the sectoral capital stocks, this implies that the price of capital is the 
same across sectors in the base year.
202 Note that the real level of transfers from government to households is assumed to grow at the same 
rate as the economy, too.
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The annual autonomous energy efficiency factor is given by f  p, representing the 
growth in energy efficiency in production. The energy efficiency factors in production 
are specific to both sector and vintage. The cumulative factor is given by the A variable. 
Equation (16.6.2) determines the labour efficiency factor. The growth in labour efficiency 
is exogenous and is labour-type specific.
Vintage Re-Calibration
The model has a vintage structure of capital which is based on an assumption of a 
putty/semi-putty structure of production. It is further assumed that the substitutability of 
capital differs across vintage, with old capital typically less substitutable than new 
capital. There are only two vintages, old and new. New capital is generated by investment 
in the previous period. Old capital is the installed capital in the previous period. Over 
time, the structure of old capital changes as the previously new capital gets merged into 
the old capital. Rather than keep track of each vintage over time, we modify the structural 
parameters of the old capital to reflect its changing composition. The key rule that has 
been adopted is that the share parameters associated with old capital should be able to 
produce all of the previous period's production (with the substitution elasticities of the old 
capital). For example, assume we have a CES production function in capital (K), labour 
(L), and energy (£). Production then has the form:
where
+ + a„E ?]A  l l ' A
=
1__
• -P ,
and X  is output (by vintage), Kv is capital by vintage, Lv is labour, and Ev is energy. 
The share parameters are vintage specific as is the substitution elasticity. The first order 
conditions for cost minimisation lead to:
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where a k v = a k 'v
where a t v = a";
where a , v = a";.
where r, w, and e are respectively the price of capital, labour, and energy. (Note that 
the model uses the modified share parameters, i.e. the share parameters of the CES 
function raised to the power of the substitution elasticity. The former share parameters 
are never formally employed in the model since only the first order conditions and the 
CES price function are used.) P is the CES dual price which is given by the following 
equation:
We assume that the production structure of output associated with new capital is 
constant over time, i.e. the share parameters and substitution elasticities are not time 
dependent (except for the efficiency factors). However, old capital changes over time as 
in each time period previously new capital is added to the old capital stock. In order to 
account for the change in old capital the share parameters for the production structure 
associated with old capital are modified in such a way that the total of the factors in the 
previous period could produce all of the previous period's output assuming the old 
substitution elasticities. To continue with the above notation, we re-calibrate the share 
parameters according to the following formula:
where the re-calibrated share parameters, a , are calibrated at the beginning of each 
period, and all the volumes are the sum of the old and new vintages from the previous
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period, and the prices are the average prices (N.B. the subscript o is used for old capital, 
and n for new capital):
^ 1- 1 ~  ^  **H./-I
i ~  K OJ. x +  K n j - 1
1 =  E a j - 1 +  ^ n j - l
p,-l II 1 +  ^ n , i - l ^ n j - \ ,]/x,
r,-\ =  [ r o ./-l +  '■ « -! K n J . x \
e,-\ =K - \ ' E-
With the above definitions of the aggregate factors and average factor prices, the 
production function associated with the a  parameters is consistent with the aggregate 
output X,./.
For brevity, the above formulas are not repeated for ail the nested CES production 
functions. As described in more detail below, the production structure can be represented 
by a nested tree structure of CES and Leontief functions. Within this structure, there are 
several CES aggregation functions whose old-vintage share parameters are re-calibrated 
in the manner described above.
6.2.11 Emissions
The emission data used in this model have been derived from an extensive data set 
constructed for the United States. The emission data for the United States have been 
collated for a set of over 400 industrial sectors. Generally, the emission data have been 
directly associated with the volume of output, with the consequence that the only way to 
reduce emissions, with a given (abatement) technology, is to reduce output. Furthermore 
this ignores important sources of pollution outside the production side o f the economy, 
namely households’ consumption. In an attempt to ameliorate this situation, the pollution 
data of the United States has been regressed on a small subset of inputs of the US input 
output table. Using econometric estimates, it has been shown that the level of emissions 
can be explained by a very small subset of inputs.203 This allows producers to substitute 
away from polluting inputs, and to use the same pollution coefficients for final demand
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consumption. Since the emission coefficients are originally calculated from a US data 
base, they are appropriately scaled so as to be consistent with the definition of output and 
inputs in Morocco. The following example shows how this is done in practice. Assume, 
in a specific sector, that output in 1990 has the value $ 1 billion, and that the estimated 
amount of lead emitted from that sector is 13,550 pounds. If the output price in 1990 is 
normalised to 1, the emission factor has units 1.355x1 O'5 pounds per (1990) USD, or 
13.55 pounds per million (1990) USD. If output in the same sector is 800 million dirhams 
(in Morocco in 1990). the dollar equivalent is 100 million. This leads to lead emissions of 
1355 pounds. The emission factor for lead in Morocco (in this sector) would then be 1.70 
pounds per million 1990 dirhams (Dh).
Equation (6-36.1) defines the total level of emissions for each type of pollutant p.2U4 
The bulk of the pollution is assigned to the direct consumption of goods which is the 
second term in the expression. The level of pollution associated with the consumption of 
each good is constant (across the row of the SAM), i.e. there is no difference in the 
amount of pollution emitted per unit of consumption whether it. is generated in production 
or in final demand consumption. The first term in Equation (6-36.1) represents process 
pollution. It is the residual amount of pollution in production which is not explained by 
the consumption of inputs. In the estimation procedure, a process dummy has proven to 
be significant in certain sectors.
The remaining equations in Table 6-36 re-produce the corresponding equations in the 
text if a pollution tax is imposed. This is actually endogenously calculated as the shadow 
price of Equation (6-36.1), once a target on the level of emission has been exogenously 
specified. The tax is implemented as an excise tax, i.e. it is implemented as a tax per unit 
of emission. It is converted to a price wedge on the consumption of the commodity (as 
opposed to a tax on the emission), using the commodity specific emission coefficient. For 
example in Equation (6-15.5’), the tax adds an additional price wedge between the unit 
cost of production exclusive of the pollution tax and the final cost of production. Let 
production be equal to 100 (million Dh), and let the amount of pollution be equal to 1 
tonne of emission per 10 million Dh of output. Then the total emission in this case is 10
‘ See Dessus et al. (1994).
!M There are 13 different types o f pollutant explicitly considered in the model. See page 130 in chapter 5.
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tonnes. If the tax rate is equal to 25 Dh per tonne of emission, the total tax bill for this 
sector is 250 Dh. In the formula below, npProd is equal to 0.1 (tonnes per million Dh). XP 
is equal to 100 (millions Dh). and xp is equal to 25 Dh. The consumption based pollution 
tax is added to the Armington price, see Equation (6-24.1')- However, the Armington 
decomposition occurs using basic prices, therefore, the taxes are removed from the 
Armington price in the decomposition formulae, see Equations (6-23.2’) and (6-23.3'). 
Equation (6-29.4’) determines the modification to the government revenue equation.
(6-36.1)
(6-15.5’)
(6-24.1’)
(6-23.2’)
(6-23.3’)
(6-29.4’)
Table 6-36: Emissions and Price Wedges
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6.3 Conclusion
This chapter described the algebraic structure o f  the model used in the study o f  the 
interdependencies o f  trade and environmental policies in Morocco. Although some o f  its
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characteristics are quite conventional in the literature on these type of models some 
features stands out as particularly innovative.
Firstly its level of detail: this model accommodates 48 sectors. 10 household types. 3 
labour categories, 3 disaggregated trade partners, and 13 types of emissions. A second 
peculiar characteristic is the way emissions are accounted for. Environmental 
contamination is generated through consumption (of intermediates or final goods) and. 
differently from previous studies that link emissions to output, this allows a reduction in 
pollution without necessarily contracting output. Another characteristic is the use of 
putty-semi putty structure o f production. This lets me model with separate elasticity of 
substitution two capital vintages representing old and new investment goods, and, in turn, 
adds realism to my study. In fact new capital, with a higher elasticity of substitution, 
offers a greater scope for abating pollution without having to reduce output and implicitly 
this accounts for the observed fact that new investment goods are usually more 
'environment friendly’.
Finally this model, by including differentiated household groups, allows one to study 
the effects of environmental (and trade) policy on income distribution. The issues of 
green tax incidence and redistribution of its revenues are only hinted at in the previous 
chapter, but they can be thoroughly analysed with the current model and should form part 
of future investigation.
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7 A General Equilibrium Analysis of Mediterranean Economic 
Integration
7.1 Introduction
A key issue in the debate on the growth of regionalism in international economic 
relations is the proliferation of regional trade treaties and their consequences. A vast 
literature primarily focuses on three key groupings: Europe, the Americas and South-East 
Asia. Although economic integration in these three areas is at different stages and 
presents different characteristics and problems, their common characteristic of deepening 
and widening regional trade treaties should call for some uniform analytical approach in 
the analysis. In particular, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models appear to be 
among the most apt analytical tools in applied economic research of trade policy reform. 
Surprisingly though, even when the focus is merely on trade, one discovers that these sort 
of models are employed, with few exceptions, only in studies for the North American 
region.205
This chapter makes a step forward in this unified approach by constructing a 
prototype two-country CGE model which includes all the main characteristics of a larger 
multi-country model of the Mediterranean area. The countries chosen for the prototype 
are Morocco and France. In order to provide a fuller picture of the integration process, a 
comparative static and a recursive dynamic version of the same CGE model have been 
used. In this way, it has been possible to assess the static welfare effects and also the 
growth interactions of the alternative trade policy scenarios.
The analysis in this chapter is based on the most recent policy package considered 
during the 1995 Barcelona conference between EU ministers and representatives of non- 
EU Mediterranean countries. Although the European Mediterranean policy covers a 
broad range o f measures and countries - from full EU membership discussed with Malta, 
Cyprus and Turkey, to minor political links with other countries - the analysis here is 
further restricted to the proposal of trade integration between Morocco and the EU. In
205 For an example of this disparity in geographical approach, confront the three papers on Europe. North 
America and Pacific integration collected in the Economic Journal Policy Forum: Regionalism in the 
World Economy, see Greenaway D. (1992), D.K. Brown, A.V. Deardorff, R. Stem (1992), I. Yamazawa 
(1992) and A. Sapir (1992). For instances of CGE analysis of the NAFTA see Roland-Holst D., K. Reinert, 
C. Shiells (1994) or Sobarzo, H. (1994).
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particular, the Euro-Med. Conference in Barcelona set 2010 as a target date for a FTA 
between the EU and its twelve Mediterranean partners as far as industrial goods are 
concerned.
Beyond this valuable "geographic originality”, this chapter's additional contribution is 
found in the development of the discussion of the sequencing issue of trade reforms. The 
economic literature on this topic is mainly devoted to establishing the correct order of 
liberalisation between the current and capital account206 and, surprisingly, it neglects the 
problem of sequencing in tariff reduction across sectors of the current account. In fact, 
adjustment costs generated by the non-instantaneous realignment of goods and factor 
prices may be quite different across sectors, and choosing the correct sectoral 
liberalisation sequence represents a major concern for policy makers. By using a 
recursive dynamic version of the multi-country CGE model, a comparison of trade 
reforms, which differ in their liberalisation sequence, is presented with an estimation of 
their effects in terms of adjustment costs and growth rates. The use of a dynamic CGE 
model in the analysis of these issues fills a gap in the literature, whose main contribution 
revolves around the theory of piecemeal reform.207 In particular, several authors identify 
conditions under which proportional and concertina reform programs are welfare 
improving,208 but none of these studies explicitly includes dynamic interactions of growth 
and adjustment costs.
The plan for the chapter is as follows. The next section extends the analysis of the 
French-Moroccan data set of chapter 3 by presenting additional information on the 
structure of production, income, trade and protection of these two economies.200 Section
7.3 introduces the basic features of the CGE model used here; section 7.4 describes the 
policy experiments with the model in comparative statics mode; section 7.5 presents the 
dynamic version o f the model and reports the results for different trade reforms 
discussing the sequencing issue. Some brief conclusions are presented in the last section. 3067
306 See for a survey Edwards, S. (1990).
307 See Rodrik, D. (1995).
•“ SeeFalvey, R. (1994).
209 These data are presented here, rather than in chapter 3, because of their relevance in explaining the 
model results.
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7.2 The French - Moroccan structure of production, income trade and 
import protection
The French-Moroccan SAM provides the basic data set for the CGE model used here. 
Although it has already been extensively examined in chapter 3, this section presents 
some additional information on the structural features o f the Mediterranean countries' 
economies which is particularly useful for the interpretation of the simulation results 
reported later in this chapter.
Table 7-1 shows structural data for France. For each of the 24 sectors and three 
aggregate macro-sectors (primary, manufactures and services), the benchmark data for 
shares of gross output (column 1), value-added (2), total demand (3), exports (4), and 
imports (5) are shown. These columns summarise the sectoral composition of production, 
income, supply, demand and trade in France. Services dominate the production side of 
the economy, generating almost 60 per cent of gross output and more than 70 per cent of 
value added. Correspondingly primary sectors represent 9 per cent of production and 6 
per cent of value added. Given a different production technology and a larger 
consumption of intermediate inputs, the manufacturing sector s share of gross output (33 
per cent) exceeds its value added share (21 per cent); while the opposite is true for 
services. Columns 4 and 5 list export and import shares. It can be seen that manufacturing 
alone records above three-quarters of total trade flows. Notice also -  in columns 8 and 9 
-  that exports and imports shares of output and demand respectively, are much higher for 
primary (13 and 19 per cent) and manufacturing (25 and 25 per cent) than services (3 and 
2 per cent210).
Columns 6 and 7 present the unskilled and skilled labour to capital ratios (in 
percentage terms). Apart from the manufacturing sectors o f Textiles, Apparel and Leather 
Shoes, which exhibits similar ratios for the two types o f skills, all the other sectors differ 
by at least an order of magnitude. Returns to skilled labour appear to be highest for the 
high tech industries (sectors 16,17,18) whereas primary sectors return on average seven 
times more to capital.
Columns 8 and 9 measure trade dependency as ratios of exports to gross output and 
imports to demand. The most striking feature of the data in these two columns is the 
symmetry of export and import dependence of the French economy. The economy-wide
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ratios (11 per cent) and the ratios for manufacturing (25 per cent) are the same in columns 
8 and 9. Exceptions showing a stronger import dependency are recorded for Estate crops 
(mainly fruits). Other primary (fisheries, forestry and mining, the most import intensive 
sector), and Energy. The intra-industry peculiarity of French trade is confirmed when 
analysing durable goods sectors: Equipment. Transport material and Electrical 
machinery, which collectively account for 36 and 34 per cent of total exports and imports 
respectively, also show the highest and almost equal trade dependency ratios among 
manufacturing sectors (around 35 per cent).
Table Basic structure of the French economy' 1990 (Heures in percentages)
X
2
VA
3
D
4
E
5
M
6
LUsk/K
7
LSk/K
8
E/X
9
M/D
10
MMor/M
II
EMor/E
1 Food Crops 3 3 3 4 2 0 12 15 9 2 1
2 Estate Crops 0 0 0 0 1 1 39 17 24 6 0
3 Other Primary 1 1 1 3 5 16 104 29 41 1 0
4 Energy 4 2 5 2 8 4 81 6 18 0 0
All Primary 9 6 9 10 16 3 44 13 19 1 0
5 M illing Conf 1 | | 2 1 19 80 14 8 0 0
6 Food Product 4 1 4 4 5 55 116 12 13 2 0
7 Beverage Tobacco 2 1 1 3 1 6 39 21 8 0 0
8 Textiles 0 0 0 1 1 104 178 28 32 1 1
9 Apparel 2 1 2 4 5 116 179 21 26 5 1
10 Leather Shoes 0 0 1 1 1 141 178 21 31 2 1
II Wood 1 1 1 1 2 66 126 8 15 0 1
12 Paper 2 2 3 3 4 31 205 II 16 0 1
13 Quarrying Min 1 1 1 2 2 43 123 16 15 0 1
14 Metal Ind 1 1 1 3 3 26 155 39 36 0 1
15 Metal Obj 2 2 2 2 3 59 208 12 13 0 1
16 Equipment 2 2 2 7 8 37 279 34 35 0 1
17 Transp Mat 5 2 4 17 12 39 204 40 33 0 1
18 Electr Machine 3 3 4 II 13 32 212 35 39 0 1
19 Chemicals 3 2 3 II 9 18 142 34 31 0 1
20 Rubber 1 1 1 3 3 81 171 24 26 0 1
21 O therInd 1 0 1 2 2 59 163 25 27 0 0
All Manufactures 33 21 33 76 74 72 287 25 25 1 1
22 Transp Communic 4 7 4 4 3 7 134 10 7 1 0
23 Banking Insurance 6 4 6 3 3 1 171 6 6 0 0
24 Other Services 48 61 48 7 4 8 141 • 1 1 1
All Services 59 72 58 14 9 8 142 3 2 1 0
Economy-wide 100 100 100 100 100 13 134 II II 1 1
The last two columns display imports from and exports to Morocco as ratios of total 
French trade flows. It is clear, as already pointed out in previous chapters, that French 
dependency over Morocco as a trading partner is very limited. It can be highlighted the 
higher import dependency for primary sectors (with estate crops recording 6 per cent) 
and apparel and leather products; notice also that export supply is concentrated in the 210
210 It should also be noticed that sectors 24 "Other Services" aggregates non-tradable sectors such as
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durable goods of manufacturing. A free trade area or customs union with the elimination 
of trade barriers, especially for agriculture (the Common Agricultural Policy) and for 
textiles and derived products (MFI) might have some trade diversion effect.
Table 7-2 shows comparable data for the Moroccan economy and close inspection 
reveals interesting similarities as well as contrasts with its northern partner. Notice, first 
of all. the very different production and income structure. The reliance of the Moroccan 
economy on primary sectors is much higher as shown by their 19 and 31 per cent shares 
for gross output and value added. In terms of the first two columns. Food crops represent 
the second largest sector (after the Other Services one). Manufacturing is concentrated in 
traditional sectors (Food, Textiles and derived products) and Chemicals (which includes 
the phosphate derived products).
Column 3 displays the demand structure (total demand) and this also shows the 
backwardness of the Moroccan economy relative to France, with a much higher share of 
income spent on food, other primary sectors, manufacturing necessities, and less on 
services.
The trade structure illustrated in columns 4 and 5 shows some features of a typical 
middle income developing country. Although previous trade policy reforms resulted in 
some export diversification, these are still concentrated in some crucial sectors. 
Phosphates (as raw material in sector 3, in conjunction with fisheries, forestry and other 
mining, and as derived products in sector 19) account for almost one third of all exports, 
followed by Apparel, Food products and other agricultural products. As far as imports 
are concerned, manufacturing and energy account for most of them.
It is particularly interesting to contrast the value-added ratios in column 6 and 
especially 7 with their French counterparts. Moroccan returns to skilled labour seem 
larger in the service sectors (driven up by the salaried component of the public 
administration in sector 24) and in the durable goods industries, but the economy-wide 
ratios register very similar values (133% and 134%) for the two countries. A significant 
difference is represented instead in the gap between the skilled and unskilled labour 
ratios that appears higher in Morocco than in France, signalling wider wage dispersion in 
the former.
construction, real estate and public administration.
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Table ~-2 Basic structure of the Moroccan economy 1990 (figures in percentages)
1
X
2
VA
3
D
4
E
5 6 
M LUsk/K
7
LSk/K
8
E/X
9
M/D
10
MFr/M
II
EFr/E
1 Food Crops 10 16 10 4 5 22 35 3 6 22 58
2 Estate Crops 2 3 1 4 0 3 32 18 | 4 55
3 Other Primary 3 5 2 19 5 5 72 54 28 8 9
4 Energy 5 7 7 3 16 0 19 5 26 2 10
All Primary 19 31 20 29 26 12 35 12 15 7 20
5 Milling Conf 3 1 3 0 1 16 218 0 4 13 89
6 Food Product 3 2 3 9 3 11 232 23 II 15 41
7 Beverages Tobacco 2 1 2 0 I 10 78 1 5 II 68
8 Textiles 3 1 3 4 6 9 96 12 24 6 12
9 Apparel 3 3 2 15 1 17 134 42 7 87 92
10 Leather Shoes 3 4 2 2 1 25 199 7 3 76 71
11 Wood 1 1 1 1 3 8 148 6 21 8 5
12 Paper 1 1 2 1 2 8 128 7 16 35 24
13 Quarrving Min 3 1 3 1 1 2 65 2 6 32 9
14 Metal Ind 1 0 2 1 7 23 178 6 42 12 1
15 Metal Obj 2 1 2 0 2 5 94 1 11 48 25
16 Equipment 1 0 2 0 II II 265 3 58 37 47
17 Transp Mat 1 0 3 1 10 5 146 6 43 45 49
18 Electr Machine 1 1 2 3 8 6 139 20 41 59 74
19 Chemicals 4 2 4 17 10 3 136 31 26 29 14
20 Rubber 1 0 1 1 2 7 132 5 19 39 4
21 Other Ind 0 0 0 0 0 10 172 4 16 65 71
All Manufactures 33 18 37 56 70 11 140 14 21 33 46
22 Transp Communic 4 7 3 7 1 2 124 15 3 54 16
23 Banking Insurance 3 4 3 0 0 2 90 1 0 54 58
24 Other Services 41 40 38 7 3 4 399 1 1 54 22
All Services 48 51 44 14 4 3 288 2 ' 54 20
Economy-wide 100 100 100 100 100 9 133 8 11 27 35
Analysis of columns 8 and 9 confirms what has already been mentioned about the 
Moroccan trade structure. Here it is possible to appreciate even more clearly the 
Moroccan export specialisation reflecting its comparative advantage, and an import 
dependency that is highest in capital goods. Morocco still appears to rely on a north-south 
typology in its pattern of trade, whereas France reflects its full integration into developed 
intra-industry trade.
The last two columns highlight another important difference, namely the much 
stronger dependency of the southern country on bilateral trade. On average Morocco 
relies on France for one third of all its exports and imports, but its dependency is not 
uniform and varies across sectors.
The next important step in the study of trade policy reform is to assess the current 
levels of protection. Table 7-3 below contains the basic data on trade protection that has 
been used in the model presented here. These were calculated directly from the SAM and 
derived from official national sources.2" The first three columns display French ad 21
211 See Chapter 4.
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valorem tariff rates applied to imports from the EC. the Rest of the world and Morocco. 
The next column shows the Moroccan tariff rates212. The next two columns display 
percentage shares of tariff revenues across sectors and although these appear to be 
similarly distributed in the two countries their value relative to total government fiscal 
revenues are very different. The last column shows French export subsidy rates.213
Table 3 Ad valorem estimates for French - Moroccan import protection 1990 tpercentaees)
T a r i f f  Rates T a r i f f  Revenues Exp.Subsidies
O f
Against:
France Morocco 
All Partners
France Morocco France 
All PartnersEC ROW Morocco
i Food Crops 0 5 2 4 22 1 3 17
2 Estate Crops 3.5 12 20 61 1 0 10
3 Other Primary 0.0 1 1 31 1 5 9
4 Energy 0.0 13 10 45 17 22 6
All Primary 0 4 9 9 38 19 30 12
5 Milling Conf 0.0 18 45 70 1 2 28
6 Food Product 0 1 II 19 20 4 2 20
7 Beverages Tobacco 0.1 70 98 54 2 1 6
8 Textiles 0 0 8 2 26 0 5 1
9 Apparel 0.0 26 10 48 11 2 0
10 Leather 0 0 35 13 14 4 0 0
11 Wood 0.0 24 8 37 3 3 2
12 Paper 0.0 11 4 36 4 3 2
13 Quarrying Min 0.0 9 1 54 0 2 1
14 Metal Ind 0.0 3 0 31 0 7 0
15 Metal Obj 0 0 7 2 50 1 3 1
16 Equipment 0.0 5 1 19 2 6 0
17 Transp Mat 0.0 29 7 29 19 9 2
18 Electr Machine 0.0 II 6 41 16 10 2
19 Chemicals 0 0 13 4 34 6 II 0
20 Rubber 0.0 16 3 51 2 2 0
21 OtherInd 0.0 14 8 82 3 1 0
All Manufactures 0.0 16 II 33 77 70 3
22 Transp Communic 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 39
23 Banking Insurance 0.0 13 14 0 3 0 40
24 Other Services 0.0 4 1 0 1 0 44
All Services 0.0 6 2 0 4 0 41
Economy-wide 0.0 13 10 33 100 100 9
% O f total govern. Revenues 2 29
Moroccan tariff revenues, in the base year SAM. represented almost one third of total 
fiscal receipts. In order to avoid budget problems, their reduction associated with trade
212 It is possible to implement region specific tariffs also for Morocco, although this has not been done in 
the present version of the model. Due to the weight of French unrestricted trade with other European 
countries, the need to differentiate tariffs by region for the French case results evident.
213 These rates are also calculated from the basic SAM data, and it has not yet been possible to 
disaggregate them by region of export destination. Besides, although services are only a small share of 
exports, they seem to enjoy too generous subsidies. Future versions of the model will try to improve on the 
subsidy measurement.
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policy reform has to be coupled with compensating measures.'14 During the 1980's the 
Moroccan commercial policy was strongly oriented towards trade liberalisation. In 1983 
import licences were required in all sectors, tariff rates were high and dispersed (some 
over 100%). and there were export licensing requirements and a state marketing board on 
exports of processed food products. By 1993 no imports required a license (other than for 
health or safety reasons), exports were free, and the monopoly of the state marketing 
board was abolished.214 15 Although these policies produced positive results (especially in 
terms of export diversification), as displayed in Table 7-3, there were still considerable 
distortions in place. This does not seem to be the case for France where trade taxes 
represent only 2 per cent of its government tax income, so that, as documented later, their 
removal has limited effects.216
This could change quite dramatically when non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are included. 
Consider, for example, this type of barrier for two sensitive sectors: food and textiles217. 
For the former sector there are several types of restrictions: import calendars (for 14 
categories of fruit and vegetables), reference quantities/tariff quotas (for sensitive fruit, 
vegetables and sea products), import levies (mainly on olive oil) and countervailing taxes 
(for some fruit and vegetables).
Figure 7-1: Number o f days per year with countervailine taxes
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
MorOCCO ■tomato««
1982 1 9 8 3  1 98 4  1 9 8 5  1 9 8 6  1987  1 98 8  1989  1990  1991 1 9 9 2  1993
Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2 display the number of days per year for which 
countervailing taxes were charged and the level of the taxes as percentage of entry prices
214 As a reminder, in the model one closure rule requires fixed government savings so that household 
income taxes are shifted to offset exactly the decreasing tariff revenues.
215 See Rutherford et al (1993), Mateus et al (1988) and official Ministry of Trade of Morocco (1995) for 
details.
216 It should be noticed that in all the simulations, French trade reform includes both tariffs and export 
subsidies abatement.
217 The following data are provided in Fontagni & Piridy (forthcoming).
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in the EU for Moroccan imports. Clearly these taxes represent a true barrier for Moroccan 
exporters21 .
Figure ?-2: Countervailing taxes as a percentage o f the entr\' price 
160% Morocco ■ tomatoes
I
 □clementines
□  lemons
h b d b i J i .
1 98 2  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988  1 98 9  1990 1991 1992 1993
For textiles the main non-tariff barriers are represented by voluntary export restraints 
(VERs). These were imposed by the EC in 1978 on trade from almost all-Mediterranean 
countries. Initially the level of the quota was above export potential but after 1984, with a 
rise in the quota allowance lower than that of exports expansion, the level of utilisation 
reached 141 per cent in 1988 (for France alone 216 per cent).
Moroccan NTBs towards European exports are present in various sectors and these 
are documented in other studies219. Unfortunately, owing to a lack of complete data on 
these instruments their inclusion in the current model has been postponed.7.3 The EMMA model: an overview
This section presents a brief overview of the Economic A/odel of the A/editerranean 
Area (EMMA), leaving its detailed description to the next technical chapter. It consists of 
a two-country Computable General Equilibrium model that can be used in two main 
modes: comparative statics and recursive dynamics. I constructed and labelled the 
EMMA model for this thesis.220
Dimensions. The EMMA model consists of two detailed regional sub-models for 
France and Morocco. The main link between them is given by their bilateral trade which 
is fully endogenous (price and quantities are determined by the equilibrium conditions).
One solution they adopted was to build greenhouses so that their harvesting season would not coincide 
with that in Europe, when these taxes are levied. This obviously hinders their comparative advantage due to 
the excessive investment costs.
I” See for instance Rutherford et al (1993).
!:o I have to acknowledge unvaluable help and guidance from Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, author of 
numerous models at the OECD development centre. For more details see the technical appendix.
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The other key dimension of the model is given by its sectoral disaggregation: the version 
used here details 24 sectors/commodities as shown in Table 7-1. Also the model examines 
supply and demand for one capital and four skill specific types of labour. Finally, the 
time horizon for the model goes to 2004 with equilibrium values reported for 5 solution 
periods (1992. 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004).
Production. Standard assumptions are made for the production structure of the 
EMMA model: producers minimise costs under constant returns to scale technology and 
in a perfect competitive environment. Their inputs choices are modelled using a nested 
structure that is very similar to the one used in the previous chapter for the Environment 
and Trade model. This is reproduced in Figure 7-1. At the top-level output is a composite 
in fixed shares of value added and non-energy intermediate inputs. It is assumed that the 
latter are consumed in fixed proportion amongst themselves (Leontief input-output 
technology), though it is possible to substitute between domestic and imported goods. In 
the next level of the nested structure value added is separated in two components: a 
labour aggregate and a capital-energy bundle. The degree of substitutability here is 
determined by the CES elasticity. Further down, the capital-energy bundle is decomposed 
in its two parts and labour is split by skill level. Some degree of substitutability is 
assumed at this level.
The other components of final demand include: government expenditure, investment 
and variation of stocks. In the model it is assumed that aggregate real government 
expenditures and variation of stocks are fixed, and, according to the closure rule, 
aggregate real investment depends on savings. These aggregated variables are then 
mapped into commodity specific demands according to fixed shares derived from the 
SAM.
201
Fieure 7-1: Production Structure
Trade. The main assumption here consists of modelling traded goods originating 
(destined) from (to) different regions as imperfect substitutes. This allows for cross- 
hauling and rules out the extreme cases of complete specialisation. In the case of imports 
this is captured using an Armington nested CES system. At a first level, for each 
commodity, demand is in terms of a composite good which is an aggregate of domestic 
and imported component. Then the imported component is further decomposed into its 
region-specific elements. Exports are treated in a symmetric fashion. Domestic producers 
optimally allocate their supply to domestic and international markets according to relative 
prices. This is achieved by means of a CET production possibility frontier.
Import demands and export supplies are thus price sensitive so that an increase in 
prices of one region with respect to other regions or domestic prices induces substitution. 
In the EMMA model a distinction is made between endogenous and exogenous regions. 
For the former, namely Morocco and France, border import prices of one country
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correspond to the export prices of the other and these are calculated as equilibrium prices 
in the model. For the exogenous region, the EC and the Rest of the World, the standard 
small country assumption holds, so that border imports or export prices are equal to 
(fixed) world prices.
Equilibrium. The market clearing condition for commodities simply sets domestic 
supply plus imports equal to domestic demand plus exports. The equilibrium conditions 
for factor markets are more complicated and vary in the dynamic and static version of the 
model. In the static version, it is assumed that capital stock is fixed. Labour supply is 
modelled in one of two extreme ways: perfectly elastic supply, implying a fixed real 
wage, or completely fixed supply221. Labour can freely move across sectors so that, for 
each skill, one economy-wide wage rate is computed. The variations in the dynamic 
version are examined below.
Closure. In addition to material balance and factor markets equilibrium, three 
additional macroeconomic “budget constraints" for the government account, the 
investment-savings account and the balance of payments account have to be satisfied in 
equilibrium. For the first it is assumed that real government savings are fixed and, given 
that also real expenditures are fixed, the household tax schedule is shifted to balance any 
loss or gain in other taxes (tariff and indirect taxes) revenues. This is equivalent to a 
lump-sum tax from or transfer to the household sector. Extended discussion on this 
particular closure rule is provided below in section 7.4.1.
The second closure rule concerns the savings-investment balance. In each sub- model 
investments are set equal to aggregate savings which result from the sum of household 
savings, the net government budget position (which is fixed in real terms) and foreign 
savings (fixed, see below). Increased demand for investment can therefore be satisfied 
only by a corresponding increased supply in savings.
Finally it is assumed that the trade balance is equal to the exogenous level of foreign 
savings. This implies that, following trade liberalisation, to finance the increased import 
demand the country has to expand its exports. This is possible, at rigid terms of trade (i.e. 
with fixed exchange rates), only if export sectors attract resources whose relative prices 
have declined due to structural adjustment in other sectors.
221 The factor markets closure rules as well as the investment-savings equilibrium condition reflect the 
macro aspects of a CGE model. In particular for the labour market see Harrigan. McGregor, Swales and 
Dourmashkin (1992), Maechler, A.M., and Roland-Holst (1995), McGregor, Swales, Yin (1996).
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The last two closure rules, that of investment-saving and of external balance are 
considered the most appropriate to the study of the effects of trade reforms. In fact one 
limitation of this approach is the assumption of exogeneity of foreign savings and better 
modelling of foreign capital flows should be an objective of future extensions.
Dynamics. The recursive-dynamic structure of the EMMA model depends on three 
main features: factor accumulation, capital vintages and productivity growth. Each 
solution year in the period 1990-2004 is solved as a static equilibrium implying that there 
is no forward-looking behaviour in the model and that the link among static equilibria is 
fully given by transition equations that govern capital accumulation.
For each period of the dynamic version of the model, capital is differentiated into two 
vintages: old and new. Old capital is equal to the capital of the previous period minus 
depreciation (whose rate is constant over time) and new capital is equal to the previous 
period's level of investment. Labour supply increases at an exogenous rate usually 
corresponding to the population growth rate.
Productivity gains are determined by increases in energy, labour and capital 
efficiency ‘shifters’ in the production function. Labour and enfergy productivity growth is 
exogenously specified whereas capital efficiency is first endogenously calculated in the 
model base run and then fixed to that value in all subsequent simulations. In the base run 
regional GDP growth rates are exogenous and the instruments used to attain them are 
determined by the endogenously determined regional capital productivity changes. Then, 
during the simulations, GDP growth rates become endogenous and can increase or 
decrease with respect to the benchmark due to alterations in policy parameters. Clearly 
this implies that the policies considered in the experiments have no direct effect on 
productivity.
7.4 Mediterranean integration. Policy description and Comparative Statics 
Results
Various factors contributed to the realisation by the European governments of the 
high negative externalities they would face with an inadequate development of the 
southern Mediterranean region. Earlier EU policy towards the Maghreb region led these 
countries to a narrow export specialisation, highly dependent on preferential trade 
agreements, and contested by emerging developing countries with lower labour costs.
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Differences in income per capita between the two sides of the Mediterranean are very 
high, resulting in high migratory pressure. At the current unemployment rates and growth 
forecasts. European labour markets will not be able to accommodate a steady flow of 
migrant workers. Other global concerns include common environmental problems, or 
political instability and crime. As a result, the idea of a FTA in the region has emerged as 
the only solution compatible with this changing environment. It will be first implemented 
on a bilateral basis (each Mediterranean country vis-à-vis the EU). before being extended 
to a regional FTA, as Mediterranean countries will sign bilateral free trade agreements 
among themselves.
Technically a free trade area consists of the elimination of all trade barriers among 
participating countries, but it does not require that each country adopt a common trade 
policy (for example the same tariff rates) towards third countries. This in fact would be a 
requirement for the formation of a customs union. The three experiments performed here 
are based on the following distinct scenarios:
1. formation of a free trade area between France and Morocco322;
2. creation of a customs union between these two countries;
3. full elimination of trade barriers.
By extending the removal of trade barriers to larger geographic groups, the degree of 
liberalisation increases from experiment 1 to 3. In fact the last experiment is performed to 
produce a reference scenario of completely free trade and, currently, it cannot be 
considered a viable policy. It should be noticed that all the simulations consider the joint 
reduction of tariff rates and French export subsidies. Moreover, between scenarios 1 and 
2, French trade policy is not changed, as the customs union scenario consists of setting 
Moroccan tariffs on imports from the rest of the world equal to the French ones.
With the EMMA model in comparative statics mode, each of the three experiments 
has been performed under two different closures for the labour markets. In both cases 
labour is fully mobile across sectors. With the first closure, it is assumed that aggregate 
labour of each skill is in excess supply, thus the domestic economy-wide wage (by skill) 
is fixed, and aggregate employment adjusts to meet demand (in Table 7-4, Table 7-5, and 
Table 7-6 results for this closure are below the label “Flat labour supply”). Full 
employment is assumed for the second closure, so demand increases will only affect
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wage rates. Clearly these two closures represent extreme cases and the resulting estimates 
of the policy effect should be treated as bounds within which more realistic values will 
lie. The capital stock is held fixed throughout these static simulations.
7 4.1 Aggregate results
In the context of trade liberalisation, aggregate results are relatively easy to predict. 
The removal of import distortions through enhanced comparative advantage and 
expanded trade, promotes greater efficiency and increases welfare. The structural 
adjustments which the economies undergo is more uncertain, but. given that trade policy 
reform usually creates winners and losers it might be important for its sustainability in the 
long term to have some ex-ante detailed sectoral information on the possible outcomes. 
This will be discussed in the next subsection.
Assumptions on the adjustment mechanism in the labour market, the closure rule of 
the government budget and trade elasticities are the main factors affecting aggregate 
results, and especially welfare effects. In order to appreciate their influence, three 
separate tables present aggregate results under different combinations of the 
aforementioned factors. 2
222 This and the following policy options consider tariff reductions for all sectors and not the 
manufacturing subset as initially proposed in the Barcelona conference.
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Removing tariffs has quite different effects on consumers’ welfare whether the 
government budget is held fixed, and increasing direct taxes on households' incomes 
compensates revenue losses, or it is left to vary to become an endogenous model result. 
In the first case. Equivalent Variation (EV) really measures the amount of net income 
(i.e. allowing for changes in tariff revenues) which would have to be given to the 
consumers at the initial prices to make them as well off as they would be at the new set of 
prices.223
By assuming fixed full employment (the case of a vertical labour supply function), 
the benefits of a more liberal trade regime are not reflected in employment changes, but 
only in more efficient reallocations of the existing labour force. With the hypothesis of a 
perfectly elastic labour supply (the case of a flat labour supply) these reallocations are 
enhanced through employment increases and this has beneficial effects on consumer 
welfare.
Finally, trade elasticities affect aggregate results by inducing stronger or weaker 
terms of trade changes. Two limiting cases are considered. In the first high elasticities of 
substitution in import demands are assumed. This is equivalent to a reduction in 
Moroccan exporters' market power in France (or that of French exporters in Morocco). 
As expected, this case registers lower terms of trade effects. When low trade elasticities 
are used, the implicit exporters market power produces stronger changes in the bilateral 
terms of trade.224
Table 7-4, with a fixed government’s budget and high trade elasticities, probably 
represents the most plausible scenario. This table’s results are commented first and then 
contrasted with the other two tables (Table 7-5 and Table 7-6).
Equivalent variation changes (see row 1) are influenced by the degree of 
liberalisation. In the case of France a direct relationship unambiguously appears: the 
more liberal the trade regime, the higher the welfare gains. For Morocco, the best 
solution seems to be a custom union with its northern partner. In this case welfare gains 
are maximised (or in the case of fixed resources, losses are minimised). This is due to two 
factors. Firstly, trade diversion is highest in the free trade area scenario and it drives up
223 See Vousden, N. (1990). page 224.
224 The two limiting values for these elasticities are 8.00 and 1.50.
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import prices worsening Moroccan terms of trade"5 and lowering welfare gains. This is 
evident in rows 16 through 19, which measure bilateral Mediterranean trade flows and 
diversion indices. Secondly, Moroccan welfare is higher in the custom union scenario 
with respect to the full free trade case, because of the •‘crowding-out” of government’s 
savings on households' incomes in the latter case. In the free trade scenario tariff 
revenues go to zero and have to be replaced by higher direct taxes. Revenues from these 
taxes record the highest increase (they rise by 92 per cent with respect to the initial 
government’s savings, see row 25) and thus affect households’ disposable income.
Real GDP grows significantly only in the case of expandable employment (consider 
rows 2 and 3. and the first 6 columns) and this also explains the higher welfare gains 
recorded with this closure. In the case of fixed resources (fixed capital stock and vertical 
labour supply) GDP variations are very small and are attributable to factors’ movements 
across sectors25 26.
Factor price variations are again dependent on the assumption made for the labour 
markets. With excess labour supply, nominal wages vary by the same amount of the 
consumer price index (so that real wages in rows 4 to 8 remain unchanged), whereas 
rental rate responds to variations in capital productivity. In the case of full employment, 
increased labour demand depends on the pattern of structural adjustment in the economy 
and factor intensities in the various sectors. Wages and rent variations are then interpreted 
from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and will be examined again in the detailed results 
section below.
Removing import protection induces real exchange rate227 and domestic price 
depreciation (see rows 12 and 13). Cheaper imports compete with domestic goods and 
exert downward pressure on the consumer price index (CPI). Besides, the real exchange 
rate must depreciate to align domestic and international resource costs. One significant 
exception is worth mentioning: the real exchange appreciation in Morocco in the case of 
a custom union with fixed labour supply. This is due to the impressive real wage increase
225 it should be remembered that Moroccan-French bilateral trade prices are endogenous. When Morocco 
increases its import demand of French goods, due to a tariff reduction, French exporters can respond by 
increasing their supply, but they have to compete for resource use in the domestic and other international 
markets. This competition results in higher French export prices, which worsen Moroccan terms of trade.
226 The model specification assumes inter-sectoral labour productivity differences, which are calibrated 
into a fixed wage distribution. This means that reallocating labour can decrease aggregate productivity per 
unit of resource cost, and especially so if labour is induced to migrate from lower to higher wage 
categories. For more detail see the technical specification in the next chapter.
227 This is defined as the aggregate value added price index (see the technical chapter)
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in the skilled occupational group, which records a very high intensity in Moroccan 
exports.
For both countries trade increases in all the simulations. It is possible to consider 
separately changes in total trade (rows 14 and 15) and in bilateral trade (rows 16 and 17). 
A clear picture of the trade diversion effects following the various policies is provided by 
the indices of import and export diversion (in rows 18 and 19).
These indices are defined as the normalised measure of the shifts in the composition 
of trade between the bilateral partner and the other regions (rest of the world and the EU). 
For example, the import diversion index is given by
tf(.W0.W|)= l<>ollw,S 'w°iINI
where m0-(«</’••«o') and w, .(*#,*. v/,r) are the 2-tuple of bilateral, and EU and ROW 
(merged together) imports in the base and after the experiment, respectively, and || • | and 
| | denote Euclidean and simplex norms.228 These indices measure the percent of imports 
or exports diverted from one market to another; positive values indicate diversion into the 
Mediterranean region and away from the others.
For Morocco, the interpretation of these indices is straightforward. Trade diversion, 
stronger for imports than exports, is reduced according to the degree of liberalisation. The 
lowest level is reached with a fully free trade regime where only about 8 per cent of 
imports and 12 per cent of exports are diverted into the Mediterranean region. This 
residual diversion, puzzling in a completely unrestricted trade regime, is uniquely 
attributable to price effects in the Mediterranean region (see rows 23 and 24).229
For France, the policy-induced trade diversion effects seem to be quite modest. This 
obviously results from the initial limited France's trade dependence on its southern
” * The export diversion index is defined analogously.
229 Notice that in the current specification of the model, basically Morocco (France) faces a downward 
sloping demand for its expons to France (Morocco) and an upward sloping supply for its partner's impon 
supply and it is impossible to rule out terms of trade effect. Brown ( 1987) signals that the magnitude of this 
effect, arising from the Armington assumption, may be quite large, suggesting that models using this 
assumption can seriously underestimate the gains from trade liberalisation.
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partner. It should be noticed, though, that in the case of complete free trade a large 
proportion of imports and exports are shifted from the EU to the ROW region."30
The final sets of aggregate results worth noting are presented in rows 20 and 21 in a 
compact format of adjustment indices of capital and labour. These indices give an 
indication of the extent of the domestic resources reallocation consequent to the adoption 
of trade liberalisation and are measured in a similar manner to the trade diversion indices. 
For example, in the case of labour, as follows:
where Lq -(¿o.,.io.,) and U are the sectoral employment in the base and after the
experiment, respectively, and ||y has the same definition. Clearly, the larger the value of 
these adjustment indices, the more resource reallocation and structural adjustment the 
economy undergoes.
Two main features are highlighted. Firstly, the results confirm that the smaller the 
size of the economy, the higher the trade dependency and the size of the initial tariffs, the 
larger will be the adjustment required after the policy shock. The highest levels of 
adjustments are reached for Morocco in the free trade experiment with perfectly elastic 
labour supply. In this case, more than 6 per cent and 18 per cent of total labour and 
capital move inter-sectorally.
Secondly, given the relatively low substitution elasticity among labour and capital, 
although some variations in the adjustment indices are observable between the two 
closures, they are not very significant and their ratio (not shown) is almost constant.
These results are contrasted with those presented in Table 7-5 and Table 7-6. The first 
of these tables collects aggregate results for the same three policy experiments under the 
assumption that trade elasticities are lower. 230
230 This effect is not visible in the aggregate tables but it is recorded in the sectoral results tables that 
follow. Besides, I use the term shifted and not diverted because in the case of free trade no preferences are 
accorded to any particular region. The ROW region trade shares increase at the expenses of the EU, but this 
is a correction of initial distortions (i.e. of the initial EU and Mediterranean preferences).
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As already anticipated, this is equivalent to assuming that French and Moroccan 
exporters have some market power in the Mediterranean region. Given the lower regional 
import demand elasticities, exporters, serving the Mediterranean region, may increase 
their prices without triggering substitution for exports from other sources. From this it 
follows that terms of trade effects are much stronger and policy-induced trade diversion 
is lower (see rows 22, and 18 and 19).231 With this low elasticity specification, welfare 
gains from trade liberalisation are severely reduced, especially for Morocco, which, by 
being more dependent on bilateral trade with France, suffers more intense imports price 
inflation (see row 24).232 The remaining results (GDP, employment, and factors' prices) 
do not qualitatively differ between Table 7-4 and Table 7-5.
The last table to be commented on. Table 7-6, collects interesting findings for the 
simulation experiments when a different closure for the government budget is 
implemented. The attention is focused on rows 25 to 31, which show per cent changes in 
the government's budget variables233. The following equation represents the 
government’s budget closure rule.
p f i U I 1 £  _  f f ™  +  y ^ y l N D T A X  +  y T A R I h h  _  y E S U B S  ^ T a K i  _  p C P l q TRA
initial savings in nominal terms are on the left hand side (and are found in row 31); these 
are equal to the difference of direct household tax revenues (HTAX and row 25), indirect 
tax and tariff revenues (Y’NnTAX and YTARJhh, and rows 27 and 27), minus expenditures on 
export subsidies, goods and services and transfers (J**"**, X™  and G™ multiplied by 
relevant price indices, and rows 28, 29 and 30).
2,1 One notable exception is given in the case of a FTA for Morocco. This was already commented above 
(see page 209 and footnote 225).
232 This problem of underestimation of trade liberalisation gains (due to excessively high terms of trade 
changes) was already signalled above in footnote 229.
233 For all the variables in rows 25 to 31, these changes are expressed as percentage variations with 
respect to the base year initial government's savings.
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With fixed real government's savings (as in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5) when tariff 
revenues (and for France, export subsidy expenditures) are reduced, due to liberalisation 
policies, household direct taxes are accordingly increased.234 In the free trade scenario. 
Moroccan consumers' direct taxes double as a percentage of the government's initial 
savings (see row 25 in Table 7-4); clearly this affect households' welfare. On the 
contrary, French consumers benefit from export subsidy expenditure contraction.
Contrast this with the results in Table 7-6. Here, with endogenous government's 
savings, household taxes do not compensate any revenue losses, which instead directly 
affect the government’s budget. Now row 31 shows what happens to the government's 
budget following a policy shock: the Moroccan government loses important revenues 
whereas the French one gains by reducing its support to exports. These losses and gains, 
by not being transferred to private agents, do not affect their welfare. EV estimations are 
now much higher for Morocco and quite reduced for France.
7.4.2 Sectoral results
In a disaggregated CGE model such as EMMA sectoral results are essential in the 
analysis of the real structural adjustment and reallocations occurring in response to policy 
change. For it is individual sectors that seek import protection, and aggregate real income 
or equivalent variation measures do not usually play a decisive role in the formulation of 
trade policy. In order to implement sustainable reforms, it is then crucial to have detailed 
information on sectoral adjustments and other trade-offs not discernible at the aggregate 
level.
Table 7-7 shows sectoral information on real GDP, real consumption, labour and 
capital demands, imports and exports inside and outside the Mediterranean region for the 
Custom Union and the full liberalisation (Free Trade) experiments. Results are shown as 
percentage differences from the initial equilibrium.
For France, the results suggest that a customs union with Morocco would have very 
little structural impact. Although trade with its partner would increase significantly with
234 Notice that row 31 (in all the three tables) records changes in government's nominal savings with 
respect to the base run. Given the fixed real savings assumption, in Table 7-4 and Table 7-J, row 3 1 values
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respect to the benchmark (and notice that the highest positive variations do indeed 
coincide with those sectors enjoying the highest initial protection, see Table 7-3), this 
would still represent a low proportion of French total trade, and the registered trade 
diversion effects would be of minor importance.
The picture changes when considering full liberalisation (Free Trade). In this case 
most manufacturing industries increase their production, whereas primary sectors and 
food processing show a reduction. This is mainly a response to increases in domestic and 
foreign demand for the expanding sectors and substitution with cheaper imports for the 
decreasing ones. Accompanying the output expansion is a growth in employment. 
Capital, due to its low substitutability with labour, is reallocated according to labour 
expansion.235 As long as trade is considered, remarkable shifts are noticeable between the 
EC and the ROW regions. With the full elimination of trade preferences for the EC and 
the Mediterranean regions, imports from and exports to the ROW become competitive. It 
is in fact this shift towards more efficient markets sources (or more profitable 
destinations) that generates welfare gains.
Morocco undergoes a remarkably larger structural adjustment, the difference with 
respect to France is especially strong for the custom union scenario. Almost half of its 
sectors are contracting and the other half are expanding. The specialisation towards 
traditional comparative advantage sectors, already signalled in chapter 5, is apparent. 
Food products, textiles, apparel, and chemicals (phosphates) register significant increases 
in gross production and exports.236
Particularly interesting in this case is the extent of capital and labour reallocation. As 
illustrated in Table 7-4, in the perfectly elastic labour supply closure, capital returns go 
up whereas they decrease with the fixed labour supply closure. With expanded 
employment, the dominating effect is the increase in capital productivity and this 
explains the rise in its price. With fixed labour and capital supply, factors rewards will 
depend on the sectoral adjustment brought about by changes in relative prices. As implied
coincide with the variation in the government's savings price index, which is assumed to be equal to the 
GDP price index (of row 13).
235 Some sensitivity analysis has been carried out with changes in the elasticity of substitution of labour 
and capital, and the results confirm this observation.
236 These are also the sectors with the highest gross product to export ratios, see column 9 in Table 7-2.
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by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem if relative prices of capital intensive goods decrease 
with respect to those of labour intensive goods, then the rental rate is expected to fall with 
respect to wages.
Table Sectoral results (Perfectly elastic labour supply - figures in percenlaees)
CUSTOMS UNION_______________________________________ FREE TRAPE
Real Real
XP C ons
LD KD Ec
M
Row
M
Med
M
Be
E
Row
E
Med
E
Real Real
XP Cons
LD KD Ec
M
Row
M
Med
M
Ec
E
Row
E
Med
E
Food C rops -1 0 -1 •1 -3 -3 14 II -69
F R A N C E  
-9 -12 0 •12 -12 -15 -2 8 -39 -39 9
E state C rop 1 0 0 1 -6 -6 98 8 -48 122 -6 1 -6 -6 -21 49 64 -17 -17 93
O ther Prim ary 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 -46 9 1 -1 1 1 -2 8 25 -14 -14 30
Energy 1 0 1 1 -1 -1 31 13 -28 82 -2 3 -2 -2 -49 36 •12 -4 -4 27
M illing  C o n f -2 0 -2 -2 -1 -1 228 21 -83 58 •14 •1 -14 -14 -34 147 189 -55 -55 41
Food Product -1 0 •1 • 1 -2 -2 129 16 -72 -10 -7 0 -7 -7 -26 69 110 -40 -40 -13
B everages T obacco -1 0 •1 •1 -2 -2 864 14 -29 496 -6 5 -6 -6 -82 1145 413 -9 -9 67
T extiles 3 0 3 3 0 0 42 7 -3 72 14 2 14 14 -20 51 26 26 26 30
A pparel 2 1 2 2 -5 -5 96 5 1 79 3 7 3 3 -62 142 32 18 18 69
Leather 2 0 2 2 -2 -2 67 5 2 51 -2 9 -2 -2 -72 199 -4 14 14 25
W ood 1 0 1 1 -2 -2 55 5 -7 161 -1 4 -1 -1 -54 154 1 9 9 35
Paper 1 0 1 1 -2 -2 34 5 -8 73 3 3 3 3 -34 57 17 13 13 33
Q u a iry in g  M in 1 0 1 1 -2 -2 13 4 -2 122 7 3 7 7 -17 6 0 8 20 20 86
M etal Ind 5 0 5 5 0 0 8 7 6 27 43 3 43 43 1 33 17 63 63 31
M etal Obj 1 0 1 1 -1 -1 21 5 -5 82 10 3 II 10 -15 44 18 22 22 64
Equipm ent 2 0 2 2 -2 -2 24 5 1 31 18 3 18 18 -19 17 24 35 35 27
T ransp  M at 1 0 1 1 -1 -1 59 7 -9 113 12 8 12 12 -60 20 6 8 26 26 27
E lectr M achine 1 0 1 1 -1 -1 52 7 -10 54 9 4 9 9 -39 43 35 17 17 31
C hem icals 3 0 3 3 • 1 -1 50 6 4 71 20 5 20 20 -32 78 42 39 39 27
R ubber 2 0 2 2 -2 -2 23 5 1 127 15 4 15 15 -30 129 8 34 34 67
O th e rIn d 2 0 2 2 -2 -2 29 5 2 153 7 5 7 7 -47 55 6 21 21 116
T ransp  C om m um c -2 0 -2 -2 • 1 •1 8 29 -91 -58 -6 0 -6 -6 -5 -4 II -59 -59 -31
B anking  Insurance -1 0 -2 •1 -1 -1 76 28 -91 -60 -7 1 -7 -7 -34 78 56 -62 -62 -34
O ther S erv ices 0 1 0 0 -2 -2 20 29 -93 -65 1 3 1 1 •18 12 17 -61 -61 -39
M O R O C C O
Food C rops -1 1 0 -2 75 75 -9 -2 -2 14 -2 1 •1 -3 71 71 9 7 7 8
Estate C rop 7 1 9 7 178 178 122 -23 -23 98 4 1 6 3 273 2 73 93 -10 -10 64
O ther Prim ary 3 2 4 2 0 72 9 II 11 8 36 1 38 35 0 78 30 59 59 25
Energy -2 9 2 -29 -30 39 39 82 -29 -29 31 -40 2 -39 -40 59 59 27 -33 -33 •12
M illing  C o n f -6 2 -6 -6 141 141 58 -67 -67 228 -12 2 •12 •12 240 240 41 -58 -58 189
Food Product 17 2 17 16 -2 -2 -10 16 16 129 17 2 17 15 15 15 -13 39 39 NO
B everages T obacco 9 2 10 8 -55 -55 496 0 -84 864 -4 1 -3 -5 168 168 67 0 -66 413
Textiles 32 1 33 31 41 41 72 81 81 42 17 1 19 16 32 32 30 85 85 26
A pparel 4 6 3 47 44 0 -27 79 0 81 96 22 2 23 20 0 98 69 0 137 32
L eather 9 2 10 8 -81 -81 51 -3 -3 67 3 1 4 1 35 35 25 38 38 -4
W ood 4 2 4 2 6 6 161 26 26 55 - I I 2 -10 •12 59 59 35 25 25 1
Paper -3 3 -2 -3 19 19 73 27 27 34 -3 2 -2 -3 50 50 33 55 55 17
Q uarry ing  M in -5 2 -4 -5 117 117 122 20 20 13 -4 2 -4 -4 161 161 86 37 37 8
M etal Ind -18 3 -18 -18 II II 27 15 15 8 -14 2 -14 -14 II I I 31 37 37 17
M etal O bj -8 3 -7 -8 78 78 82 34 34 21 -7 2 -6 •8 105 105 64 54 54 18
Equipm ent 6 3 7 5 II II 31 0 49 24 13 2 13 II 20 20 27 0 87 24
T ransp  M at 13 2 14 12 -47 -47 113 40 40 59 2 2 3 0 27 27 27 87 87 8
E lectr M achine 5 3 5 4 0 0 54 48 48 52 7 3 8 6 42 42 31 108 108 35
30 3 31 29 -4 -4 71 80 80 50 56 3 57 55 19 19 27 156 156 42
-7 3 -6 -8 31 31 127 24 24 23 -9 2 -8 -10 98 98 67 43 43 8
O th e rIn d -2 7 4 -26 -28 94 94 153 0 -15 29 -28 3 -28 -30 180 180 116 0 18 6
T ransp  C om m um c 8 2 9 8 0 35 •58 19 19 8 13 1 15 12 0 6 •31 35 35 11
B anking Insurance 5 3 6 4 0 31 -60 -7 -7 76 7 1 8 6 0 2 -34 17 17 56
O ther Serv ices 7 3 8 6 0 21 -65 36 36 20 9 2 10 8 0 • 14 -39 60 60 17
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Examining the pattern of output changes and of capital intensities, in Table 7-2'}1 and 
Table 7-7, it can be seen that three of the four most capital intensive sectors of the 
Moroccan economy (in order: energy, metal industries, beverages and tobacco and 
leather product) are all contracting.
These sectors in fact release the necessary capital for the expanding sectors which are 
in areas of higher comparative advantage: textiles, apparel, food products, phosphates (in 
other primary and chemicals), estate crops.
For brevity, a similar table with sectoral results for the fixed labour supply case has 
been omitted. The only point worth noting is that the results for this latter case do not 
qualitatively differ from those displayed by the perfect elastic supply; the same 
reallocative forces (tariff reduction and comparative advantage) are still responsible for 
the structural adjustment the economies undergo.
Both aggregate and sectoral results confirm expectations about the ranking of France 
and Morocco in terms of welfare effects and adjustment. Morocco benefits more than 
France given its size and trade dependency. Clearly the advantages increase with the 
degree of liberalisation, although higher adjustment costs are incurred. As far as 
comparative statics results are concerned, the best option, for Morocco, in terms of the 
combination of positive effects, balanced adjustment costs, and political feasibility seems 
to be represented by a custom union treaty.
7.5 Dynamic simulations and results
7.5.1 The benchmark scenario
Applied general equilibrium models are not forecasting tools, so the 1990-2004 
benchmark scenario for the Mediterranean economies studied here is not intended as a 
realistic prediction, but simply as a scenario in which current economic policies 
parameters remain unaltered. This Business as t/sual (BaU) scenario is obtained by 
making assumptions about the future behaviour of those variables that govern the 237
237 Capital intensity is indirectly measured in columns 6 and 7, the lower the value the higher the capital 
contribution.
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dynamics of the model, namely: factors and productivity growth rates. During the 
dynamic calibration of the model the labour growth rate in efficiency units is set 
exogenously together with a target real GDP growth rate while the instrument is the 
capital productivity growth rate.
the capital productivity growth rates take the following form. Real GDP is defined as the 
sum of factor demands in efficiency units:
base year, and assuming exogenous growth rates for the labour force (g/) and labour 
productivity (gu), it is possible to re-write equation (1) as follows:
During dynamic calibration equation (3) is solved for gM, the capital productivity 
growth rate. This is then fixed during the other experiments, and GDP growth rate gr
strictly defined steady state. This means that not all the variables (Y,, L, and K,) grow at 
the same rate, as shown in Table 7-8. In fact, by exogenously setting both labour force 
and productivity growth rates independently, a basic restriction for such a steady state is 
deliberately not respected. An alternative would be to choose the labour force growth rate 
and to calculate the labour productivity growth rate according to the relationship: 231
231 For the exact version see the following technical chapter.
239 With no shocks and by fixing the capital productivity growth rate thus calculated, the model will 
exactly recalculate the GDP growth chosen during the dynamic calibration.
240 See Ballard et al. (1985).
In a simplified version238, the two crucial equations used in the dynamic calibration of
Y, = Al,L, + Ak,K, ( 1)
and grows according to an exogenous rate g r :
( 2)
By imposing A,L (labour productivity) and A,K (capital productivity) equal to 1 in the
O+g y r  y,., = U+gu. r  o+g, y  +a+g *  y (3)
becomes an endogenous result of equation (2).23<) This procedure, which is standard in 
calibrating recursive dynamic CGE models240, does not guarantee that the model has a
2 1 9
0  + £,u.) = (l + S ,)/ 0  + £i.)
The BaU assumed growth rates are summarised in Table 7-8 together with the capital 
productivity values resulting from the dynamic calibration.
Table 7-H: Growth rates in the recursive dynamics
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 ____ L252____ 1325____ 1228____ 22421____ 242414
Labour force 0.005 0 005
France 
0 005 0.005 0005 0.010 0.010
Morocco
0010 0.010 0.010
Labour productivity 
Skilled workers 0 005 0 005 0.005 0 005 000 5 0010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0010
Unskilled workers 0015 0015 0015 0015 001 5 0020 0020 0020 0020 0.020
RGDP 0020 0025 0.027 0.025 0025 0 045 0.045 0 045 0 045 0 045
Depreciation 0.045 0.055 0.055 0055 0 0 5 5 0035 0 045 0 045 0.045 0 045
Capital productivity 0.016 0.037 0035 0.027 002 3 0.025 0030 0.031 0.035 0.032
The labour force rate is assumed to be uniform across skills and equal to the national 
population growth rates241; labour productivity rates are differentiated by skill and by 
region; and real GDP growth rates are simple trend extrapolations of past growth rates. 
The table also shows the assumed region-specific capital stock depreciation rates. In 
addition to the data shown here, the assumptions on government and foreign savings also 
influence the dynamic behaviour of the model. For simplicity, and consistent with long 
run equilibrium, it has been assumed that French and Moroccan governments will have a 
balanced budget by the year 2004, and that foreign savings are fixed to the initial values 
shown in the SAM for 1990.242
Trade liberalisation policies can have multiple effects on growth performance. Firstly, 
they can improve allocative efficiency by affecting relative prices and can make 
investment goods cheaper. Secondly, as pointed out in an extensive literature, more 
liberal trade can have positive effects in terms of increased technical efficiency or 
productivity. The best-known attempts to link outward orientation and productivity are 
based on ‘X-efficiency’, economies of scale, capacity utilisation, increased competition.
241 These are taken from World Bank international statistics.
242 These particular assumptions on government and foreign savings might seem a bit restrictive in a 
growth model. In fact, liberalisation is usually accompanied with increased foreign capital inflows. Their 
inclusion would probably generate larger growth gains, but the purpose of the following simulations is to 
measure the isolated effect on growth of liberalisation policies alone. See text below and footnote 244.
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and technological catch-up.24 43 Finally, these policies might trigger virtuous circles by 
attracting more foreign capital.244 In the EMMA model, given the closure rules chosen 
for its recursive dynamics mode (in particular setting aggregate investment equal to 
aggregate savings), and given the exogeneity o f productivity changes, only the first effect 
is properly taken into account.245 In practice, as already demonstrated in the comparative 
statics section, by changing relative prices, Mediterranean economic integration induces a 
more efficient allocation of resources and expands incomes. More savings become 
available and they can be devoted to larger investment. This might be magnified if the 
relative price of investment goods has been reduced.
It could also be possible to exogenously change productivity growth rates. For 
example, to mimic endogenous growth effects, labour productivity can be exogenously 
increased during a trade liberalisation experiment. This has been done for a few 
simulations, although not reported here. As expected, the main effect is to enhance 
growth and incomes. This effectively shows that the results reported in the main text, i.e. 
with no productivity effects, should be considered as a sort of lower bound.
In fact, in the next section the growth effects of the usual three policy scenarios will 
be examined by focusing mainly on the changes in real investment and its price.
7.5.2 Rationale for the experiments and simulations description
Greenaway and Morrissey , and Kreuger246 identify three core areas of disagreement 
over policy reform. First, the magnitude of change required is unknown; second, it is 
difficult to specify the range of reforms necessary and in what order they should be 
implemented; third, there is little agreement on the appropriate speed of reform. These 
issues are also linked to administrative capacity and credibility. This section contrasts 
two different ways of implementing the trade liberalisation reforms described above, in 
order to try to shed some light on the different consequences that the speed and
242 Among the various papers on trade and growth explicitly referring to Morocco are those by M.
Haddad (1991) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout ( 1996).
244 See, for Morocco, Haddad and Harrison (1992).
245 In this sense, the model presented here is not a model o f endogenous growth.
244 See Greenaway and Morrissey (1993) and Kreuger (1992) page 253.
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magnitude of policy change can have on GDP growth and structural adjustment, thus 
achieving the second main objective of this chapter, as stated in the introduction.
In essence, each of the three alternative policy scenarios of free trade area formation, 
custom union creation and full free trade will be implemented in two variants. The first 
consists of gradual proportional across the board reduction of the initial tariffs (and 
subsidies). The second variant implements an initial change to uniform tariffs and then, in 
subsequent periods, their gradual reduction. The uniform tariff and subsidy chosen for all 
sectors are equivalent to the trade weighted average of the initial rates247.
Table 7-9 details the changes in the policy parameters performed in the six 
simulations. It is possible to see that the overall shock (from 1990 to 2004) of policies 1 
to 3 is equivalent to the comparative statics experiments. Policies 4 to 6, although they 
reach the same final year's value248 of the other three, are implemented differently. In the 
first round (1992) tariffs are set equal for all sectors to the shown values and then reduced 
accordingly. An exactly equivalent procedure has been followed for export subsidies.
The motivation for attempting these particular simulations stems from an 
examination of the proposals the Moroccan government presented to the European 
Community and to the WTO249. Among the various issues discussed in those documents 
are the reciprocity of the trade reforms and the sequencing of liberalisation across sectors. 
Two major concerns of the Moroccan side are the effects of a freer access to the 
European markets for its agricultural goods and the shock to the domestic manufacturing 
industries once these sectors are open to trade. Without explicitly attempting 
liberalisation of particular sectors before others, the policy experiments essentially 
consist of a special kind of sectoral sequencing in the trade reform and show which are 
the expected aggregate effects.
247 These uniform rates can be read on the last row (labelled “economy-wide”) of Table 7-3. Interestingly, 
an anempt to calculate the revenue neutral tariff (subsidy) rate yielded a result very close to the average 
one. In other words, implementing the uniform average tariff has almost no consequences for government 
revenues. In contrast such a policy should be less liable to rent seeking, have much lower administrative 
costs and, as shown below, it improves allocative efficiency.
241 The only exception is for the final year’s tariff rates of policies 2 and 4: in fact in the former Moroccan 
tariffs on ROW imports are equal to the French tariffs but are not uniform across sector as in policy 4.
249 See Royaume du Maroc. Ministèro de I’Agriculture (1994), and Royaume du Maroc (1994).
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Table 7-9 Dynamic trade policy simulations: reduction coefficients and uniform rales values
------------------------------- L222------------- 1282_________1225________ 1228________ 2221________ 2224
T anfi of: on imports from_____________________________________Type of policy_____________________________________
I FT A
Morocco
Morocco
France 
France__
France
Row
Morocco 
Row__
1.00 
1 00
1 00 
1JM)
090  
1 00
090
1.00
0.75
LOO
0.75
LOO
0 50
1.00
0 50
1.00
025 
1 00
025
LOO
0 00
1.00
000
1.00
2 CUSTOM
Morocco France 1.00 090 075 0 50 025 000
Morocco Row 1.00 0.75 0 5 0 025 =French tariff =French tariff
France Morocco 1.00 090 0 75 0 50 025 0.00
France Row IJX) L00 1.00 LOO LOO LOO
3. FREE
Morocco All 1.00 090 0.75 0.50 0.25 000
France__ All 100 _ 0.90 0 75 0.50 _________025____________0 Æ
4. FTA uniform
Morocco France 1.00 1 x 0.33 0 75 x 0 33 0 5 xO.33 0 25 x 0 3 3 0 0 0
Morocco Row 1.00 1.00 1.00 LOO LOO 1.00
France Morocco 1.00 1 xO 10 0.75 x 0.10 0 5 xO 10 0 25 x 0.10 000
France Row 1.00 1.00 100 TOO 1.20 ______ L2Q
5 CUSTOM uniform
Morocco France 1.00 1 xO 10 0 75 xO 10 0 .5x0 .10 0.25 x 0.10 000
Morocco Row 1.00 1 x 0.33 0 75 x 0.33 0 .5x0 .33 0 25 x 0 33 1 x 0 05
France Morocco 1.00 1 xO 10 0.75 xO 10 0.5 xO.10 0 .25x0.10 000
France Row 1.00 LOO 1.00 LOO _________ LOO_____ LOO
6. FREE uniform
Morocco All 1.00 1 xO 10 0 7 5 x 0 .1 0 0 5 xO.IO 0 2 5 x 0  10 000
France Morocco 1.00 1 xO 10 0.75 xO 10 0 5 0 x 0  10 0.25 x 0.10 000
France Row 1 00 1 x 0 05 0.75 x 0.05 0 50 x 0 05 0.25 x 0 05 000
The difficulty of establishing a clear theoretical result provides further motivation for 
carrying out a numerical simulation of these two different tariff reduction procedures. 
Greenaway and Morrissey250 argue that the general principle guiding tariff liberalisation 
is to reduce all tariffs proportionally. Economic theory is less clear about the welfare 
effects of differential tariff reductions although, if goods are net substitutes, it is argued to 
be generally beneficial to reduce the highest tariffs and increase the lowest tariffs. This 
last result is discussed in Falvey and Kim (1992), where they state that the adjustment in 
individual tariffs will be welfare improving in the following cases: (i) a cut in the highest 
ad valorem tariff of a good that is a net substitute for all other goods; (ii) an increase in 
the lowest ad valorem tariff, including any zero tariffs, of a good that is a net substitute
250 See Greenaway and Morrissey (1993) page 259.
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for all other goods; (in) a reduction (increase) in the tariff of a good that has a higher 
(lower) tariff than its net substitutes, and a lower (higher) tariff than its net complements,.
Falvey and Kim assert that results (i) and (ii) form the basis for the popular 
"concertina"' approach to trade liberalisation, but they warn that little concern appears to 
be expressed over determining whether the net-substitutes requirement is satisfied.251 
Clearly the uniform procedure described in Table 7-9 for policies 4 to 6 can be 
considered as an approximation to the "concertina" approach just described.
Further complications in the empirical study of implementing a uniform tariff 
structure arise in presence of additional distortionary policy measures (indirect taxes and 
export subsidies in the Moroccan-French case). Mitra (1986) and Dahl. Devarajan and 
van Wijnbergen (1986) study, with static CGE models, the conditions for an “optimal”252 
tariff structure in a second best framework for India and Cameroon respectively. One 
interesting result253 is the sensitivity of the “optimal” tariff structure to the degree of 
policy distortion assumed to remain. Essentially when indirect taxes are set to zero the 
resulting “optimal” tariffs are highly uniform254, however when they move into second 
best world (where production taxes are present) then tariff rates vary widely across 
sectors.
These considerations suggested testing a further variant of policies 4 to 6 of Table 7- 
9, namely to set, by the year 1992 onwards, uniform indirect taxes for all sectors equal to 
the average rate calculated from the base SAM. It should be noted that these uniform 
production tax rates are not very high; they are equal to 6.6% and 7.0% for France and 
Morocco, respectively. In fact, this new version does not produce qualitatively different 
results, rather it enhances the effects of the previous version (with no uniform indirect 
taxes). As expected, the uniform tariffs-and-indirect-taxes variant, through greater 
efficiency gains, registers higher growth rates than the tariffs-only variant. For brevity.
251 See Falvey and Kim (1992) pages 914. On the theory of piecemeal tariff reform see Lopez and 
Panagariya (1992) and other references therein.
252 The optimality criterion is represented by the maximisation of the utility of the representative 
consumer.
255 In Dahl. Devarajan and van Wijnbergen (1986).
254 See table 2 in Dahl, Devarajan and van Wijnbergen (1986).
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and because this case is closer to the actual proposed policy reforms, only the uniform 
tariffs-and-indirect-taxes version results have been reported below.255
A final observation is necessary before proceeding to the description of the simulation 
results. The long-term growth implications of alternative trade strategies are of clear 
interest to policy makers, but as already stated in the previous section, the model used 
here will only partially capture policy effects on growth. It remains heavily dependent 
about the assumptions made on the exogenous variables (factor growth, productivity, 
depreciation, and expectations). One way of testing the robustness of the following 
results would be to undertake extensive sensitivity analysis on crucial parameters and, 
maybe also, to attempt different modelling approaches. This is left to future research and 
is therefore not carried out here.
7.5.3 Experiments results
Table 7-10 below reproduces the main results of the dynamic simulations. For each 
policy (proportional tariff reduction for Free Trade /Irea (FTA), CUSTOM union, FREE 
trade and uniform tariffs-and-indirect-taxes reduction version) real GDP growth rates, 
real investment, investment and GDP prices are presented as percentage differences with 
respect to the base year. It should be noticed that all the effects reported here are 
permanent.
In order to highlight the differences between the policies the results in Table 7-10 are 
reproduced graphically in Figure 7-1 to Figure 7-10 in the annex at page 232.
Not surprisingly, even in these dynamic simulations Morocco registers larger effects 
than France in terms of all the variables considered. More open trade regimes seem to 
boost growth in the southern Mediterranean country by up to almost 4% (in the final 
year) of the base run growth rate in the proportional free trade experiment, and by more 
than 5% in the uniform version of the same policy. Clearly, the removal of the 
distortionary effect of tariff dispersion in the uniform policies helps to reach higher 
growth levels. In terms of GDP growth, the relative small difference between the custom 
union and full free trade policy options is partially confirmed.
255 The main drawback of this version is that the terminal values (in the year 2004) for policies 1 to 3 and
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Table -10 Dynamic simulations: main results (% differences from base run)
FRANCE --MQRQÇ
___IW2 I W 1998 2001 2004 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Real tiP P
Base ryn__ ___ iS Q _ ____ 2 J 0 _ 270 2 50 250 4 50 4 50 4 50 4 50 4 50
FT A 000 000 001 001 001 -0 20 -0 22 -021 0 23 0 69
CUSTOM 004 -0 08 -0 26 -0 47 -051 -0 46 0 27 1 02 3 05 1 89
FREE 0 20 -0 08 -0 42 -0 95 -1 07 -0 16 0 30 1 47 3 18 4 05
uFTA 1 19 0 93 0 34 -0 69 -1 04 5 18 240 0 % 1 08 1 37
uCUSTOM 241 1 56 0 03 -1 64 -1 97 2 58 241 1 91 340 3 85
uFREE 4 59 291 0 13 -2 70 -3 20 277 266 2 63 4 13 504
Reni ImeMment
Base run 247.972 291.4% 300.752 326.757___355.961 6.587 7.924 8.675 9.477 10.638
FT A 000 000 000 001 001 0 12 040 0 84 1 19 1 28
CUSTOM -0 12 -033 -0 57 -0 64 -0 62 1 09 2 42 407 3 58 4 07
FREE -0 34 -0 98 -1 72 -1 74 -1 47 060 201 441 6 39 721
uFTA 0 29 0 57 -0 55 -0 97 -1 13 1 75 2 69 2 85 3 16 3 20
uCUSTOM 1 31 0 85 •1 21 -1 85 -1 90 0 15 2 75 5 47 7 72 6 27
t i l  R H 3 11 1 58 -201 -3 12 -2 82 0 03 325 6 11 855 947
Investment
Base run
Price
0 9998 1.0021 1 0049 1 0063 1 0077 1 0057 1 0085 1 0222 1 0410 1.0538
FT A 000 001 003 005 006 -021 -0 77 -1 88 -3 00 -3 37
CUSTOM -0.13 -0 38 -071 -0 88 -0 95 -2 34 -5 06 -7 95 -7 34 -7 63
FREE -0 53 -1 79 -3 77 -5 29 -5 85 -1 16 -3 79 -7 71 -10 58 -11 49
uFTA 0 48 096 086 0 74 0 67 -1 39 -3 01 -4 09 -5 23 -5 59
uCUSTOM 091 1 12 0 35 -0 23 -0 44 -0 54 -4 42 -8 97 -12 30 -9 95
uFREE 1 49 074 -2 21 -4 52 -5 38 -0 28 -5 15 -9 70 -1300 -1401
U P P  Price
Base run 1 0308 1.1039 1 1805 1.2538 1.3255 1 0485 1.1275 1 2293 1.3513 1 4724
FT A 001 0 02 0 05 0 08 0 10 0 03 003 -0.12 -0 42 -0 58
CUSTOM -0 19 -0 56 -1 00 -1 24 -1 31 -021 -0 46 -0 65 -1 02 -1 35
FREE -0 59 -1 93 -3 88 -5 25 -5 75 -0 16 -0 51 -091 -1 19 -1 56
uFTA 0 02 -0 39 -0 74 -1 01 -115 -1 02 -2 17 -2 25 -2 52 -266
uCUSTOM 0 55 -0 30 -1 57 -2 43 -273 -073 -242 -2 85 -3 14 -3 88
uFREE 1 23 -0 58 -4 00 -6 46 -7 37 -0 86 -3 02 -3 48 -3 75 -4 08
Note: "u. . . ’' policy simulations reproduced here are those with uniform indirect taxes.
For France the experiments show a reduction (up to -3% in the worst case) of GDP 
growth rate to be correlated with more liberal trade. In order to explain this reduction it is 
necessary to consider the other variables of Table 7-10.
As stated at the outset of this section the growth of capital stock, through investment, 
is the main endogenous mechanism influencing real GDP growth performance. The 
crucial equation is the investment-saving closure equation reproduced below:
P1 I WT = Sll+Sg + PSA,h S f + Ym:pr -  £  PA,X,ASnxK
I
the left hand side measures current value for aggregate investment as the product of real 
investment (ITOT) and its price index; this value must be equal to the current value of
4 to 6 will not be exactly equal.
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aggregate savings: the sum of household, government and foreign savings. In the 
dynamic simulation real government savings starting at positive values for both France 
and Morocco go to zero by the year 2004. and foreign savings are fixed in real terms to 
the base year value'56, thus households' real savings, its price256 57 *, government's savings 
price25“ and the investment price are the endogenous variables determining capital 
accumulation and growth.
From the above equation, it is expected that, with the same level of current savings, a 
reduction in investment prices would produce increased real investment. Indeed in the 
case of Morocco investment grows (quite dramatically for policy 6 uFREE) and becomes 
also cheaper. A full analysis of the investment price reduction would be based on the 
following decomposition:
dP ' = a d dPd + a ,  ^ „ ( l  + r )  + a .  Pm d x
the variation in the price of investment depends on changes of the domestic price of 
investment ( Pd ), the import price ( Pm ) and the tariff rate ( r  ). Clearly the policy 
change directly affects the tariff, but domestic and imports prices for Morocco and France 
are also expected to change as a result of the policy shock256 and these changes affect the 
price of investment.
In the case of France though, reduced investment prices do not occur alongside 
increased real investment. This is explained by noting the reduction in the price of GDP 
(the government savings price) which more than offsets the investment price contraction. 
The GDP price decreases due to the liberalisation process and lowers government savings 
(in current values). This reduction is only partially compensated by the increase in 
households’ savings (in current value). Furthermore, given the balanced budget closure 
for the government account, tariff revenues losses, occurring during the trade 
liberalisation, are compensated by increased households’ direct taxes. This further exerts 
downward pressure on households' disposable incomes and private savings.
256 Given that the price of foreign savings is the numeraire of the model and it is fixed at 1, it is equivalent 
to define foreign savings either in real or current terms.
257 Equal to the consumer price index; see comments in the technical specification of the model.
251 This is equal to the price of GDP (i.e. equivalent to the GDP deflator).
2”  Import prices from the ROW region are fixed (small country assumption).
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Another interesting feature of these experiments is represented by the marked 
difference between the uniform and proportional policy results. This difference is 
remarkable not only for the final year but also in all the intermediate years. This is easily 
explained by the reallocation that uniform policies require in the first round. This benefits 
Morocco but also France. In fact for all the simulations, French real GDP is slightly 
lower than in the base run, and yet, because of the higher growth rates in the early period, 
GDP is higher with uniform rather than proportional policies.
A sound policy recommendation would be to implement uniform tariffs at an early 
stage and then reduce them. This seems to confirm the orthodoxy of the trade reforms of 
the World Bank structural adjustment programs: more uniform tariffs across sectors is 
seen as a means of simplifying the system, reducing the spread of effective protection 
rates, resources misallocation and the opportunities for rent seeking activities.260 The first 
best policy would probably be to set policy parameters to their long run optimal levels as 
soon as possible. In fact if factor and commodity prices adjust instantaneously between 
activities, the appropriate speed of liberalisation would be a trivial issue.261 In practice 
any change in policy is likely to generate adjustment costs both in terms of output 
foregone while resources are “idle” in the process of moving between sectors and in the 
resources actually absorbed in this movement. Adjustment costs will depend on the 
extent of inter and intra industry adjustment. Thus an indirect measure of adjustment 
costs can be seen in the factor adjustment indices defined above (see page 211).
Table 7-11 (reproduced graphically in Figure 7-9 and Figure 7-10) displays two 
different types of normalised ratios. The first, the ratio of labour adjustment indices to 
real GDP growth rates, is calculated as follows:
''' gy.,
This ratio is shown in the base run rows. // is a normalisation of the labour adjustment 
index with respect to GDP growth rate, it gives an indication of the share o f total labour 
that moves inter-sectorally per unity of GDP growth rate. For instance in France for the
260 See Greenaway and Milner (1993) page 173.
261 See Falvey and Kim (1992) pages 919.
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first year of the simulation (1992), for each percentage point in GDP growth rate, 0.54 
per cent of total labour moves to new sectors.
The second index is calculated as an elasticity and is equal to the first index computed 
for an experiment and divided by the base run one:
/ 2.1 /
, experim ent, t 
1 ,h a se -ru n ,t
The resulting values are shown in the rows for each simulation. If a simulation 
registers a value equal to 1, it means that both the GDP growth rate and the adjustment 
index are increased (or decreased) in the same proportion with respect to the base run.262
Table ~-l 1: Labour Adjustment index as a ratio o f real GDP growth
_______ 1992 ____1995 1991L _ 2001 2004
______________________________________ France
/< Base Run 0.54 0.75 0.67 0.69 0 70
1, F T  A 1.00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1.00
1; C T S T O M 098 0.99 098 0.99 1 00
/: FREE 0.95 0 9 6 0 90 093 099
/.- u F T A 1 46 1 16 098 0.99 1 00
/.- u C T S T O M 1 60 1.15 091 095 1 00
/.• u F R E E 1 80 1.15 0 79 086 0.97
Morocco
/, Base Run 0.87 1 28 0.99 0.70 0.70
h F T  A 0 99 0 9 8 095 094 0 9 7
h C T S T O M 094 0 9 4 0 89 0 95 097
h F R E E 098 0.96 0 92 095 095
1, u F T A 1.08 1.04 0.95 093 0.96
h u C T S T O M 114 1.01 0 88 0 89 1 05
h uF R E E 1.20 1.00 0 9 0 0.92 093
Clearly in this type of CGE model, higher GDP values (and higher growth rates) are a 
direct consequence of increased allocative efficiency Therefore many of the values in 
Table 7-11 are expected to be close to 1. Yet, a closer inspection of these tables reveals 
another interesting feature. In the early rounds (1992 and 1995) there is a tendency for the 
uniform policies to be costlier, in terms of labour adjustment, then their proportional 
counterparts. Uniformity produces higher growth with non-linearly augmenting 
adjustment costs. This is partially reversed in the second half of the period, especially for 
Morocco.
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Although further investigation is necessary to confirm the validity and robustness of 
these measurements, they give a preliminary indication of the likely balance between 
increased growth and adjustment associated with different types of policy. Being 
credibility a crucial success factor for trade policy reforms, policy makers should be 
cautious not to being forced to reverse a blunt pro-growth policy due the too large 
resources reallocation involved.
7.6 Conclusion
As stated in the introduction this chapter had two primary objectives: to estimate the 
effects of trade policy reforms currently planned for the Mediterranean area and to extend 
the discussion of the sequencing issue of trade reform by looking at the problem of the 
order of liberalisation of production sectors.
The first objective has been met by constructing a detailed two-country CGE model 
and using it to appraise the effects of trade liberalisation in three main scenarios: a 
custom union, a free trade area and a benchmark case of full liberalisation. The evidence 
obtained from the model results indicates that removing trade barriers may produce 
considerable gains. Their magnitude is proportional to the initial level of protection, trade 
dependency and size of the economy involved. Extensive discussions of the effects of 
different closure rules and trade elasticity on aggregate results as well as a detailed 
examination of sectoral adjustments complete the analysis of the first part.
To study the effect of differential liberalisation of the current account a dynamic 
version of the two-country CGE model has been constructed. This was then used to 
compare the effects on growth and adjustment costs of different sequencing scenarios. 
The results confirm that increased growth shown by policies implementing more 
extensive liberalisation (the uniform policy scenarios) is derived from the stronger 
allocative efficiency they induce, but that it is also accompanied by higher adjustment 
costs. An elasticity-type of index has been devised as a summary measure of the trade- 26
262 This measure is similar to the emission elasticity shown in the Trade and Environment chapter.
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7.7 Annex: Dynamic simulation figures
Figure 7-l: % Differences in GDP growth rates - France
Figure 7-2: % Differences in Real Investment - France
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Figure '-3: % Differences in Investment Price - France
2 3 3
Figure "O'. % Differences in G DP growth rates - Morocco
2 3 4
Figure ~-7: %  Differences in Investment Price - Morocco
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F m ire ~-9:Labour adjustment elasticity index (b) - France
Fieure ~-10: Labour adjustment elasticity index (F) - Morocco
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8 Appendix: The EMMA model specification
8.1 Introduction
This appendix is organised in a similar manner of the previous technical chapter 
(chapter 6). To avoid repetitions, it describes in details only those equations, which are 
specific to the EMMA model, and it refers to chapter 6 for those equations, which are the 
same in the EMMA and Environment and Trade models.
An overview and main characteristics of the EMMA model have been already 
presented in the previous chapter. Although EMMA has been explicitly constructed for 
this thesis, it has some relationships with an earlier global model.263 There are though 
significant differences between the earlier model and EMMA. The earlier model is a 
global model whereas EMMA is a multi-country model and does not include the ‘world’, 
as an integrated, endogenous block. Thus the main changes in adapting the former model 
have been in the trade block and in the closures. A high degree of spatial disaggregation 
for import sources and export destinations, absent in the global model, is included in 
EMMA.
The detail for the labour markets has been improved and their closures have been 
modified. In EMMA two alternatives are explored: a flat labour supply curve, implying 
excess supply and infinite elasticity, and a vertical labour supply, implying full 
employment and zero elasticity of supply. A policy of minimum wages, relevant for both 
France and Morocco, has been implemented and tested in the model, although the results 
are not reported here and will form part of future research projects. In essence, it has 
been assumed that for a particular skill (or sector) a fixed real (or nominal) minimum 
wage was imposed. If an experiment (for example trade liberalisation) has a deflationary 
effect on wages, the consequences for the protected skill are as follows: in France, it 265
265 In particular EMMA replicates the standard parts (CES production functions, CET export supply and 
Artnington CES import demand functions) of any multi-sectoral general equilibrium model, for which no 
original approach is claimed here. The reference global model was developed primarily by D. Van der 
Mensbrugghe and D Roland-Holst while I was consultant at the OECD.
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simply creates unemployment'64, whereas in Morocco, people losing their job in the 
protected market move to the informal economy thus depressing the informal wage.
In EMMA the production structure includes energy as a separate production factor. 
This is for two reasons. First, it renders EMMA’s results more comparable with those of 
the previous model; secondly, although this might not be relevant in the French - 
Moroccan case, many trade interactions between the southern and northern shores of the 
Mediterranean occurs in the energy sector.265
Finally the recursive dynamics structure of the Moroccan trade and environment 
model, used in the previous chapters, has been adapted to the current two-country model 
transforming EMMA from a static to a dynamic model and allowing the analysis of 
policy sequencing.
8.2 Dimension, variables and parameters of EMMA
The remainder of this section introduces the dimensions of the EMMA model and 
provides a full list of the model variable and parameters. There are four main dimensions; 
sectors, labour skills, regions, and time. Some of these broad dimensions are split into 
sub-dimensions (or subsets to use the GAMS terminology).
Sectors
The base data set is constructed around a 24-sector database, derived from the 
French-Moroccan SAM presented previously. The sectors are defined in Table 8-1. The 
usual indices are shown under each table title. In the case of multiple indices, they are 
simply synonyms (or aliases) for each other. Table 8-2 provides the definition of the 
regions. Table 8-3 defines the labour skill dimension. Table 8-4 defines the time 
dimension. 2645
264 Unemployment benefits can be easily included in the model, thus introducing a new policy instrument. 
These can then be distributed back to households or, as in the new French employment program policies, 
distributed to production sectors through indirect tax reduction.
265 In fact I started working on the model before completing the construction of the France-Morocco SAM 
but having in mind the crucial European imports of oil from Mediterranean developing countries.
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Table 8-1 : Sectoral Definition of EMMA
( i j )
1. F ood C rops 13. Quarry ing m in ing
2. E state C rops 14. M etal industries
3. O ther P rim ary 15. M etal products
4.. Energy 16. M otors and  equ ipm en t
5. M illing 17. V ehicles and o th e r  transportation equipm ent
6. Food p rocessing 18. Electrical eq u ip m en t & appliances
7. B everages and tobacco 19. C hem icals
8. T ex tiles 20. Rubber and  p la stic  products
9. A pparel 21. O ther m anufactu ring
10. L eather products 22. Transport and  com m unication
I I . W ood products 23. Banking and  insurance
12. P aper 24. O ther Services
Table 8-2: Regional Definition of EMMA
(r.r)
1. F rance 3. Rest o f  E urope
2. M orocco  4. Rest o f  the W orld
Table 8-3: Labour Skills in EMMA
W
1. U nskilled labour
2. Skilled labour
3. S alaried  labour
4. O ther labour (independen t w orkers, em p loyers)
Table 8-4: Time Definition of EMMA
(I>
0. 1990
1. 1992
2. 1998
3. 1995
4. 2001
5. 2004
The following indices are also used in the equations and in the model definition:
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k This index represents the consumer goods. Consumer goods are essentially 
identical to producer goods except for the energy good. (Under the current 
definition of sectors, there is only one energy good) 
e This index represents the energy good. In the current version there is only one 
energy good, but in future versions it could index the different types of 
energy.
v This index represents the capital vintage. It has two dimensions which take 
either the value Old, or the value New.
The variables and parameters definitions follow.
Variables 
Factor demands
LAJ Sectoral aggregate labour demand
LgJ Government sectoral aggregate labour demand
Lr Sectoral demand for labour skill /
KvJ Capital demand by vintage
Kgd Government capital demand
X* Capital- output ratio
Composite Factor demands
Qki l Capital, labour and energy aggregate in production (top nest)
Capital and energy aggregate in production (2nd nest) 
Demand for the energy bundle (by vintage)
Factor supplies
Pop
K
Population 
Capital stock 
Labour supply 
Growth rate of investment
Volumes
C„
C„
Consumer spending on non-energy commodities 
Consumer spending on energy 
Government spending on goods and services 
Investment demand of aggregate energy 
Government demand of aggregate energy 
Intermediate demand (at the Armington Level) 
Energy demand (by fuel e)
Consumer spending (at Armington level)
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X*' Government demand (at Armington level)
X" Investment demand (at Armington level)
X ""H K Stocks change (at the Armington level)
XA Aggregate Armington demand
XT' Bilateral trade flow matrix (imports of country r from country r')
X11 Domestic demand (of domestic production)
.V*' Domestic demand for aggregate imports
Real Macro Variables
XPv Aggregate vintage output
y R ( i l ) P Real GDP
j ç T o tG Government total expenditures
G™ Government real transfers (to households)
j T Ì Ì T Total Investment
j S K X ’K Total Stock change
Nominal variables
Ss Households savings
s , Government savings
Sf Foreign savings
Ÿ Supernumerary income
r 1 Disposable income
y D E P R Depreciation allowance
Y Total factorial income
y /N D T A X Indirect taxes revenues
y T A R I F Tariff revenues
y t iS U B S Export subsidies expenditure
h ,ax Households direct taxes
Prices
P Consumer price (on non-energy commodities)
p h X Consumer price (on energy)
P :l Investment price (on energy)
P x; Government price (on energy)
p e r Production price (on energy)
P Price index of aggregate investment
p S T x r  K Price index of aggregate stock change
p W F Price of foreign savings
■ oop GDP price index
p ’ Government total expenditure price index
p c . Government goods expenditure price index
p r , Consumer Price Index
PA Armington price
PXv Unit cost by vintage
PX Output price excluding indirect taxes
PP Output price including indirect taxes
pica Aggregate (CES dual) price of the Q * h l  bundle
r 1 Sectoral price of aggregate labour
241
w*
I d  S e w
x*
R4 
R* 
PET 
PM 
P*
P°
Government sectoral price of aggregate labour
Price of the Q '^ bundle
Vintage specific sectoral rental rate of capital
Government rental rate of capital
Economy-wide rental rate of capital
Relative sectoral rental rate on old capital
Border price for imports of country r from country r’
Import price (including taxes and subsidies) of aggregate imports 
Export price (including taxes and subsidies) of aggregate exports 
Domestic sales price of domestic production
Parameters
Production coefficients 
a Input-output coefficients
d  Share parameter for Capital (in the disaggregation of Q^h bundle)
d 1 ' Share parameter for Ç r‘ in aggregate output
d '  Share parameter for the Ç; bundle (in the disaggregation of the ÇpEL
bundle)
d s Share parameter for skill (in the disaggregation of aggregate labour)
d  Share parameter for aggregate labour (in the disaggregation of the ÇT L
bundle;
d  Share parameter for the Energy bundle (in the disaggregation of bundle)
d 1’ Share parameter for specific fuel in aggregate energy demand
d  Inter labour elasticity of substitution (in labour demand)
d h Elasticity of substitution between capital and aggregate energy
d "  Elasticity of substitution between capital-energy bundle and aggregate labour
d ' ‘ Inter energy elasticity of substitution (in production)
AK Capital efficiency factor for demand
A! Labour efficiency factor in labour demand
(Ou Sectoral wage premium matrix
Consumption
p  ELES parameter (marginal propensity)
8 ELES parameter (subsistence minima)
d ( Inter energy elasticity substitution (in consumption)
ai Consumption mapping matrix
d 1 Energy share in consumption
Government
aggregate 
aggregate 
aggregate
d* Share parameter for goods expenditure (in the disaggregation of
government expenditure .v"*')
d 'K Share parameter for capital payments (in the disaggregation of
government expenditure X1"*')
d '1 Share parameter for labour payments (in the disaggregation of
government expenditure Xr*°)
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f f
<s*
G E
Elasticity of substitution between different ty pes of expenditures in aggregate 
government spending
Inter energy elasticity of substitution (in government expenditure)
Share parameter for aggregate energy government consumption (in the 
disaggregation of C„)
Share parameter for specific fuels Investment goods (in the disaggregation of 
£*)
Investment and stocks change
d '  Inter energy elasticity of substitution (in investment)
d  Share parameter for non-energy Investment goods (in the disaggregation of¡"h)
</' Share parameter for aggregate energy Investment goods (in the
disaggregation of !"")
a / 1 Share parameter for specific fuels Investment goods (in the disaggregation of
E1)
aSTIK K Share parameter for Stocks change (in the disaggregation of f 'r,H K)
Trade
Tariff rates (region specific) 
t f ' Export subsidy rates (region specific)
oT Share parameter for aggregate imports (Armington Is' nest)
d 1 Share parameter for domestic demand (Armington 1” nest)
a ‘ Share parameter for aggregate exports (CET 151 nest)
a,J Share parameter for aggregate domestic sales (CET Is' nest)
<t>,rr Share parameter in the decomposition of aggregate imports (Armington 2nd
nest)
& ''  Share parameter in the decomposition of aggregate exports (CET 2nd nest)
c f CES Armington elasticity of substitution (between imports and domestic
production)
A" CES Armington elasticity of substitution (between imports from different
regions)
o' CET elasticity of substitution (between exports and domestic sales)
f f  CET elasticity of substitution (between exports from different regions)
Miscellaneous
A* Energy efficiency factor for
kEr Energy efficiency factor for
A*7 Energy efficiency factor for
j J i S T O C K Energy efficiency factor for
Energy efficiency factor for
s Depreciation coefficient
/ Indirect tax rate
consumption 
production 
investment 
stocks change 
government consumption
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8.3 Model blocks
8.3.1 Household Consumption
Household expenditure behaviour is modelled in EMMA in exactly the same way as 
in the Environment and Trade model. The only two differences of the EMMA 
specification consist of the absence of an index for the household types (EMMA has only 
one representative consumer), and of the introduction of an energy efficiency 
parameter.266 The basket of consumer goods is somewhat different from the sectoral 
definition of producer commodities. All energy goods are grouped in one basket and 
disaggregated by fuel type at a second stage. In other words, at the first stage, consumers 
maximise over all non-energy goods and a single energy bundle.
Table 8-5: Household Consumption
(8-5.1) Y‘ = YJ -  Pop£  Pk 0k
k•
(8-5.2) Ck = e kPop + t ± Y '
* k
(8-5.3) Sh =YJ - ^ P ‘ Ck
The next stage maps household demand in terms of consumer commodities into 
demand for produced commodities, this is trivially determined for the non-energy 
commodities. Equation (8-6.1) in Table 8-6 determines the Armington consumer demand 
for non-energy commodities. The matrix ac is simply a matrix of 0’s and 1 ’s, mapping 
the non-energy goods indexed by k ' to the same non-energy good mapped by nf.
Each agent in the economy (producers, consumers, and other final demand accounts) has a demand for 
an energy bundle. The CES structure of energy demand, which includes the efficiency parameter, is the 
same for all agents, however, the share and substitution parameters are allowed to differ.
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T a b le  8 -6 : T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  C o n s u m p t i o n  in to  P r o d u c e d  G o o d s
(8-6.1) X&
a '
Equation (8-6.2) determines the demand for the fuel components of the energy 
aggregate. The formula includes an energy efficiency factor for consumption.
8.3.2 Consumer Prices
In this section consumer prices are determined starting from the most disaggregated 
level. Table 8-7 describes the (CES) prices of the consumer goods which are determined 
from the Armington prices. The following equations replicate the price equations o f the 
Environment and Trade model with the exception of the energy efficiency factor.
Table 8-7: Consumer Prices
(8-7.1)
(8-7.2) P Z - Y A J A *
k
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Equation (8-7.1) in Table 8-7 defines the CES dual price, PEc, for the energy bundle 
in consumption"6 . Equation (8-7.2) maps the Armington price to the consumer price for 
non-energy goods, where the index k' runs over the non-energy commodities. 
Equation (8-7.3) simply transfers the price of the energy bundle into the consumer price 
vector. Finally, Equation (8-7.4) defines the consumer price index.
8.3.3 Production
The production inputs choice in EMMA is modelled as in the Environment and Trade 
model, i.e. as a nested structure with different degrees of elasticity of substitution (CES) 
at the different levels. A graphical description of the production structure is given in 
Figure 7-1.
The main difference here is that the top level in the nest is a Leontief structure in non- 
energy intermediate inputs and an aggregate bundle designated by QKEL. The QKEL bundle 
is an aggregate of capital, labour, and an energy bundle, as before. Table 8-8 provides the 
top level demands for the non-energy intermediate inputs and the QKEL bundle.
Table 8-8: Top Level Production Nest
(8-8.1) X "  = I < V . , ^ v , v 
(8-8.2) Q™l = a Kf LXPvJt
X*p is intermediate demand (at the Armington level, i.e. before disaggregation into 
import demand and demand for domestically produced commodities). The index n f 
identifies elements pertaining to the set of non-energy commodities. In Equation (8-8.1) 
aggregate intermediate demand is determined directly (i.e. summing over vintage), since 
non-energy intermediate demand is not dependent on the vintage. The matrix a, is the 267
267 Note that in the current version the energy bundle includes only one commodity. Thus, its difference 
from the non-energy bundle consists only o f the energy efficiency factor. In future versions though, the 
energy consumption bundle could easily be decomposed in different type o f energy sources (see the trade- 
environment model of the previous chapter)
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matrix of input-output coefficients for non-energy intermediate inputs, and XPv 
represents aggregate sectoral output for each vintage. QKEL represents the capital, labour, 
energy bundle, and it is determined using a fixed coefficient function, with aKEL being the 
share parameter.
At the next stage in production, the QKEL bundle is split into aggregate labour demand 
on the one hand L4. and the ç /'E bundle on the other. This is done exactly in the same 
way of the Environment and Trade model (see relevant equations in chapter 6).
The next level of the CES nesting disaggregates the QKE bundle into the energy 
bundle on one side, and capital demand on the other side (see the relevant equations in 
chapter 6).
The last two bundles to decompose are: aggregate labour and the energy bundle. This 
is again done as in the Environment and Trade model (see the relevant equations in 
chapter 6268).
8.3.4 Production Prices
Given the Leontief specification for the top nest of the production structure, the only 
difference of the EMMA model with respect to the previous one is in the equation that 
defines the unit cost of production by capital vintage, PXvJV, In Equation (8-9.1), note that 
PXvJV is also a CES dual price for the special case when the substitution elasticity is 0.
Table 8-9: Unit Production Cost
(8-9.1) PXvJV = Z ^ P A ^ < LP r  
nf
261 The current version of EMMA uses a single energy nesting, i.e. the decomposition of the energy 
bundle into the fuel components requires only one CES function. The index e represents the fuel 
commodities in the sectoral disaggregation.
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8.3.5 Equilibrium in Factor Markets
Since there are no changes for the capital markets we refer to the relevant section in 
chapter 6 for the equations determining the equilibrium for capital demand and supply, 
and this section describes the determination of labour market equilibria.
There are as many labour markets as there are labour skills. Labour supply in the 
EMMA model is determined in one of two extreme versions: either excess supply is 
assumed (i.e. real wage is fixed, which is equivalent to imposing an infinite elasticity to 
the supply curve) or full employment (labour supply is fixed with zero elasticity).
Table 8-10: Equilibrium on the Labour Market
(8-10.1) W, = PCF,W0J 
(8-io.2) =
i
The two possible closures are alternatively determined by Equation (8-10.1) or 
Equation (8-10.2). The former simply sets the fixed real wage, and employment will be 
determined via demand. Equation (8-10.2), the case of fixed labour supply, is a market 
clearing condition and determines the equilibrium wage rate on the labour markets.
8.3.6 Determination of Vintage Output
The equations of this section determine the optimal allocation of production across 
vintages and exactly reproduce the equations of the same section of the technical 
specification of the Environment and Trade model. The optimal allocation is derived 
from the capital/output ratio. This depends on all the prices in the nested CES structure 
and since in EMMA the top nest presents zero elasticity of substitution, the only equation 
showing some difference is Equation (8-11.1) which calculates the optimal capital/output 
ratio.
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8.3.7 Income Distribution
EMMA has only one representative household which receives most of its income 
from value added. Other sources of income include depreciation allowance, and transfers 
from the government.269 Table 8-12 lists the equations determining household income.
(8-12.1)
(8- 12.2)
(8-12.3)
(8-12.4)
(8-12.5)
Table 8-12: Household Income and GDP Statistics
yD E P R  =  g  R  A K
y ^ w,
/ L /
y r D  _ y _ j j T A X  j y C P I  q TRA
vJIQOP
= 5 X o
p ,DP = Y ,+ r
Equation (8-12.1) defines the depreciation allowance on the total capital stock of the 
previous period.270 Y°EPR is the value of the depreciation allowance, 8  is the depreciation
249 Note that in the Environment and Trade model transfers and factor payments from and to the ROW 
were explicitly considered. Here their net value has been simply aggregated to the foreign saving value.
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rate (defined on the aggregate capital stock, but region specific), and R4 is the economy­
wide rental rate. Equation (8-12.2) defines total household income. It is the sum of 
payments to production factors (including payments by the government), less 
depreciation. Y is total household income. Equation (8-12.3) determines household 
disposable income, Y*. Y* is equal to aggregate income, less direct taxes, HTAX, plus 
transfers from government to households, GTRA. GTRA needs to be multiplied by a price in 
order to preserve the homogeneity of the model. The consumer price index, PCPI, was 
chosen as the appropriate deflator.
Equation (8-12.4) defines real GDP, xRGnP27> It is the sum of factor demand in 
efficiency units. Equation (8-12.5) defines the GDP deflator, pCDP,272 The GDP deflator 
is defined as the value of factor payments, divided by the sum of factor volumes.
Table 8-13 presents the government and investment closure rules. Equations (8-13.1) 
and (8-13.2) determine respectively the government’s tax revenues from the production 
tax and the import tax. Equation (8-13.3) calculates government’s expenditures for export 
subsidies. Note that in Equations (8-13.2) and (8-13.3) the regional indices are explicitly 
used. The tariff rates (export subsidies) are trading-partner specific, i.e. the tariff rate 
(export subsidies) is allowed to vary depending on the region of import. Also note that 
the “world” price of imports, is the trading partner’s export price. This implies that there 
is no single world price for a commodity. The aggregate world price faced by a country 
will be a weighted average of the export prices of its trading partners. Finally, also note 
that the variable M  represents the bilateral trade flow matrix for each commodity. Import 
volumes are read along a row, while export volumes are read down a column. 2701
270 There are two variables representing the aggregate capital stock, K and 1C, each representing a 
different unit o f account. K is in millions of 1990 USD and in the base year, represents the total value of 
the capital stock. K1 is also in millions of 1990 USD, but in the base year, it represents aggregate capital 
remuneration. The reason for using 1C is to be able to normalise the capital rental rate to the value I in the 
base year. A numerical example may clarify the difference. For example, in the US (in 1985), aggregate 
capital remuneration, as determined from the US national accounts, is $ 1,216 billion. The aggregate value 
of the capital stock is estimated to be $10,399 billion. Given the rental rate normalisation rule, the first 
number is used in the model as the base year value of the capital stock. If instead, the second number were 
used (or the true value were used), the imputed rental rate would be 0.117. In fact, it makes no difference, 
since it is only an indexing issue. However, it does make a difference when imputing the depreciation 
income, hence the use of K. (K is discussed again in the section on capital accumulation.)
271 It is assumed that there is no change in the efficiency of capital in the government sector, though there 
is efficiency improvement in the use of labour.
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Table 8-13: Government Receipts and Saving
(8-13.1) Y 'W D T A X  = T P p X  x p
(8-13.2) y ™ f = x  < r pE 'r M"r'
(8-13.3) y K S " B S  = Y i £ ' r P E ; , M ' '
r ‘
(8-13.4) s t  = P C lD P s g
(8-13.5) S  _ y j T A X  + y  I’yW O T A f +  y T A R l h l -  _ y  E S I  IB S  \  _  p ( ,  j ^ T o l C ,
The government closure rule is specified in Equation (8-13.4): government saving is 
fixed (in real terms). Government saving is simply the difference between government 
revenue and government expenditure and is determined by Equation (8-13.5). With 
exogenous government saving the household tax schedule is endogenous. Household 
taxes are determined by (inverting) Equation (8-13.5), i.e. HTAX is the equilibrating 
variable to achieve the fixed government balance.273
Table 8-14: Determination of Aggregate Investment (Exogenous Foreign Saving)
(8-14.1) P' I TOT =Sh+Sg + P *”  S, + r “ ™ -  £  PA,X,ASnx K
(8-14.2) S, = P*"* Sf
Table 8-14 includes the equation for the closure of the saving and investment account. 
Domestic investment is equal to domestic saving plus a fixed level of foreign saving. 27
272 All base year factor prices are equal to one, therefore, this implies that the denominator is evaluated in 
base year prices.
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Under this rule, foreign saving does not react to regional changes in relative rates of 
return. In this case, the value of investment. P1 x lTOT, is determined by Equation (8-14.1). 
Aggregate fixed investment (in value) is the sum of saving, plus depreciation, less 
expenditures on stock building. Saving includes household saving, 5*, government 
saving, Sg, and foreign saving, S/. Foreign saving is exogenous in each time period. 
Changes in stocks are represented by XASTOCK (at the Armington level). The investment 
deflator, P1, will be defined below. ITOT represents the volume of real investment. 
Equation (8-14.2) defines the value of foreign saving using p SAU as a price index.
8.3.8 Investment and Stock Building
This section determines investment and stock building demand for goods and 
services. As described above, aggregate investment is determined by total savings. The 
volume of investment is disaggregated into final demand for goods and services using a 
fixed coefficient Leontief function. Energy is further disaggregated using the same nested 
structure as that used in production and consumption. Table 8-15 presents the equations 
for investment final demand for goods and services.
Table 8-15: Final Demand for Investment Intermediate Inputs
(8-15.1) ii X
) “4
(8-15.2) E ' = aE' I TOT
Equation (8-15.1) specifies the (Armington) investment derived demand for non­
energy goods and services, where XA1 represents demand, and J  are the Leontief fixed 
input coefficients. Equation (8-15.2) determines demand for the energy bundle, E1, where 
aEI is the input coefficient for aggregate energy demand in investment.
Table 8-16 lists the equations describing the disaggregation of the energy bundle into 
the fuel composites. 273
273 In the reference scenario, government saving is held fixed at its base year level which implies that as a 
share of GDP, government saving (or the deficit), declines over time.
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(8-16.1) Y AI — n '  ^ kh Pk 
PA.,
Equation (8-16.1) decomposes the energy bundle into the fuel components. The CES 
share parameters are given by ae'. and the substitution elasticity is cf'. The energy 
efficiency factor enters at this level of the energy nest.
The aggregate volume of stock building, f TOCKt ¡s exogenous in each period, and 
normally set to zero in some future year. Final demand for stock building is determined 
via a fixed coefficient function, including demand for the fuel composites, i.e. the 
substitution elasticity for splitting the energy bundle into fuel composites is equal to zero. 
Table 8-17 lists the equations of intermediate demand derived from stock building.
Table 8-17: Demand for Intermediate Goods and Services, and Fuels, 
Derived from Stock Building
(8-17.1) V  ASTO C K  A n f
S T ( X 'K  j S T I X 'K  
= «„/ 1
(8-17.2) A S T O C K
_ S T O C K
_  a e  j S T ( X 'K  
R E S T O C K  1
Equation (8-17.1) determines (Armington) demand for non-energy goods and 
services, x4STOCK, derived from stock building, and Equation (8-17.2) defines derived 
demand for the fuel composites.
8.3.9 Investment and Stock Building Prices
In this section prices in investment and stock building are determined going from the 
bottom up. Table 8-18 describes the prices in the demand for investment goods.
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I
(8-18.2) P' =Y*a*fPAnf+aE‘ PEI
nf
(8-18.3) pSiO C K Z  S T ( X  K  o  A , V  —S T O C K  a n f  P A nf 
n f  e
PA<
j f s n x  K
Equation (8-18.1) in Table 8-18 defines the CES dual price, PEI, for the energy 
bundle. Equation (8-18.2) determines the aggregate price index of investment. Finally, 
Equation (8-18.3) defines the aggregate price of stock building, p ST(XK. it is the weighted 
sum of the intermediate input prices, with A being the energy efficiency factor in 
the stock building sector.
8.3.10 Government Expenditures
This section determines government expenditures on purchases of goods and services, 
as well as on labour and capital. Contrary to the other final demand sectors, government 
is assumed to demand factor services.274 The top level government expenditure function 
is a CES function in capital, labour, and aggregate intermediate inputs. Final demand by 
the government is assumed to derive from the minimisation of the following cost 
function:
min PCtCt + RgK* + IV* LA‘ 
subject to the production function:
774 Note, however, that due to lack of data in the current data-set on labour and capital use in the 
government sector, government expenditures are only on goods and services. This simply means that, 
during the calibration of the model, the labour and capital shares of total expenditure are set to zero.
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Equations in Table 8-19 provide the derived reduced form first order conditions for 
government demand for the three components of the CES expenditure function.
Table 8-19: Government Demand for Goods, Services, Labour, and Capital
Equation (8-19.1) determines aggregate intermediate demand for goods and services 
by the government, Cg. Xr°'a represents the volume of government expenditure, P° is the 
aggregate price o f government purchases , Pig is the aggregate purchase price of goods
substitution elasticity. Equation (8-19.2) determines government demand for capital, K f,  
where Rg is the rental rate on government capital. Equation (8-19.3) determines 
government's aggregate demand for labour, Lg .
The next level of demand disaggregates the Cg bundle into sectoral demand for non­
energy goods, and the energy bundle. The energy bundle is further decomposed into 
demand for the fuel components.
(8-19.1)
(8-19.2)
(8-19.3) La‘ = aGLX To*i
and services, aac is the CES share parameter for goods and services, and ( f  is the CES
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Table 8-20: Government Demand for Goods, Services, Energy, and Fuels
(8-20.1) X*}’ = a,*”i Cg
(8-20.2) Eg = aOE Cg
Equation (8-20.1) determines (Armington) demand for non-energy goods and 
services, XAG, using the fixed coefficients a ,Cnf. Equation (8-20.2) determines demand for 
the energy bundle, Eg. Equation (8-20.3) determines the demand for the fuel components, 
by disaggregating the CES energy bundle.275
8.3.11 Government Prices
This section determines prices in government demand. As in all other economic 
sectors, it starts at the bottom with basic prices.
2,5 Aggregate government labour demand should still be disaggregated by skill type. This is easily 
derived with a CES conditional demand but it is not shown here since not used in the current model.
o‘
(8-20.3)
Table 8-21: Prices in Government Consumption
(8-21. 1)
(8-21.2) PCg = X  a,xw PAnf + a(iE PEG
Ci-o"' \ - p t
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Equation (8-21.1) in Table 8-21 determines the price of the energy bundle. . The 
aggregate price of expenditures on goods and services, PCg. is given by Equation (8- 
21.2). The CES dual price of output, Pc, is given by Equation (8-21.3).
8.3.12 Trade Equations
Import Structure
The structure of import demand of EMMA and the Environment and Trade model are 
quite similar. Given the difference in the final demand specification the equation 
specifying the aggregate Armington demand across all agents is slightly different.
Figure 8-1 : Structure of Import Demand
Apart from this difference the first level of the Armington nesting is exactly the same 
as the previous one. At the final level, agents minimise the cost of the aggregate import 
bundle, subject to an aggregation function over imports originating in each region of the 
model, namely the Mediterranean region and the Rest of the World.
Table 8-22 specifies the equation determining aggregate Armington demand, XA, i.e. 
the sum of Armington demand across all agents.
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(8-22.1) XA, = £  X *  + X,M + X,A<; + X*' + XlASTtXK
J
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The Armington price, PA, is determined in the exact same way of the Environment 
and Trade model.
In EMMA the next stage in the Armington decomposition is slightly different and the 
relevant equations are described below in Table 8-23.
Equation (8-23.1) determines the world trade flow matrix (in volume) for each 
commodity, A f . Reading along a row, it specifies import demand for commodity i in 
region r, originating in region r  ’. Summing down column r ' determines aggregate export 
demand for region r ’. The relevant import price, is the export price of the exporting 
region, augmented by a trading partner-specific import tariff. Equation (8-23.2) 
determines the aggregate import price of commodity /, which will be an average of the 
export prices o f all the region’s trading partners, tariff inclusive. Equation (8-23.3) fixes 
the price for a commodity imported from the Rest Of the World region (small country 
assumption).
Table 8-23: World Trade and Import Prices
(8-23.1) M\y = * ¡ ' » 4  J
(8-23.2) p M  _r i j r £  <!>;•'[ p £ ; ' ( i + r ; r )]<''
(8-23.3) p g r R O W a _  p g r . ”R O W "
Export Structure
In EMMA export supply is specified as in the previous model. The top level of the 
CET decomposition is therefore equal in the two models.
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The final trade equations are instead peculiar to EMMA and they determine the 
second nest of the CET decomposition of exports. The regional disaggregation of exports 
is given in Equation (8-24.1), in which, clearly, the same symbol X f r as before has been 
used with the indices transposed, d  ' represents exports subsidies. Analogously equations 
(8-24.2) determines aggregate export price PE inclusive of export subsidies.
Table 8-24: Export Market Equilibrium
(8-24.1)
p e , " ( i 
PE
(8-24.2) P‘ = X © ; ,[ ^ ; r( i+ < v )]
i<unr>
8.3.13 Walras law and numeraire
In the EMMA model, Walras’ law has been defined to be the equality of the trade 
balance to the (negative) of foreign saving. Equation (8-25.1) defines Walras' law.
Table 8-25: Trade Closure
(8-25.1 ) £  £  PE' ' M ' 7 + pSAlF Sf  * X  E  PE' r  M 'y
On one side of the balance sheet are exports, evaluated at world prices, and net 
foreign saving. On the other side of the balance sheet are the sum of imports evaluated at 
world prices (excluding tariffs). Due to Walras' law, one equation in each region is 
redundant, and Equation (8-25.1) is dropped from the model.
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\Any price in the model can be chosen as the numéraire. In the current version of the 
model, the foreign saving price index. PS/llF, has been designated as the numéraire, and 
its value is always set to 1.
8.3.14 Aggregate Capital Stock and Productivity Growth
In this section are described the equations concerning the pre-determined exogenous 
variables, the energy efficiency factors, and the labour transition. The equations for the 
aggregate supply of capital, and for its productivity factor have been described in chapter 
6.
Table 8-26: Other Pre-Determined Exogenous Variables
(8-26.1) Pop, =(\+y^)" Pop,.n
(8-26.2) X ™  =(\ + Yy, y X ™
(8-26.3) G ™ = ( l  + y ')"G ™
In Table 8-26, Pop, is the population at time t. X r°,G is the level of total real 
government non-transfer expenditures (including goods, services, labour, and capital). 
Gm4 is the real level o f transfers from government to households. Both XTolG and GTRA 
are assumed to grow at the same rate as the economy.
The energy efficiency factors are also exogenous and pre-determined leading to the 
following set of transition equations:
Table 8-27: Energy Efficiency Factors
(8-27.1) * & -(■
(8-27.2) = o  + rr)"A fi.
(8-27.3) t f - o + r ? * ) " # .
(8-27.4) /If = 0 +  Y  ' / ) "  ¿ f - n
(8-27.5)
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The annual autonomous energy efficiency factors are given by f p, f  c, /■*, /  and 
/  " representing respectively the growth in energy efficiency in production, household 
consumption, government demand, investment demand, and stock-building demand. The 
energy efficiency factors in production are specific to both sector and vintage. The 
cumulative factors are given by the A variables.
The transition equations in Table 8-28 determine the changes in the labour supply 
curve and labour efficiency. Equation ( 16.6.1 ) simply shifts the labour supply curve out. 
The shift factor is the same as the population growth rate, but it could easily be made to 
differ. Equation (16.6.2) determines the labour efficiency factor. The growth in labour 
efficiency is exogenous and can be both sector and labour-type specific.
Table 8-28: Labour Transition Equations
(8-28.1) L% ={\ + y ? y
(8-28.2) MhJ = (\+ r:yA !hJ.n
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9 Conclusion
This thesis should be viewed essentially as a collection of three academic papers. 
These correspond to chapters 3, 5, and 7. Given that each paper has its own set of 
conclusions, in this final chapter, rather than reiterate the main results, I go back to the 
initial questions that motivated my work and see what are the main contributions and 
integrating features and what may be the possible future extensions.
In a somewhat schematic fashion I identify twelve main points that make some 
original contribution to the economic literature. The sequence in which I briefly present 
them here simply follow the order of exposition in the thesis: there is no intention of 
listing them in order of importance.
Firstly, I provide a new valuable database for the Mediterranean region. This takes 
the form of a detailed, up to date and consistent two-country SAM for France and 
Morocco. I restricted the database to these two countries given that their economic 
relationships represents the broader links between the north and south of the 
Mediterranean quite well. I can proudly say that the value of this database is apparent 
from its inclusion in the GTAP public database of SAMs for computable general 
equilibrium analysis.
Secondly, based on this SAM I construct a fixed-price multiplier model initially, 
merely with a descriptive purpose in mind. In this way I offer some new empirical 
evidence relevant to the literature on the economic relationship between the north and 
south shore of the Mediterranean. I also undertake a comparison of the Mediterranean 
situation with that o f NAFTA and identify similar patterns of dependence and 
specialisation in the less developed partners of these two groups. The simple and 
transparent analytical structure of the multiplier model highlights the main structural 
features of the economies under study, emphasising the major linkages between supply 
and demand, trade and production, factors and income distribution. I argue that building 
this type of model is relatively easy and the sort of results they offer may be very helpful 
in the construction of more complex CGE models. I have in mind, for instance, how 
much sectoral detail should be included in a CGE model, how many and which type of 
households and factors, or which important linkages deserve special modelling attention.
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Thirdly, although CGE models are a natural evolution of earlier input-output and 
multipliers models, the two communities of researchers working with these two analytical 
tools have, with few exceptions, remained quite detached. They tend to use slightly 
different jargon, analyse distinct issues and publish results in specialised journals. By 
jointly presenting both types of models, this thesis attempts to fill a gap in the economic 
literature that neglects the close connections between these two modelling families.
The fourth feature of originality is in the formulation of a particular kind of 
sensitivity analysis. Instead of the usual elasticity sensitivity analysis that focuses on the 
curvature of demand and supply functions, I undertake a share sensitivity analysis by 
concentrating on the functions’ intercept values. By measuring the variations in the size 
of the multipliers, 1 assess the sensitivity of the results to different ways of accounting for 
imports and conclude that results generated from data-intensive SAM formats, such as 
those with full distinct domestic and imported intermediates tables, do not differ 
appreciably from more statistically parsimonious formats. This proves to be quite 
important given that import functions in a CGE model are usually calibrated from the 
second type of formats.
The complete description of the Moroccan SAM assembly provides some guidelines 
in the process of database construction and is the fifth point of originality in this thesis. 
One of the most common obstacle researchers have to face is making sense of conflicting 
estimates from disparate government and other agency sources and by supplying 
accessible sources and methods for this and other difficulties I fill another gap in the 
applied economics literature.
A detailed quantitative assessment of the interdependencies between trade and 
environmental policies in Morocco is an additional novelty. I answer directly the initial 
questions of how trade liberalisation may affect the environment and which are the 
consequences on international competitiveness of implementing a stiicter environmental 
protection policy. I do so by constructing and using a CGE model.
Three further points of originality can be emphasised. I use a CGE model with a very 
high level of detail. The model explicitly includes dynamic features. Emissions are 
generated through consumption rather than being linked to output levels. Therefore
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beyond the concrete application to Morocco, these characteristics make the trade and 
environment analysis different from earlier studies concerned with similar issues.
The tenth point is the application of a new multi-country model to the Mediterranean 
region. I have already signalled the geographic bias of applied general equilibrium 
analysis towards the North-American regional group in the literature to date. My applied 
study contributes a balance to this situation.
Apart from this geographic focus, the novelty of this analysis is also ascribable to the 
intrinsic characteristics of the model. It distinguishes, for both o f the two countries 
expressly modelled, trade flows from and to different regions thereby permitting a study 
of different regional integration policies. Labour markets can be modelled in two limiting 
cases, making clear the possible sensitivity of the results to factor market adjustments. 
Experiments with different closure rules and trade elasticities are fully documented at the 
aggregate and detailed sectoral level.
The twelfth and final point is concerned with the particular use of the dynamic 
version of the multi-country model. By tackling directly the issue o f  the sequencing of 
tariff reduction across sectors within a dynamic applied general equilibrium analysis, I 
extend a literature largely devoted to either the theory of second-best and static piecemeal 
reform or to establishing whether to open first the current or the capital account. I devise 
a summary elasticity measure linking adjustment costs (approximated by labour 
displacements) to GDP growth rates and use it to show the possible trade-offs between 
growth with the adjustment costs of conservative liberalisation versus big-bang-like 
sequences.
A few suggestions for future research close the thesis. As far as the first paper is 
concerned, I would consider extending the share sensitivity analysis to a CGE context 
and maybe look at other intercepts, not only those of import functions.
I also realise the need for future research in two main directions for the trade and 
environment model. A clearer focus on issues of income inequality: the relation between 
poverty and environment degradation is a central question in the literature and a CGE 
approach might be fruitful. Additional investigation could also attempt to integrate two 
separate themes in environmental modelling, that of resource management (for example
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mining in the case of Morocco) and emission abatement. Both these themes have linkages 
with trade and growth in developing countries.
Finally, a crucial issue is only hinted at in the third paper and deserves more attention. 
In a world of increasingly mobile capital, characteristics of and interactions between 
labour markets will determine how countries will or will not take advantage of more 
liberal trade. A deeper understanding of the interactions between capital flows, labour 
adjustment and trade defines a challenging and important agenda for future research.
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